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Abstract 
This thesis analyzes the implementation and performance characterization of sym-
metric key block ciphers. In particular, we study block ciphers which consist of 
Substitution-boxes (S-boxes) and Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) mappings. 
New mechanisms are proposed to evaluate the performance of block ciphers in terms 
of complexity and security for both hardware and software implementations. Con-
figured with parameterized components, many cipher cases are derived from two 
cipher structures, a nested Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN) and a class of 
Feistel networks. In our study of each case, the hardware complexity and speed are 
evaluated by considering a gate network consisting of one- or two-input logic gates, 
which is suitable for an Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) realization. 
The software complexity (in terms of both speed and memory requirements) is eval-
uated through table lookup implementations, which is a classical approach used for 
fast software implementations. The results of the complexity evaluation are verified 
with implementations using 0.18 p,m and 0.35 p,m CMOS technologies for hardware 
and C/C++ compilers for software. Cipher security, in the form of resistance to 
differential and linear attacks, is used to normalize the performance in the analy-
sis. Because the discussed structures are similar to many existing ciphers such as 
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Camellia, this mechanism enables us 
i 
to study the efficiency of existing and new ciphers through a wide comparison of 
security, performance, and implementation methods. 
In addition to differential and linear cryptanalysis, we also examine integral, eX-
tended Sparse Linearization (XSL), and power attacks that may be applied to block 
ciphers. The XSL attack is discussed with respect to its effectiveness on the various 
studied cipher structures. Finally, a simple power analysis attack is implemented 
on Camellia's key schedule in the circumstance where the processor leaks Hamming 
weight information and the influence of the attack on the design of key schedules is 
explored. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
With the rapid development of computer and communication networks, the exchange 
of information is becoming more and more important for newly emerging applications 
such as electronic commerce and online database inquiry. For these applications, 
privacy of customer information must be protected. Since most public networks are 
open to malicious attackers, network security arises as a promising and significant 
research subject, especially as the Internet and wireless communication become a 
considerable part of human life. 
Encryption technology is the core part of network security. The security and effi-
ciency of encryption algorithms influence the performance of protected data services 
directly. Various space-consuming applications (e.g., teleconferencing and video on 
demand) are being implemented in broadband data networks, occupying much more 
bandwidth than traditional tasks. Currently, significant effort is being devoted to 
the throughput increase of network equipment such as routers and switches. As a vi-
tal part of secure communications, the encryption technology must now meet higher 
speed requirements. 
Since the Data Encryption Standard (DES) [1] was proposed, block ciphers have 
1 
been playing a very important role in data encryption services because of their ad-
vantages: 
• Fast speeds in both software and hardware 
• Short lengths of cipher keys 
• Well studied cipher components and structures 
When a block cipher is used for secure communication, the key used for the cipher 
is shared secretly by the sender and the receiver. The key is often exchanged using 
public key cryptography as suggested in IEEE Standard 1363 [2). 
1.1 Motivation 
In 1977, the U.S. National Bureau of Standards published DES as a recommended 
algorithm for symmetric key block encryption. Until recently, DES had dominated 
in many security services. However, the current hardware technology and distributed 
computing make brute-force exhaustive key search attacks faster and cheaper. As 
a result, the security of DES is increasingly inadequate. For example, given a pair 
of plaintext and ciphertext, the key used for DES encryption could be found by 
exhaustive search using dedicated cracking hardware within 56 hours in 1998 [3) or 
distributed computation through the Internet within 22 hours in 1999 [4). With a 
56-bit key, DES is not secure enough due to its small number of possible keys (i.e., 
256). 
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) has been developed by the U.S. Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), as a symmetric key block 
cipher solution to efficiently provide enough security through the use of a larger key. 
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In January 1997, NIST called for algorithms as possible candidates as symmetric key 
block ciphers. The candidates needed to support at least a block size of 128 bits 
and key sizes of 128, 192, and 256 bits. Fifteen candidates were publicly tested and 
evaluated. Rijndael [5] was finally selected as the AES in October 2000. 
As a 3-year project, the New European Schemes for Signature, Integrity, and 
Encryption (NESSIE) initiative also launched open calls for algorithms in the field 
of symmetric key block ciphers in 2000. Like the AES project, NESSIE's main 
objective is to offer cryptographic primitives with a higher security and efficiency 
level than the existing primitives. The cipher Camellia [6] was included together 
with AES into the NESSIE portfolio of 128-bit block ciphers in February 2003 [7]. 
Both the AES and NESSIE projects generated a great amount of activity in the 
study of symmetric key block ciphers including algorithm designs, software imple-
mentations, hardware implementations, and security evaluations. 
Despite the need for efficient cipher designs, there has been no effort to develop 
a general model for simultaneous evaluation of hardware performance and security. 
It is not unusual that before a block cipher design is finalized, most analysis work is 
focused on security and software speed. Hardware suitability is often overlooked at 
this phase since it takes much time and energy to investigate the implementation of 
a cipher in an Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC). Typically, only when 
a block cipher is well established do researchers undertake hardware analysis. For 
example, as one candidate for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), the cipher 
RC6 [8] had attracted much academic interest before its hardware performance was 
well studied and recognized to be poorer than other algorithms. As a result, many 
block ciphers are inherently software-oriented and their hardware implementations 
3 
are neither fast nor compact1. 
One of the main objectives of this work is to investigate block ciphers suitable for 
hardware implementation and seek methods to implement efficient and secure block 
ciphers in hardware. We begin with the study of the design, implementation, and 
hardware complexity of basic cipher components. Then, a mechanism is presented 
to analyze different configurations of block cipher structures. The analysis integrates 
the hardware complexity, efficiency, and security evaluation into several performance 
measures. This mechanism will be utilized to discover the best secure cryptographic 
configurations that are hardware-oriented. Our hardware implementation will be 
concentrated on Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) design in order to 
facilitate superior performance over other targeted hardware environments such as 
Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) 2 . 
Following the hardware analysis, similar performance characterization can also 
be applied to software implementations. As a fast development technique across 
platforms, the table lookup approach has been selected to implement block ciphers, 
for example in [5, 9, 10]. Thus, a software performance metric is defined to integrate 
the security provided by cipher structures and the efficiency evaluated from corre-
sponding table lookup implementations. The performance measured by this metric 
helps us to study the software efficiency and security of cipher structures on the same 
basis. 
In addition to performance characterization, this thesis considers other facets of 
1 DES is a notable exception and many operations used by DES are more oriented to hardware, 
e.g., bit permutations and small S-boxes. 
2With increasing gate densities and speeds, FPGAs are also used in many cryptographic ap-
plications. Due to a large variety of architectures, however, it is difficult to perform a meaningful 
hardware characterization for general FPGA implementations. 
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block cipher study which may influence the security of cipher structures or implemen-
tation. Specifically, we examine the two recently introduced cryptanalysis techniques 
of eXtended Sparse Linearization (XSL) and simple power attacks. 
We believe that this work enhances the association between engineering and cryp-
tography, and makes a significant contribution to the implementation and perfor-
mance analysis of potential cryptographic structures. 
1.2 Thesis Outline 
Chapter 2 provides the cryptography background which is relevant to this thesis. A 
short but self-contained introduction is given on Shannon's product cipher, cipher 
components, structures, and examples. Differential and linear cryptanalysis are de-
veloped as the most fundamental tools for security consideration. Another attack, 
integral cryptanalysis, is illustrated using AES as the targeted cipher. The cipher 
implementation techniques are also briefly introduced. 
Chapter 3 discusses the design and hardware implementation analysis of basic 
cipher components including MDS mappings and invertible S-boxes. The proposed 
S-box model and MDS implementation methods are used for two efficient AES hard-
ware designs. 
Chapter 4 proposes many SPN and Feistel cipher cases with different configura-
tions of parameterized S-boxes and MDS mappings. Several metrics are defined to 
integrate hardware complexity and security evaluations. The hardware performance 
characterization is then undertaken on the basis of these metrics. 
Chapter 5 compares the software performance of cipher cases proposed in Chap-
ter 4. The table lookup implementation is used for performance evaluation, while 
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other implementation methods are briefly discussed and compared. 
Chapter 6 investigates the effectiveness of an XSL attack [11], which was proposed 
in 2002 but has not yet been proved to be practical. In this chapter, a straightforward 
method is presented to evaluate the susceptibility of a block cipher to this potential 
attack. 
Chapter 7 investigates the simple power analysis applied to a block cipher key 
schedule. Specifically, we apply the attack to the key schedule of Camellia. It is 
shown that such an attack works well even with measurement errors when the pro-
cessor running Camellia leaks the Hamming weight of intermediate data. A general 
susceptibility evaluation and possible countermeasures are also suggested. 
Chapter 8 draws conclusions and identifies future research directions. 
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Chapter 2 
Background of Cryptography 
This chapter introduces the basic design concepts, typical examples, and security of 
block ciphers, which are relevant to the contents later in this thesis. To consider the 
security of a block cipher, three fundamental attacks on block ciphers are illustrated 
briefly. More details can be obtained from appropriate literature, such as [9, 12, 13, 
14] which contain a complete expose of cryptography. 
2.1 Encryption and Cryptosystems 
Encryption is the mapping from the original message, called the plaintext, to a ran-
dom looking message, called the ciphertext. During the mapping, a specific data set, 
called the key, determines the relation between them. The key should be randomly-
selected information that is hard to deduce. As the inverse of encryption, decryption 
restores the plaintext from the ciphertext with knowledge of the key. The keys 
used for encryption and decryption may be different. Without the knowledge of the 
decryption key, decryption should be infeasible. 
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v, Insecure v, Message 
---
Encryption :n. Decryption ~ Message 
algorithm 
channel algorithm 
t t 
Encryption Decryption 
keyKe keyKa 
Figure 2.1: General Model of Cryptosystem 
In a cryptosystem, encrypted information is transferred through an insecure chan-
nel as shown in Figure 2.1. In symmetric key ciphers, such as DES [1] , the encryption 
key Ke and the decryption key Kd are the same and should be kept secret; while 
in asymmetric key ciphers, such as RSA [15], one of the two keys is made publicly 
available and the other key cannot be derived from this public key through feasible 
computation. 
Both symmetric and asymmetric key cryptography are widely used in data net-
works. Since one's public key can be used by others for encryption and authenti-
cation, asymmetric key cryptography (thus also called public key cryptography) is 
more suitable for network security applications such as key distribution and digital 
signatures. Although the cipher key needs to be securely distributed, symmetric key 
cryptography has two significant advantages: 
• High Encryption Speed: The speed of a symmetric key cipher is much faster 
than an asymmetric key cipher. According to RSA Laboratories [16], DES is 
generally at least 100 times as fast in software and between 1,000 and 10,000 
times as fast in hardware as RSA, depending on the implementation. 
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• Short Key Length: A symmetric key cipher can obtain enough security with 
a much shorter key. Based on current technology, a key of 128 bits is secure 
enough for recently proposed symmetric key ciphers. However, RSA requires 
a key size of at least 1,024 bits for current applications, which is not desirable 
for some bandwidth or memory restricted environments such as a smart card 
system. 
The low performance of asymmetric key cryptography is due to the large arithmetic 
operations involved. For example, the RSA and Diffie-Hellman [17] algorithms calcu-
late exponentials modulo a large prime and elliptic curve cryptography [18] multiplies 
two variables in large finite fields. These operations are inefficient in both software 
and hardware compared with the small components used in symmetric key ciphers. 
As a result, symmetric key cryptography is widely used in security applications which 
require high throughputs and/or small memory. Its most obvious application is con-
fidentiality, which has a message encrypted so that the message can only be known 
by the sender and receiver. 
2.2 Block Ciphers 
According to the size of plaintext and ciphertext units, a symmetric key encryption 
algorithm can also be classified as a block cipher or a stream cipher. A block cipher 
encrypts the plaintext of a fixed bit length to the corresponding ciphertext of the 
same length. A block cipher with ann-bit block length is also called ann-bit block 
cipher. The cipher key is another block of bits with its own length. For security 
considerations, recently proposed block ciphers typically have a block size of 128 bits 
and a key size of 128 bits or more. 
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A stream cipher encrypts the plaintext in small units, usually bit by bit. The 
plaintext is combined with a bit sequence, called the keystream, to generate the 
ciphertext typically by bit-wise eXclusive-OR (XOR) operations. Stream ciphers 
can be designed to be very fast. Alternatively, a block cipher can be used as a 
stream cipher by selecting feedback modes (e.g., the Cipher Feedback and Output 
Feedback modes [14]), where the block cipher works as a keystream generator. 
2.2.1 Product Ciphers 
As introduced by C.E. Shannon in [19), the security of a block cipher can be generated 
by combining individual cipher steps appropriately into their "product". A product 
cipher usually iterates similar cipher operations for a certain number of rounds. The 
cipher key is expanded to a number of subkeys by a key schedule and the subkeys are 
mixed with data blocks in different rounds typically using bit-wise XOR operations. 
In a product cipher, diffusion and confusion are two fundamental methods to 
frustrate statistical and mathematical attacks. The method of diffusion involves 
the dissipation of the redundancy that may be exploited by attackers into statistics 
across the entire block so that it is difficult for a meaningful recognition of patterns. 
The method of confusion is to complicate the mathematical relation between the 
ciphertext, plaintext, and key information so that the key is hard to derive even if 
plenty of ciphertexts are analyzed. The Substitution-Permutation Network (SPNjl 
and the Feistel network are two typical architectures used to achieve this [12). Each 
cipher architecture is a well organized configuration of cipher components, which are 
simple cipher operations. 
1 For historical reasons, these ciphers are referred to as Substitution-Permutation Networks al-
though the permutation layer is now typically replaced by an invertible linear transformation layer 
to improve resistance to differential and linear cryptanalysis [20]. 
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2.2.2 Cipher Components 
An m x n cipher component performs a simple mapping from an m-bit input to 
an n-bit output. A component is either linear or nonlinear. The most important 
nonlinear component is the Substitution-box (8-box). A typical linear component is a 
linear transformation involving the XOR of a subset of input bits to produce output 
bits. 
Linear Transformations 
A linear transformation enhances diffusion of a cipher. In a linear transformation 
from m-bit input X= (xm-b · · ·, x 0 ) ton-bit output Y = (Yn- 1 , · · ·, y0 ), each output 
bit Yi can be expressed as an affine function of the input: 
(2.1) 
where "EB" denotes an XOR operation and ai,m-1 , · · ·, ai,o, bi are binary constants. 
As a result, the linear transformation can be expressed as 
Y=AXEBB (2.2) 
where X andY are m-tuple and n-tuple representations of X andY, respectively, A 
is an m x n binary matrix, and B is a binary m-tuple. Corresponding to the location 
of Yi in Y, the i-th row of A consists of ai,m-b · · ·, ai,O and the i-th element of B is 
bi. 
The iterated structure of a purely linear transformation does not provide more 
security since the composition of multiple linear transformations is still linear. That 
11 
is, 
\ I 
' v \ I\ I 
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I I \ 
Y3 Y2 Y1 Yo 
Figure 2.2: A 4 x 4 Bit Permutation 
where A3 = A2A1 and 83 = A2B1 EBB2. However, the linear transformation is efficient 
and used to scramble the output bits of different S-boxes. By doing so, statistical 
relations among the plaintext, the ciphertext, and the key become complicated and 
difficult for attackers to analyze. 
A bit permutation is a very simple linear transformation and used in many ciphers 
such as DES. For a bit permutation expressed in form of (2.2), A has only one nonzero 
element in each row and B = 0. As illustrated in Figure 2.2, a bit permutation can 
be easily implemented by wiring input bits and output bits. 
Recently, some techniques in coding theory have been absorbed into the de-
sign of linear transformations, e.g., the usage of Reed-Solomon codes in the cipher 
SHARK [21]. Thus, the input and output of a linear transformation are often ex-
pressed as vectors of symbols in finite fields [22]. To measure the avalanche effect of 
a linear transformation, the branch number of a linear transformation is defined [23] 
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as: 
B = min{H(X) + H(Y)} 
X;l:O 
(2.3) 
where H(X) and H(Y) denote the number of nonzero symbols in X andY, respec-
tively. It is proved that a Maximum Distance Separable (MDS} [24) mapping has 
an optimal branch number B equal to m + 1, which is highly diffusive and effec-
tive in providing resistance to differential and linear attacks, as will be discussed in 
Section 2.3. 
S-boxes 
An S-box performs a nonlinear transformation in which the output bits cannot be 
expressed as affine functions. An S-box is invertible if a one-to-one mapping is 
performed. One important security measure of an S-box is nonlinearity, evaluated by 
the minimum Hamming distance from any linear combination of output bit functions 
to an affine function [20). Figure 2.3 and Table 2.1 show an example 4x4 S-box taken 
from the first row of the first DES S-box. This S-box is obviously invertible and its 
nonlinearity can be shown to be 2. The permutation shown in Figure 2.2 cannot be 
used as an S-box because its nonlinearity is 0. 
Table 2.1: Mapping Table of a 4x4 S-box (in hexadecimal) 
x 3x 2X1X0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B c D E F 
Y3Y2Y1Yo E 4 D 1 2 F B 8 3 A 6 c 5 9 0 7 
Since S-boxes are the most typical components to provide confusion, many criteria 
and construction methods have been developed (e.g., in [20, 25, 26, 27, 28]). Different 
S-boxes in a cipher can have different mappings or one mapping can be used for all 
S-boxes in a cipher. 
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Other Components 
S-box 
Y3 Y2 Y1 Yo 
Figure 2.3: A 4 x 4 8-box 
Many other components are also used in block ciphers. They include addition, data 
dependent rotation, multiplication modulo 232 , etc.. These components are not of 
direct relevance to structures considered in this thesis because they are not as widely 
studied and accepted as 8-boxes and linear transformations in cipher design. 
2.2.3 Cipher Structures 
In this section, we consider the two best known structures for block ciphers. 
Substitution Permutation Networks 
During encryption using an 8PN cipher, as Figure 2.4 illustrates, the input data of 
each round is typically mixed with subkey bits before entering the 8-boxes. Each 
8-box performs a nonlinear mapping on small sub-blocks thus creating confusion in 
the data. The outputs of 8-boxes are modified by a linear transformation whose 
purpose is to generate a diffusion of statistical effects in the data. The decryption 
is composed of the inverse linear transformations, the inverse 8-boxes, and the key 
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mixtures in reverse order to encryption. To maintain similar dataflow in encryption 
and decryption, SPN s typically omit the linear transformation in the last round of 
encryption. 
Plaintext 
Round 1 
Roood 2-R-2{ ••• ••• • •• ••• 
RoundR-1 
RoundR 
Ciphertext 
Figure 2.4: A Substitution-Permutation Network 
For any input X, a function f(X) is an involution if f(J(X)) =X [29]. If the 
S-box layer and the linear transformation in Figure 2.3 are involutions, both the 
encryption and decryption operations can be performed by the same SPN except for 
small changes in the key schedule in the case of XOR key mixing. We refer to such 
a cipher as an involution SPN, of which the ciphers Anubis [30] and Khazad [31] are 
examples. 
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Feistel Networks 
As the other typical architecture of block ciphers, the Feistel network has been widely 
used and studied. In each round i of a Feistel network as shown in Figure 2.5, the 
right half of the round input (denoted as Xi) goes through function F parameterized 
by sub key Ki. Also called the round function, F often consists of key mixture, S-
boxes, and a linear transformation. The output ofF, denoted as Yi, is XORed with 
the left half of the round input. The round output is the swapped result of Xi and 
plaintext 
iterated 
I I 
~ 
Figure 2.5: A Feistel Network 
One advantage of a Feistel cipher is that, even ifF is not invertible, the same 
cipher structure of Figure 2.5 can be used for both encryption and decryption with 
the appropriate modification to the key schedule. 
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2.2.4 Examples 
Recent initiatives in cryptography have focussed on the development of new block 
cipher standards. As the successor of DES, the SPN cipher Rijndael [5] was selected 
by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology as the Advanced En-
cryption Standard (AES) [32] in October 2000. As a Feistel network proposed in [6], 
Camellia was included together with AES into the NESSIE portfolio of 128-bit block 
ciphers in February 2003 [7]. Consequently, AES and Camellia are two important 
examples of ciphers that are expected to be widely used in cryptographic applications 
of the future. 
Data Encryption Standard 
Proposed in the 1970s, DES [1] is a Feistel cipher with a block size of 64 bits and 
a key size of 56 bits. DES conforms to the general Feistel structure illustrated in 
Figure 2.5 except for an initial permutation at the beginning and its inverse at the 
end of the cipher. After the plaintext passes through the initial permutation, the 
64-bit permuted result splits to two 32-bit halves and enters a Feistel network of 16 
rounds. In each round, the function F processes 32-bit Xi with subkey Ki of 48 
bits. Within the function F as Figure 2.6 shows, a bit permutation expands Xi to 
48 bits, which are then XORed with subkey Ki. The result after subkey mixture 
forms the inputs of 8 parallel 6 x 4 S-boxes (81 to 88). The outputs of S-boxes are 
concatenated and pass through another bit permutation to form Yi. 
The key schedule of DES consists of two 28-bit rotating registers and two bit 
permutations PC1 and PC2. The key passes through PC1 to form the initial con-
tents stored in the two registers. In each round, the two registers are rotated left 
independently for 1 or 2 bits. The rotated results are concatenated and pass through 
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X; (32 bits) 
32x48 Bit Expansion 
32x32 Bit Permutation 
Y; (32 bits) 
Figure 2.6: Function F of DES 
PC2 to get one sub key Ki. 
Advanced Encryption Standard 
AES [32] is a 128-bit SPN cipher using keys with sizes of 128, 196, and 256 bits. 
With larger block and key sizes, AES is believed to be much more secure than DES. 
The number of rounds R depends on the key size, e.g., R = 10 when the key size is 
128 bits. 
At the beginning of the cipher, the 128-bit plaintext is stored in a two-dimensional 
array of bytes called the State and denoted by { A.i,j}, 0 ~ i, j ~ 3 . There are four 
sequential steps in each round of the cipher. Each step takes data from the State as 
the input and stores the result in the State as the output. These four steps are [32]: 
• ByteSub: This is a layer of parallel 8 x 8 S-boxes. Each byte enters an S-
box independently. All AES S-boxes perform the same invertible mapping 
which consists of multiplicative inversion over GF(28 ) followed by an affine 
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transformation. 
• ShijtRow: This is a byte-wise cyclic shifting in each row of the State. The 
shift offset of each round is fixed but different from one row to another. The 
updated State { .A~,j} can be expressed as: 
• MixColumn: Each column performs an MDS mapping, which can be imple-
mented by matrix multiplication over GF(28): 
).~ . 
,J 02 03 01 01 .Ao · ,J 
).~ . 
,J 01 02 03 01 .A1 · ,J 
-
).~ . 
,J 01 01 02 03 .A2 · ,J 
).~ . 
,J 03 01 01 02 .A3 · ,J 
• AddRoundKey: In this operation, a 128-bit subkey is mixed with the State. 
Each column of the State is XORed with one 4-byte word of the subkey. 
It should be noted that AES still follows the general SPN structure illustrated in 
Figure 2.4. AES has an initial AddRoundKey before the first round. ShiftRow and 
MixColumn are linear and can be expressed together in the form of (2.2) where A is 
a 128 x 128 binary matrix and B = 0. Such a combined linear transformation has a 
branch number B of 5. MixColumn is replaced with another AddRoundKey in the last 
round. Therefore, AES can be described in the form of Figure 2.4 by considering the 
round structure as AddRoundK ey, ByteSub, and a linear transformation composed 
of ShiftRow and MixColumn. 
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The AE8 key schedule expands the cipher key into enough subkeys, which are 
sequentially stored in an array W[] of 4-byte words. The first Nk words of W[] are 
initialized as the cipher key, where Nk is the word length of the cipher key. Then, the 
next Nk words are derived from the current Nk known words using a sliding window 
approach. Many operations such as substitution, rotation, and constant padding are 
performed during the derivation. 
Camellia 
Camellia is a 128-bit Feistel-like cipher using keys with sizes of 128, 196, and 256 
bits. A general round structure, as shown in Figure 2.5, is iterated for 18 times when 
128 bit keys are used or 24 times when 192 or 256 bit keys are used. 
The round function F of Camellia is illustrated in Figure 2.7. First, the 64-
bit Xi is XORed with subkey Ki· The data mixed with the subkey then enters a 
layer of parallel 8 x 8 8-boxes. Camellia uses four invertible mappings for 8-boxes, 
denoted by St, 82 , 83 , and 84 . A linear transformation follows the 8-box layer, which 
is implemented by XORs as shown in the figure. Note that the branch number B of 
this linear transformation is 5 [6]. 
Two functions called F L and F L -l are inserted into the Feistel network every 
6 rounds. These two functions perform simple logic operations with two subkeys 
required and are linear when the subkeys are fixed. There are also two 128-bit key 
mixtures using XORs, located at the beginning and the end of the cipher, respec-
tively. The key schedule, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7, expands all 
subkeys using a structure similar to encryption. 
20 
xi (64 bits) 
Key mixture (XOR) +-Ki (64 bits) 
~--~--~--------~ 
8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Yi (64 bits) 
Figure 2.7: Function F of Camellia 
Other Block Ciphers 
In addition to DES, AES, and Camellia, many other block ciphers have been proposed 
with different cryptographic properties. 
Serpent [33] and RC6 [8] were two AES candidates but not selected in the last 
round of competition. As an SPN cipher of 32 rounds, Serpent uses 8 different 4 x 4 
mappings for S-boxes, while a certain mapping is used for all S-boxes in the same 
round. Serpent is fast in hardware and its structure is optimized for a bitslicing 
implementation [34] in software. RC6 is based on the cipher RC5 [35], which uses 
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data-dependent rotations and integer additions for encryption. RC6 also uses integer 
multiplications. 
The block ciphers SHARK [21] and Square [36] include many features adopted 
by AES. SHARK is a 64-bit SPN cipher with an MDS mapping based on a Reed-
Solomon code. Square is a 128-bit SPN cipher like AES. As one significant difference 
from AES, the linear transformation of Square does not have cyclic shifting for each 
row. Instead, the byte >..i,j in the State is changed to Aj,i· 
Hierocrypt [37], Anubis [30], Khazad [31], and MISTY [38] were all submitted to 
NESSIE for evaluation. Hierocrypt has a 2-level nested SPN structure which will be 
introduced in detail in Chapter 4. Anubis and Khazad are both involution ciphers 
which perform the same operations in encryption and decryption with only slight 
changes in the key schedule. Except for the involution feature, Anubis and Khazad 
are very similar to AES and SHARK, respectively. MISTY is a nested Feistel network 
with a block size of 64 bits. 
2.3 Cryptanalysis 
As the art of breaking ciphers, cryptanalysis is a valuable tool in finding the potential 
drawbacks in current ciphers and developing practical design principles. Differential 
cryptanalysis [39] and linear cryptanalysis [40] are two of the most powerful crypt-
analytic techniques applied to block ciphers. They first concentrated on DES-like 
cryptosystems and are now used as general tools for security evaluation. Integral 
cryptanalysis was first applied on the cipher Square and became well known for its 
application to AES as described in [5]. Implementation attacks exploit the statistics 
existing in power, timing, and other measurable physical factors. 
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2.3.1 Differential Cryptanalysis 
Differential cryptanalysis is a chosen-plaintext attack introduced by E. Biham and 
A. Shamir in CRYPT0'90 [39]. A chosen-plaintext attack needs access to the en-
cryption machinery so that attacks can get the ciphertext corresponding to a selected 
plaintext. 
For a system with block input and output, if two outputs Yt and Y2 correspond 
to two inputs xl and x2, respectively, then the input difference2 is: 
and the output difference is: 
where "EB" represents bit-wise XOR. Among all possible input pairs with a differ-
ence of L1X, only a subset of output pairs lead to the specified difference of L1Y. A 
mapping from an input difference L1X to an output difference L1Y is called a differ-
ential. The probability that a differential (L1X, L1Y) occurs is called the differential 
probability and denoted by Pv: 
Pv = prob{Yt EB Y2 = L1Y I xl EB x2 = L1X}. 
Differential cryptanalysis works with the notion that the key mixture applied to the 
input pair (i.e., XORing key K with inputs) does not affect the differential statistics. 
Assuming X~ and X~ represent two inputs to a system with a key mixture added at 
20ther differences are also defined, e.g., the difference calculated from modulo subtraction [41] 
but in the context of ciphers we shall examine, the given difference definition is the most useful. 
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the beginning so that 
we have 
L1X' = X~ EB X~ = (X1 EB K) EB (X2 EB K) = L1X . 
The attack begins with seeking the highly likely differential of a system. For 
example, in an SPN cipher of R rounds, an attacker hopes to find a differential from 
some plaintext difference to some output difference of the (R-1)-th round, which 
occurs with a significant Pv. With this differential, the attacker can decrypt the 
corresponding ciphertexts one round with all possible subkey candidates of the last 
round to determine possible inputs to the last round. By checking for which subkey 
candidate the output difference of the differential holds for the calculated outputs of 
the (R-1)-th round most frequently, the valid subkey candidate of the last round 
can be distinguished. 
Once the last subkey is distinguished, it is straightforward for the attacker to use 
the same technique to determine key bits from the (R -1)-th round, the (R- 2)-
th round, etc.. To thwart such an attack, cipher designers construct ciphers so 
that there are no large differential probabilities. To achieve this, no highly likely 
differential characteristics should exist in the cipher. A differential characteristic of 
1 rounds is a sequence denoted as (L1Zo, L1Z1 , · · ·, L1Zi, · · ·, L1Zy), where L1Z0 is the 
input difference of the first round, L1Zy is the output difference of the last round, 
and L1Zi is the output difference of the i-th round and also the input of the (i+1)-th 
round, 0 <i <"(. Denote Pd as the probability that such a differential characteristic 
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holds. In practice, the number of chosen plaintext pairs required by differential 
cryptanalysis, Nv, can be approximated by 
in order to attack "! + 1 rounds of the cipher [42]. The number of plaintexts required 
by the attack is used to indicate the workload since both the processing time and 
memory requirement can be deduced from this number. 
An S-box is active if it is involved in the differential characteristic in the attack. 
Considering all S-boxes, {Si}, in a cipher, their maximum differential probability Ps 
is defined [39] as: 
If a total of na active S-boxes exist in the differential characteristic used for the 
attack, then 
A linear transformation with a large branch number can ensure a large value of na, 
thus, making the upper bound of Pd even smaller. A small Pd is desirable because 
of its reciprocal relation to the workload given by the number of plaintexts N D· 
Based on the basic differential attacks, many more advanced attacking tech-
niques have been proposed and may lead to more significant results. The method 
to use differentials instead of characteristics for security evaluation has been pre-
sented in [41], which helps to understand the provable security of the cipher. High 
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order differential cryptanalysis can be applied to the block ciphers with low nonlin-
ear degrees [43]. 'fruncated differential cryptanalysis [44] uses differentials with only 
part of the ciphertext bits involved in the output differences. Impossible differential 
cryptanalysis [45] examines the non-existence of differences in order to distinguish 
the correct key guess. 
2.3.2 Linear Cryptanalysis 
Linear cryptanalysis, introduced by M. Matsui in EUROCRYPT'93 [40], is mainly 
applicable as a known-plaintext attack, which assumes that the attacker has access 
to enough existent plaintext-ciphertext pairs. Linear cryptanalysis exploits the linear 
relationship between plaintext bits and ciphertext bits, and can be used to statisti-
cally determine subkey bits in the last round. Subsequently, the other subkeys can 
be determined in the same way with less workload. 
The basic idea of this method is to find a linear approximation expression of 
the cipher algorithm. The method begins with a statistical linear path between 
the input and output bits of an S-box. Then, the path is spread to the entire 
cipher structure. By cancelling the common terms, a linear approximation expression 
without any intermediate bits will be obtained. For an n-bit cipher with input 
X = (xn-1, Xn-2, · · ·, xo), output Y = (Yn-1, Yn-2, ···,Yo) and an m-bit cipher key 
K = (km-b km_2 , • • ·, ko), the final effective linear expression [40] is of the form: 
x· IT\ x· ···IT\ x· IT\ y· IT\ y· .. ·IT\ y· = kz EB kz .. · EB kz (2.4) 
•1 = •2 = >a = 31 = 32 = Jb 1 2 c 
If the bit variables in (2.4) are selected randomly, then the probability that (2.4) 
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holds, denoted by PL, should be 1/2. However, since Y is obtained by encrypting X 
with fixed K, the values in these bit locations are not totally random. A cryptanalyst 
would hope that (2.4) holds with probability PL which is not equal to 1/2. The linear 
probability bias £, given by £ = IP- 1/21, indicates the effectiveness of the linear 
approximation. The larger the bias c is, the better linear attacking performs. Once 
a good linear expression is statistically found, we obtain the equivalent of one bit of 
information about K. 
Since the right side of (2.4) is fixed to be either 0 or 1, the attack can derive more 
key bits by statistically testing each key candidate. To attack an SPN cipher of R 
rounds, for example, an attacker hopes to find a linear expression consisting of bit 
variables of the plaintext and output of the ( R-1 )-th round. Then the corresponding 
ciphertexts are decrypted one round with all possible candidates of the last round 
subkey. By checking for which subkey candidate the linear expression holds true 
with a probability bias c significantly different than 1/2, the attacker can distinguish 
the valid subkey candidate from others. Once the last subkey is distinguished, it is 
straightforward to determine subkey bits of other rounds. 
In order to perform an accurate statistical test, substantial plaintext-ciphertext 
pairs need to be processed. We take the complexity of cryptanalysis to be indicated 
by the data amount required by the attack. It is shown by Matsui [40] that the 
number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs required by linear cryptanalysis, NL, can be 
approximated by 
To thwart these two attacks, cipher designers construct ciphers so that there is 
no large bias c different from 1/2 for the probability that a linear expression holds. 
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To achieve this, no highly likely linear characteristics should exist in the cipher. 
Since any linear approximation of a data block or vector can be regarded as its inner 
product with a masking bit vector over GF(2), a linear characteristic of 'Y rounds is 
a sequence of masking values denoted as (FZ0, rzb · · ·, rzi, · · ·, FZ7), where FZ0 
is the masking value for the first round input, r Z7 is that for the last round output, 
and rzi is that for the i-th round output and also the (i+1)-th round input. 
An S-box is active if it is involved in the linear characteristic in the attack. 
Considering all 8-boxes, {Si}, in a cipher, their maximum linear probability3 is 
defined [40] as: 
Qs 6 m~ max (2xprob{ X· FX = Si(X) · FY}- 1)2 
t FY#O,FX 
where "·" denotes a bit-wise inner product and r X and FY denote masking variables. 
A linear approximation is established by combining appropriate S-box linear ap-
proximation expressions into a linear characteristic with the following Piling-Up 
Lemma. 
Theorem 2.1 (Piling-Up Lemma [40]): Let ui , 1 ~ i ~ n, be independent random 
variables whose values are 0 with probability Pi or 1 with probability 1 -Pi. Then the 
probability that u1 E9 u2 · · · E9 Un = 0 is 
n 
1/2 + 2n-l II (Pi - 1/2) · 
i=l 
3 The terminology used here is the same as defined in [6, 38, 46] although it should be noted that 
it does not represent a true probability. 
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Hence, the bias of u 1 E9 u2 · · · E9 Un = 0 is 
where £i = IPi - 1/21. 
n 
£ = 2n-1 II £i 
i=l 
The Piling-Up Lemma is useful for approximating the overall linear probability. 
As a result, we can define a linear characteristic probability Pl with upper bound: 
where na is the number of activeS-boxes in the linear characteristic used for attack-
ing. Thus, it can be shown that the workload now is also expressed as 
A linear transformation with a large branch number is often used to diffuse S-box 
outputs and thus increase the value of na. As a result, the workload of the attack is 
enlarged. 
The maximum probability of a linear characteristic is the primitive way to eval-
nate the resistance of a block cipher to linear cryptanalysis. Sometimes, a linear 
attack can be improved because different linear characteristics with the same linear 
approximation as shown in (2.4) can be combined to form a linear hull [47] with 
a higher probability. To understand provable security against a linear attack, it is 
desirable to estimate the expected probability of a linear hull. A method to seek the 
upper bound of such a probability has been suggested for SPNs in [48]. The basic 
linear attack can also be modified to utilize multiple linear approximations [49] or 
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nonlinear approximations [50]. 
Similar to each other as examined in [51, 52], both differential cryptanalysis 
and linear cryptanalysis begin with statistical recognition of specific cipher struc-
tures. For each attack, the maximum probability of any characteristics is calculated 
straightforwardly and used widely for security evaluation of proposed ciphers. The 
best linear approximation or differential characteristic can be searched for using the 
method presented in [53]. Provable security, in terms of the maximum probability of 
differentials or linear hulls, is a more accurate measure, but is generally difficult to 
compute or intractable to determine the required probabilities. As a result, consid-
ering the provable security of block ciphers in the context of differential and linear 
cryptanalysis appears to be generally impractical. 
In this thesis, all 4 x 4 S-boxes are assumed to satisfy p8 , qs ::; 2-2 and all 8 x 8 
S-boxes are assumed to satisfy p8 ,q8 ::; 2-6 • Many proposed ciphers such as Ser-
pent [33], AES, Hierocrypt [37, 54], and Camellia have S-boxes satisfying these re-
quirements; others such as Anubis [30] and Khazad [31] have slightly higher Ps and 
qs. 
2.3.3 Integral Cryptanalysis 
Integral cryptanalysis [55] is a chosen-plaintext attack first proposed by the authors 
of the cipher Square [36]. This attack exploits the effect of balancing caused by 
invertible components used in the cipher. 
To attack AES using integral cryptanalysis as presented in [5], a special set of 
256 plaintexts can be selected such that each plaintext has one distinct value at 
one common byte location and has the same values at the other 15 byte locations. 
The byte location with all different values is called active. Figure 2.8 shows a set of 
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plaintexts with an active byte located at the right bottom of the State (denoted by 
"A" in the figure). It should be noted that AES substitution and key mixture does 
not change the status of the active byte in the State. ShiftRow shifts the active byte 
to the left bottom and MixColumn propagates the active status to all the 4 bytes in 
current column. 
A 
A 
A 
A A A 
Plaintext & after ByteSub after ShiftRow after MixColumn 
Figure 2.8: Active Status of the State in the AES First Round 
Figure 2.9 illustrates the status change occurring in the second round. ShiftRow 
shifts the bytes in the active column to each column of the State because of a different 
byte offset per row. After MixColumn, all the bytes are active. The State keeps the 
same active status until MixColumn of the third round. However, each byte after 
MixColumn in the third round is the XOR sum of the products of active bytes and 
constants. Such an XOR sum is not active but has a property called balancing. That 
is, the 256 values at this location corresponding to the 256 plaintexts can be XORed 
to get 0 as the result. Such a balancing property is compromised by ByteSub of the 
fourth round. 
For AES of 4 rounds, an attacker collects the ciphertexts associated with the 
above 256 plaintexts of the same set. Assuming a 32-bit partial key associated with 
one column of the State is known for the last subkey, 4 bytes at the beginning of the 
fourth round can be restored. By checking whether the balancing property exists 
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A A A A A A 
A A A A A A 
A A A A A A 
A A A A A A 
after ByteSub after ShiftRow after MixColumn 
Figure 2.9: Active Status of the State in the AES Second Round 
for all 256 restored values at the same byte locations, the valid 32-bit partial key 
candidate of the last round can be distinguished. This procedure can be repeated 
for other 32-bit partial subkeys associated with other columns of the State until all 
128 bits of the last subkey are deduced. 
The above attack against 4 rounds of AES can be extended up to 7 rounds 
by processing more sets of plaintexts and guessing more partial key candidates in 
different rounds [5]. Further, high order integral cryptanalysis and its application to 
block ciphers have been discussed in [55]. 
2.3.4 Implementation Attacks 
During a cipher implementation execution, some physical information may be leaked 
to the external environment. If the leakage information can be measured by the at-
tacker, an implementation attack (also called a side-channel attack) may be launched. 
These types of attacks are usually targeted to smart-card solutions because it is rel-
atively easy to model their relation between internal circuits and physical leakage. 
The attack based on power analysis was first introduced by P. Kocher et al. to 
deduce the key of DES from tamper-resistant devices [56]. To measure the power 
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reconfigured once produced. With a relatively longer development time, ASICs con-
tain far more gates and run much faster than FPGAs. When manufactured in a 
large volume, an ASIC has a very low product cost. Therefore, this type of circuit 
is desirable for widely-used applications with high performance requirement. 
Cryptographic hardware can be optimized for area requirement or throughput by 
choosing different design methods: 
• Round iterated design: A round structure of the cipher is implemented and 
used in an iterative fashion to produce the encrypted output. The additional 
logic is needed to switch the data for input, iteration, and output. Such a 
design has the smallest area requirement but produces the lowest throughput. 
• Pipelined design: A task is partitioned into several sequential stages, which 
have roughly equal delays. Registers are used to separate the adjacent stages 
and temporarily store the intermediate data and control signals, which enable 
each stage to work independently. A stage may contain one or several rounds 
of the cipher. Pipelining within one round is sometimes possible but limited 
due to large delay discrepancies of cipher components. 
• Loop unrolled design: Several sequential rounds are implemented as a single 
combinational logic. Since the redundancy between rounds can be further 
reduced by CAD tools, such a design is faster than an iterated design but 
requires more area. 
• Block parallel design: The design contains several independent encryption 
blocks. An 1/0 port controller assigns the input data to each block and assem-
bles the encrypted data for output. 
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It should be noted that, although producing high throughputs, the pipelined design 
and parallel design can only be used when non-feedback block cipher modes are 
used. They cannot be used for example to implement the Cipher Block Chaining or 
Cipher Feedback modes [14]. During logic synthesis, an optimization strategy can 
be specified to give area or delay a higher priority. 
Several implementation cases are listed, in which different implementation meth-
ods and technologies were used. 
DES 
DES has been implemented commercially by many hardware developers. As are-
cent case, Helion Technology claimed a hybrid DES design, which was an iterated 
structure of 2-round loop unrolling core [63]. The ASIC design in 0.18 Jlm CMOS 
technology has a throughput of 1.25 Gbits/s with less than 6,000 gates, while the 
FPGA design using a VirtexE-8 chip has a throughput of 526 Mbits/s with 855 LUTs 
(i.e., Lookup Tables). 
AES 
Many hardware implementations had been performed since the AES project was 
announced. Table 2.2 lists some typical published results. A round iterated design 
in an ASIC is significantly faster than that in an FPGA. However, when a chip with 
large area capacity is used, a fully pipelined AES implementation in FPGA can also 
run very fast. 
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Table 2.2: Several Published AES Hardware Implementations 
lmplementors Throughput Area Design Technology 
(Gbitsjs) Method 
B. Weeks et al. [64] 0.443 46mm:.~ iterated ASIC, 0.5 pm 
5.163 471 mm.: pipelined 
T. Ichikawa et al. [65] 1.95 612K gates iterated ASIC, 0.35 pm 
H. Kuo et al. [66] 1.82 3.96 mm:.~ iterated 
Helion Tech. [63] 2 27K gates iterated ASIC, 0.18 pm 
25 n.a. pipelined 
0.300 5.3K CLBs loop unrolling 
A. Elbirt et al. [67] (2-round) FPGA, Vertex 
1.938 llK CLBs pipelined XCV1000-
(5-round) BG560-4 
K. Gaj et al. [68] 0.332 2.9K CLBs iterated 
CLBs: Configurable Logic Blocks 
Camellia 
Three types of implementations were presented by Camellia's authors in [10]. Type 1 
used a fully loop unrolling design optimized for throughput and achieved a through-
put of 1.17 Gbits/s in 0.35 J.tm CMOS technology, about 40% slower than AES 
implemented using the same methodology. The area requirement of the Camellia 
implementation of this type is 272,819 gates, which is about 55% less than the AES 
counterpart. Optimized for logic area, the ASIC implementation of Type 2 used a 
round iterated structure and achieved a throughput of 220 Mbitsjs with a gate count 
of 11,350. Targeted on FPGA XC4000XL series, Type 3 was also a round iterated 
design and achieved a throughput of 122 Mbits/s with 874 CLBs. 
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2.4.2 Software Implementations 
During software development, many factors need to be considered, such as the pro-
cessor word size, the operating system, the software language, and the compiler. 
Many cryptographic operations include bit permutations and finite field mathemat-
ics, which are hard to be coded directly. In this case, a set of tables are usually 
generated in the memory to store the computation results based on different inputs 
as indices. As a result, these time-consuming operations can be realized as fast 
as memory access. Especially when the machine has a large word size (e.g., 32 or 
64 bits), several operations caused by the change at the same small sub-block can 
be combined into one table lookup. This table lookup method is used in the fast 
implementations of DES [9], AES [5], and Camellia [10]. 
Table 2.3: Software Implementations on Different Platforms 
(Selected from Tables 30 and 31 in [69]) 
II Ciphers II Pill, MS I PIV, Linux I Alpha, OSFl I Mac II 
DES 62/ 62 61/ 61 37/37 60/ 59 
AES 23/23 24/ 25 17/ 17 29/ 28 
Camellia 37/37 64/63 36/35 31/ 31 
Each entry: # cycles per byte for encryption/ decryption 
Table 2.3 lists the implementation results of the three ciphers of interest on dif-
ferent platforms measured by NESSIE [69]. The encryption and decryption times 
are indicated as the numbers of clock cycles per byte of output produced. 
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2.5 Summary 
This chapter reviewed the basic design concepts of block ciphers as well as their 
security and implementations. The security of a block cipher is usually evaluated 
with respect to cryptanalysis. Several types of cryptanalysis have been introduced 
with emphasis on differential and linear attacks, which are the most well-known and 
fundamental attacks applied to block ciphers. The technology used for cipher imple-
mentations was briefly described with results of typical published cases presented. 
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Chapter 3 
Hardware Design and Analysis of Block 
Cipher Components 
Both S-boxes and MDS mappings are widely used components in current block cipher 
design. An MDS mapping can be performed through multiplications and additions 
over a finite field. In finite field arithmetic [22] with base 2, additions are bit-wise 
XORs, and multiplications can be calculated as polynomial multiplications modulo 
an irreducible polynomial. The MDS mapping used in AES encryption is imple-
mented efficiently by several applications of "xtime" [5] (i.e., one-bit left shifting 
followed by addition with the irreducible polynomial). However, this method only 
suits the case that all entries in the generation matrix have both low Hamming 
weights and small magnitudes. 
As typically the only nonlinear components in a block cipher, S-boxes must be 
designed to promote high security. As a result, each bit of an S-box output is 
a complicated Boolean function of input bits with a high algebraic order, which 
makes it difficult to optimize or evaluate the complexity of S-boxes generally in 
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hardware1. We propose an efficient hardware model of invertible S-boxes through 
the logic minimization of a decoder-switch-encoder circuit. By use of this model, 
a good upper bound of the minimum hardware complexity can be deduced for the 
S-boxes used in SPNs and some Feistel networks (e.g., Camellia [6]). The model can 
be used as a technique for the construction of S-boxes in hardware so that the space 
and time complexities are low. 
In our work, we take the conventional approach that the space complexity of a 
hardware implementation is evaluated by the number of 2-input gates and bit-wise 
inverters; the time complexity is evaluated by the gate delay as measured by the 
number of traversed layers in the gate network. As a general complexity evaluation, 
these measures are not exactly proportional to the real area and delay in a synthesized 
VLSI design because logic synthesis involves technology-dependent optimization and 
maps a general design to different sets of cells based on targeted technologies. For 
example, a 2-input XOR gate is typically larger in area and delay than a 2-input 
AND gate in most technologies. As well, it is assumed that the overhead caused by 
routing after logic minimization can be ignored. Although routing affects the perfor-
mance in a place-and-routed implementation, it is difficult to estimate its complexity 
accurately before synthesis into the targeted technology. 
From previous FPGA and ASIC implementations of block ciphers, such as those 
listed in [70], it is well established that S-boxes normally contribute to most of a 
cipher's area requirement and delay. Although linear components such as MDS 
mappings are known to be much more efficient than 8-boxes, it is important for cipher 
designers to characterize hardware properties of both S-boxes and MDS mappings 
on the same basis as is done through the analysis in this chapter. 
1Some special cases with algebraic structure as in the AES S-box can be efficiently optimized. 
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The content of this chapter is also presented in [71]. 
3.1 Optimized MDS Mappings for Hardware 
3.1.1 MDS Mappings 
A linear code over Galois field GF(2n) is denoted as an (l, k, d)-code, where l is 
the symbol length of the encoded message, k is the symbol length of the original 
message, and d is the minimal symbol distance between any two encoded messages. 
An (l, k, d)-code is MDS if d = l-k+l. A (2k, k, k+l)-code with generation matrix 
g = [IIC], where C is a k x k matrix and I is an identity matrix, determines an MDS 
mapping from the input X to the output Y through matrix multiplication over a 
finite field as follows: 
fM : X t-t Y = C · X (3.1) 
where 
ck-1,k-1 
X= ' Y= ' C= 
Xo Yo Co,k-1 Co,o 
Each entry in X, Y, and Cis an element in GF(2n). 
For a linear transformation, the branch number was defined in (2.3) as the mini-
mum number of nonzero elements in the input and output when the input elements 
are not all zero. It is desirable that a linear transformation has a high branch number 
when it is used after a layer of S-boxes in a block cipher, in order for there to be low 
probabilities for differential and linear characteristics [39, 40]. A mapping based on 
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a (2k, k, k+l)-code has an optimal branch number of k+l. 
3.1.2 Bit-Parallel Multipliers 
An MDS mapping can be regarded as matrix multiplication in a finite field. Since 
the generation matrix is constant, each element in the encoded message is the XOR 
of several outputs of constant multipliers. As basic operators, bit-parallel multipliers 
given in a standard base [72, 73] are selected in this research. A constant multiplier 
can be written as a function from an element A to an element B over GF(2n) as 
follows: 
fe : A f-+ B = C · A (3.2) 
where C is the constant element in GF(2n). The expression in binary polynomial 
form is given as 
bn-1Xn-1 + · · · + bo = (cn-1Xn-1 + · · · + co)(an-1Xn-1 + · · · + ao) mod P(x) (3.3) 
where P(x) denotes the irreducible polynomial of degree n for the field. An n x n 
binary matrix :Fe is associated with this constant multiplier such that: 
bn-1 an-1 
bn-2 
=:Fe x 
an-2 (3.4) 
bo ao 
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where 
fn-1,n-1 fn-1,0 
:Fe= 
fo,n-1 fo,o 
and Ai E { 0, 1}, 0 ~ i, j ~ n -1. The entries in each column of :Fe are determined 
by 
fn-1,jXn- 1 + · · · + fo,j = xi(Cn-1Xn-1 +···+co) mod P(x). (3.5) 
Since :Fe is constant, it is trivial to implement a constant bit-parallel multiplier by 
bit-wise XOR operations. For example, considering a constant multiplier to perform 
B = 19H x A over GF(28) where "H" indicates hexadecimal format and P(x) = 
x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1, we get the binary product matrix :F19H and the corresponding 
Boolean expressions for all bit outputs as the following: 
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 b7 = a4 Ef)a3 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 b6 = a3 EB a2 
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 b5 = a7 EB a2 EB a1 
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 b4 = a7 EB a6 E9 a1 E9 ao 
:F19H = :::::} 
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 b3 = a6 E9 a5 E9 a4 E9 a3 E9 ao 
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 b2 = a7 EB a5 E9 a2 
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 b1 = a6 E9 a4 E9 a1 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 bo = a5 E9 a4 E9 ao 
If we define w(:Fe) as the count of nonzero entries in :Fe and wi(:Fe) as the 
count of nonzero entries in row i of :Fe, the number of 2-input XOR gates used 
for the multiplier is upper bounded by w(:Fe) -n and the delay of gate levels is 
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m~{ flog2 Wi (Fe) l}. 
z 
3.1.3 Complexity of MDS Mappings 
An MDS mapping has been defined in (3.1) where each entry Ci,j of matrix C is 
associated with a product matrix Fci,;. Replacing each Ci,j in matrix C with Fci,j 
as a submatrix, we get an nk x nk binary matrix Fe as the following: 
Fe= 
Fco,k-1 Fco,o 
Because Y is the matrix product of Fe and X, the MDS mapping can be straightfor-
wardly implemented by a number of XOR gates. The gate count of 2-input XORs is 
upper bounded by 
GMvs = w(Fe)- nk (3.6) 
and the delay is upper bounded by 
(3.7) 
where 0:::; i:::; n-1. 
3.1.4 Three Types of Matrices 
In the search of optimized MDS mappings in the next section, we will use three types 
of matrices which suit different applications. When an exhaustive matrix search is 
impractical, we will limit the search scope to one of the following three matrix types. 
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• Circulant matrices: Given k elements a 0, ... , ak-b a circulant matrix A is 
constructed with each entry Ai,j = a(i+j) mod k. The probability that a circulant 
matrix is suitable for an MDS mapping C is much higher than that of a normal 
square matrix [36]. 
• Hadamard matrices: Given k elements ao, ... , ak-b a Hadamard matrix A 
is constructed with each entry Ai,j = aiEej. Each Hadamard matrix A over a 
finite field has the following properties: A2 = 1·'I where 1 is a constant. When 
1 = 1, A is an involution matrix. An involution MDS mapping is required by 
an involution SPN. 
• Cauchy matrices: Given 2k elements ao, ... , ak-1, f3o, ... , f3k-b a Cauchy ma-
trix A is constructed with each entry Ai,j = 1/ ( ai EB ,83). Any Cauchy ma-
trix is MDS when a 0 , ••• , ak_1 are distinct, ,80 , ..• , .Bk-1 are distinct, and 
ai =f:. ,83 for all i, j [24]. Although a Cauchy matrix can be conveniently used 
as matrix C for an MDS mapping, the relation between selected coefficients 
(i.e., a 0 , ... , ak_1, ,80 , ... , .Bk-1) and corresponding MDS complexity is not as 
straightforward as in the former two matrix types. Therefore, it is difficult to 
select coefficients to construct a Cauchy matrix that can be efficiently imple-
mented in hardware. 
3.1.5 The Optimization Method 
The hardware complexity of an MDS mapping is determined directly by matrix C. 
In order to improve hardware performance, matrix C should be designed to produce 
low hardware complexity. However, not every matrix with low complexity is suitable 
as an MDS mapping. The mapping associated with matrix C can be tested using the 
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following theorem: 
Theorem 3.1 [24]: An (l, k, d)-code with generation matrix g = [IIC] is MDS if, 
and only if, every square submatrix of C is nonsingular. 
To minimize gate count and delay in hardware, we want to find an MDS mapping 
based on a (2k, k, k+1)-code over GF(2n) with low Hamming weights of w(Fc) and 
wi(Fc). Theorem 3.1 provides us a way to determine whether a matrix candidate is 
MDS. Theoretically, the optimal MDS mapping can always be determined through 
an exhaustive search of all matrix candidates of C. However, such a search is compu-
tationally impractical when k and n get large. In this case, it is reasonable to focus 
the search on some subsets of candidates which are likely to yield MDS mappings. 
The search scope can thus be limited to circulant, Hadamard, and Cauchy matrices. 
Table 3.1: Four Choices for MDS Search 
II Search Options II # of Candidates I Applicable Cases II 
Exhaustive 2k"n small k, n 
Circulant Matrices 2/Cn large k, n 
Hadamard Matrices 2":n large k, n as well as involution 
Cauchy Matrices 2:.:/Cn hard to find MDS mappings 
in other matrix categories 
Table 3.1 describes four choices for the MDS search. We adopt an appropriate 
searching method based on the number of candidates to be tested and the required 
MDS features (involution or not). If computation permits, exhaustive search is pre-
ferred. When an exhaustive search is impractical, a search in circulant matrices may 
be performed for non-involution MDS mappings or a search in Hadamard matrices 
may be performed for MDS mappings which are involutions. Since only a subset 
of MDS mappings can be derived from circulant, Hadamard, or Cauchy matrices, 
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only exhaustive search over all possible matrices (and therefore all MDS mappings) 
is guaranteed to find a truly optimized MDS mapping. However for large k and n, 
searching over a subset of MDS mappings is the best that can be achieved. The 
objective is to find the candidate with the MDS property and a low hardware cost. 
The hardware "cost" could be gate count, delay, or both. Sometimes, no candidates 
in the sets of circulant and Hadamard matrices pass the MDS test. In this case, the 
optimal mapping will be determined through a search of Cauchy matrices, where 
each candidate is deterministically MDS. 
Once a candidate is proved to be MDS (or involution MDS), those remaining 
candidates with higher hardware cost can be ignored narrowing the search space. 
The results generated in this searching method can be used for the hardware char-
acterization of ciphers with MDS mappings of a specified size. 
It is noted that w(Fc) - nk just indicates the upper bound of XORs in the 
circuit. Two greedy methods introduced in [73] can be applied to the MDS matrix 
multiplication in order to further reduce redundancy in the circuit. However, the 
improvement of using greedy methods is not significant when w(Fc) is already low. 
3.1.6 MDS Search Results 
We have implemented a search for the best MDS mappings of various sizes. Dur-
ing the search, gate reduction is given higher priority than delay reduction because 
the delay difference among mappings is generally not evident. The optimal2 non-
involution MDS mappings for bit-parallel implementations for various sizes of MDS 
2Here "optimal" means "locally optimal" when the MDS mapping is constrained to a particular 
matrix category. 
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mappings are given in Table 3.2. As in AES, SPNs using these optimal MDS map-
pings are more efficient in encryption than decryption. In Table 3.2, the average 
weight is determined by computing the number of matrix entries and dividing by 
two. That is, it represents the average number of ones in a matrix across all nk x nk 
matrices. These average weight values are included to show how effective the opti-
mization work is for each MDS category. 
Table 3.2: MDS Search Results 
MDS Galois P(x) Average Involution w(Fc) Delay Matrix 
Field Weight (#layers) Type 
(4,2,3) GF(22 ) 7H 8 No 9 2 exhaustive 
(4,2,3) GF(24 ) 13 H 32 No 17 2 exhaustive 
(4,2,3) GF(21S) llD H 128 No 35 3 exhaustive 
(8,4,5) GF(24 ) 13 H 128 No 76 3 circulant 
(8,4,5) GF(21S) llD H 512 No 164 3 circulant 
(16,8,9) GF(24 ) 13 H 512T No 464 4 Cauchy 
(16, 8, 9) GF(21S) llD H 2048 No 784 4 circulant 
(4,2,3) GF(2:t) 7H 8 Yes 11 2 exhaustive 
(4,2,3) GF(24 ) 13 H 32 Yes 21 2 exhaustive 
(4,2,3) GF(211 ) llD H 128 Yes 48 3 exhaustive 
(8,4,5) GF(24 ) 13 H 128 Yes 88 3 Hadamard 
(8, 4, 5) GF(211 ) llD H 512 Yes 200 4 Hadamard 
(16, 8, 9) GF(24 ) 13 H 512T Yes 544 5 Cauchy 
(16, 8, 9) GF(211 ) llD H 2048 Yes 928 5 Hadamard 
t: Most randomly generated matrices are not MDS due to a small field and the 
requirement of a large branch number. 
The optimal involution MDS mappings in terms of our complexity analysis are 
also given in Table 3.2. Since the MDS test of Theorem 3.1 is computationally 
intensive, an involution test will be performed first to eliminate wrong candidates. 
In [29], an algebraic construction of an involution MDS mapping based on Cauchy 
matrices is described. This known MDS mapping is used to eliminate remaining 
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candidates that produce higher complexity and therefore reduce search space before 
a better mapping is found. 
The categories in Table 3.2 correspond to many MDS mappings in real ciphers 
(although there are minor differences in finite field selection). For example, Square, 
AES, and Hierocrypt at the lower level have non-involution MDS mappings based on 
(8, 4, 5)-codes over GF(28 ) [32, 36, 37]. SHARK has an non-involution MDS mapping 
based on (16, 8, 9)-codes over GF(28 ) [21]. Hierocrypt at the higher level has two 
choices of non-involution MDS mappings, based on (8, 4, 5)-codes over GF(24) and 
GF(232), respectively [37]. Anubis has an involution MDS mapping based on an 
(8, 4, 5)-code over GF(28 ) [30]. Khazad has an involution MDS mapping based on 
a (16, 8, 9)-code over GF(28 ) [31]. None these ciphers have MDS mappings with 
complexity as low as their corresponding cases listed in the tables. The mappings 
of AES, Anubis, and Khazad have MDS mappings that are close to the optimal 
cases in terms of gate counts (i.e., w(Fc) = 184,216, and 1296, respectively), while 
Hierocrypt's MDS mappings have high complexity, similar to the average gate counts. 
As Table 3.2 indicates, the involution MDS mappings are not as efficient as non-
involution MDS mappings after optimization. However, the performance difference 
between them is quite small. When used in an SPN, the involution MDS mapping 
produces equally optimized performance for both encryption and decryption. When 
an SPN uses a non-involution MDS mapping optimized only for encryption, the 
inverse MDS mapping used in decryption has a higher complexity. For example, the 
MDS mapping used in AES decryption has w(Fc) = 472 and, hence, needs more 
gates in hardware than the MDS mapping used for encryption which has w(Fc) = 
184. When a non-involution MDS mapping is optimized for both encryption and 
decryption, the overall hardware cost is similar to an optimized involution MDS 
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mappmg. 
3.1.7 Synthesis Results 
We implemented the optimized MDS mappings in hardware using both 0.18 J.Lm 
and 0.35 J.Lm CMOS technologies. Synopsys Design Compiler was used for synthesis 
and the default optimization strategy gave the space concern a higher priority [74]. 
TSMC's cell library was targeted to 0.18 J.lm technology, where a specific area size 
was reported after synthesis. The cell library lsL10k.db was targeted to 0.35 J.lm 
technology, where the area was reported in the number of equivalent NAND gates. 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show the synthesis results of optimized MDS mappings listed in 
Table 3.2. The synthesis circuits of these MDS mappings produce space complexities 
with roughly the same trends as shown in Table 3.2. Because some cells in the 
target libraries have more than 2 inputs, the ratio between experimental values and 
the corresponding estimates vary slightly when the fields and minimum distances of 
MDS mappings are both small. This variance becomes insignificant as the complexity 
of an MDS mapping increases. The delay time of an MDS mapping may be larger 
than its estimate when the circuit becomes larger (e.g., mappings based on (16, 8, 
9)-codes when using 0.35 J.lm CMOS), which is due to technology related wiring 
overhead and optimization strategy. 
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Table 3.3: Synthesis Results of Non-Involution MDS Mappings 
MDS Hamming Gate .1811m CMOS .3511m CMOS 
Weight Delay Area Delay Areal Delay 
(11m2) (ns) (ns) 
(4, 2, 3), GF(22 ) 9 2 105.7 0.80 12 2.25 
(4, 2, 3), GF(24 ) 17 2 260.2 0.42 28 2.25 
(4, 2, 3), GF(28 ) 35 3 544.8 0.42 57 2.25 
(8, 4, 5), GF(24 ) 76 3 1549.0 1.30 153 3.62 
(8, 4, 5), GF(2!S) 164 3 3659.0 1.33 375 3.51 
(16, 8, 9), GF(24 ) 464 4 8863.0 2.01 844 8.59 
(16, 8, 9), GF(2!S) 784 4 17376.4 2.01 1636 9.49 
t : #equivalent NANDs 
Table 3.4: Synthesis Results of Involution MDS Mappings 
MDS Hamming Gate .1811m CMOS .3511m CMOS 
Weight Delay Area Delay Areal Delay 
(11m2) (ns) (ns) 
(4, 2, 3), GF(22 ) 11 2 113.8 1.59 12 3.44 
(4, 2, 3), GF(24 ) 21 2 280.5 0.95 27 2.43 
(4, 2, 3), GF(21l) 48 3 703.3 1.10 63 3.85 
(8, 4, 5), GF(24 ) 88 3 1687.2 1.70 174 3.77 
(8, 4, 5), GF(21l) 200 4 4260.8 1.33 398 6.34 
(16, 8, 9), GF(24 ) 544 5 9371.2 2.64 891 11.45 
(16, 8, 9), GF(28 ) 928 5 19559.6 2.36 1850 10.96 
t : #equivalent NANDs 
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3.2 General Hardware Model of Invertible S-boxes 
3.2.1 Biham's Method to Simplify S-box Circuits 
In [34], a method of generating a Boolean function through nested multiplexing is 
introduced to optimize gate circuits for the 6 x 4 S-boxes in DES implementations. 
Consider that a Boolean function f(a, b, c) with three input bits a, b, and c can be 
written as 
f(a, b, c)= JI(a, b)· c + h(a, b)· c 
where fi(a, b) and h(a, b) are two Boolean functions and"+" denotes OR. If h(a, b)= 
!I(a, b) EB h(a, b), then 
f(a, b, c) = h(a, b) EB (h(a, b)· c) . 
Similarly, a Boolean function with an input of 4 bits can be regarded as a multiplexor 
using one input bit to select two boolean functions determined by the other three 
input bits. This procedure is repeated until a Boolean function has 6 input bits. A 
6x4 DES S-box contains four of these 6-bit Boolean functions. This general approach 
can be taken for any sizeS-box and works well for optimization of smallS-boxes such 
as the 4 x 4 S-boxes in Serpent [33]. However, in the case of general invertible 8 x 8 
S-boxes used by many ciphers, this method can be improved upon, as we shall see. 
3.2.2 Decoder-Switch-Encoder Model 
In this section, we derive a general hardware model of n x n invertible S-boxes by 
simplification of a decoder-switch-encoder structure. Using this model, the upper 
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bounds of optimized gate counts and delays for S-boxes can be deduced. 
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Figure 3.1: A General Hardware Structure of Invertible S-boxes 
As shown in Figure 3.1, the n x 2n decoder outputs 2n distinct minterms from 
then-bitS-box input. The switch is a wiring area composed of 2n wires. Each wire 
connects an input port Xi to an output port Yj, O~i,j ~ 2n-1. Since the S-box is 
invertible, only one input port is connected to an output port. Although the wiring 
scheme embodies the S-box mapping, the switch does not cost any gates. The output 
of the switch is encoded through a 2n xn encoder, which produces then-bit output 
of the S-box. A detailed example is presented in Figure 3.2, which is chosen for DES 
(the first row of the first S-box with the mapping shown in Table 2.1). 
Decoder 
The nx2n decoder is implemented by n NOT gates and a number of AND gates. The 
NOT gates generate complementary variables of n inputs. The AND gates produce 
all 2n minterms from n binary inputs and their complements. 
The most straightforward approach is to generate every minterm separately, 
which costs 2n · (n- 1) 2-input AND gates plus n bit-wise NOT gates, and a delay 
of flog2 n l + 1 gate levels. This approach can be improved by eliminating redundant 
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Figure 3.2: The Circuit of a 4 x 4 Invertible S-box 
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Oo 
AND gates in the circuit. The gate count of the optimized circuit can be generated 
using a dynamic programming method. 
for i +-- 0 to n - 1 do 
D(i, i) +-- 0 
for step +-- 1 to n - 1 do 
for i +-- 0 to n - 1 - step do 
j = i +step 
D(i,j) +-- oo 
for k +-- i to j - 1 do 
temp= D(i, k) + D(k + 1,j) + 2i-i+l 
if temp< D(i,j) then D(i,j) +--temp 
return D(O, n- 1) 
Figure 3.3: Algorithm to Determine Decoder AND-Gate Count 
Consider the dynamic programming algorithm in Figure 3.3, used to compute the 
minimum number of AND gates in the decoder. Let D( i, j) be the minimal number 
of 2-input AND gates used for generating all possible minterms composed of literals 
Ii, · · ·, Ii and their complements. Thus, D(i,j) = 0 when i = j. If we know two 
optimal results of subproblems, say D(i,k) and D(k + 1,j) where i:::::; k < j, all 
minterms for h · · · , Ii can be obtained by using AND gates to connect two different 
minterms in the subproblems, respectively. Since the number of these pairs is 2i-i+l, 
this solution needs D(i, k) + D(k + 1, j) + 2i-i+l AND gates in total. The algorithm 
of Figure 3.3 can be easily modified to determine the actual gate network used for 
the decoder. When n = 2k, it can be shown that the number of 2-input AND gates 
and bit-wise NOT gates in the decoder is given by 
k 
Gnec(n) = n L 22i-i + n. 
i=l 
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(3.8) 
The delay, in terms of the number of gate levels, of the decoder is 
Encoder 
The 2n x n binary encoder can be implemented using a number of 2-input OR gates. 
Table 3.5 gives the truth table of a 16 X 4 binary encoder. Each output signal oi is 
the OR of the 2n-l input signals that produce "1" in column Oi in the truth table; 
this is denoted as Oi = L: Yk. If we separately construct circuits for these output 
signals, it would cost n · (2n-l -1) 2-input OR gates and a delay of n-1 gate levels. 
Fortunately, most OR gates can be saved if the same intermediate ORed signals are 
reused. 
Considering that the OR is done in a dynamic programming method, some sub-
problems used in calculating Oi are also used in calculating Oi if i > j > 0. For exam-
ple, as shown in Table 3.5, the task of calculating On-l includes the subproblems of 
calculating the OR from Y5.2n-3 to Y6.2n-3_1 and calculating the OR from Y6.2n-3 to 
Y2n_1 . These two subproblems are also included in the calculation of On-3 and On-2, 
respectively. As a result, the OR gates needed to solve the recurrent subproblems 
can be saved. Actually, in the procedure of calculating Oi, only the subproblem of 
calculating the OR from Y2i to Y2iH_1 has to be solved because all other 2n-i-l_1 
subproblems have been solved in the procedures of calculating On-b · · ·, Oi+l· In 
this sense, we need 2i-1 OR gates for the subproblem that has not been solved and 
2n-i-1 -1 OR gates to OR the results of all 2n-i-l subproblems. In total, the count 
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Table 3.5: Truth Table of a 2n x n Encoder 
Input Output Input Output 
yk 03 02 01 Oo yk On-1 On-2 On-3 ... 
Yo 0 0 0 0 Yo,···, Y2n-a_1 0 0 0 ... 
y1 0 0 0 1 
y2 0 0 1 0 Y2n-a,···,Y2n-2_1 0 0 1 ... 
y3 0 0 1 1 
y4 0 1 0 0 Y2n-2, • • • , Y3·2n-3_1 0 1 0 ... 
Ys 0 1 0 1 
y6 0 1 1 0 Y3.2n-a, • • ·, Y2n-1_1 0 1 1 ... 
y7 0 1 1 1 
Ys 1 0 0 0 Y2n-l, · · · , Ys.2n-a-1 1 0 0 ... 
Yg 1 0 0 1 
Yw 1 0 1 0 Ys.2n-a, · · · , Y6·2n-3_1 1 0 1 ... 
Yu 1 0 1 1 
Yi2 1 1 0 0 Y6·2n-3' ' • • 'Y7·2n-3_1 1 1 0 ... 
Yi3 1 1 0 1 
Yi4 1 1 1 0 Y7·2n-3' • • • 'Y2n-1 1 1 1 ... 
Y1s 1 1 1 1 
(a) n = 4 (b) n ~ 4 
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of OR gates for the encoder is 
n-1 
GEnc(n) = L[(2i- 1) + (2n-i-l- 1)] = 2n+1 - 2n- 2 (3.9) 
i=O 
which is less than n(2n-l- 1) for n > 2 and the gate delay is 
DEnc(n) = n- 1 
which is the same as the delay before simplification. 
3.2.3 S-box Complexity 
Based on the analysis of the decoder-switch-encoder structure, the hardware com-
plexity of invertible S-boxes is estimated. Since 8 x 8 S-boxes are very popular in 
current block ciphers (e.g., AES [32], Hierocrypt [37], and Camellia [6]), let us exam-
ine the usability of this model in this case. According to (3.8) and (3.9), the upper 
bound of the optimal gate count for an 8 x 8 invertible S-box is 806, while the gate 
count before logic minimization is 2816. 
Through experimental simplifications using the Synopsys logic synthesis tool [74], 
we realized 8x8 invertible S-boxes with a count of equivalent gates close to 800 when 
the target library was lsL10k.db, as shown in Table 3.6. In addition to the S-boxes 
of AES and Hierocrypt, we also implemented 10 randomly generated 8-boxes with 
p8 , q8 ~ 2-4 • In this table, the average cell count is 548 and the average equivalent 
gate count is 777. Since a small part of cells in the library have more than 2 inputs, 
the average of gates used for an 8 x 8 S-box is between 548 and 777 when only gates 
with 1 or 2 inputs are used. Such a result is quite close to the upper bound derived 
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Table 3.6: Synthesis Results of 8 x 8 S-boxes 
(RS-1,· · ·,10: randomly generated S-boxes with p8 , q8 ~ 2-4) 
S-box #cells Area Delay (ns) 
( # equivalent gates) 
AES 510 752 18.14 
Hierocrypt 555 784 15.85 
RS-1 563 785 18.31 
RS-2 531 765 17.72 
RS-3 567 788 16.43 
RS-4 525 759 17.93 
RS-5 571 784 17.24 
RS-6 557 775 16.32 
RS-7 538 780 16.44 
RS-8 553 779 17.29 
RS-9 552 775 14.83 
RS-10 550 793 17.57 
from our model when n = 8. 
When considering the implementation of an S-box with our model, the upper 
bound of the gate count increases exponentially with the S-box size n, as shown in 
Figure 3.4. Simultaneously, the upper bound of delay increases linearly, as shown in 
Figure 3.5. In these two figures, the S-box optimization model described in [34] and 
presented in Section 2 is used as the reference and the decoder-switch-encoder model 
is labelled DSE. When the size of an S-box is less than 6, the delay of the two models 
are similar and the gate count of the reference model is slightly lower. As the size of 
the S-box increases, the decoder-switch-encoder model costs less in both gate count 
and delay. The details of gate counts and delays are listed in Table 3.7 and Table 3.8. 
Given the fact that about half the gates used in the reference model are XOR gates 
which are typically more expensive in hardware in area and delay than NOT, AND, 
and OR gates, the decoder-switch-encoder model would appear to be more useful 
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for hardware design, both as an indication of the upper bound on the optimal S-box 
complexity and as a general methodology for implementing an invertible S-box. 
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3.3 Efficient AES Encryption Implementations 
Since AES was selected to succeed DES, it is of great significance to characterize the 
implementation of AES in hardware. As introduced in Section 2.2.4, each round of 
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Table 3.7: Gate Counts of Invertible S-boxes in the Decoder-Switch-Encoder Model 
II S-box Size ll4x41 6x6 I 8x8 I10x10 l12x12 l14x14 l16x16 II 
NOT# 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 
AND# 24 88 304 1120 4272 16712 66144 
OR# 22 114 494 2026 8166 32738 131038 
Gate Count 50 208 806 3156 12450 49464 197198 
Reference Count 36 192 1020 5112 24564 114672 524268 
Table 3.8: Gate Delays of Invertible S-boxes in the Decoder-Switch-Encoder Model 
II S-box Size ll4x4 I 6x6 l8x8 I10x10 l12x12 l14x14 l16x16 II 
NOT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
AND 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 
OR 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 
Delay 6 9 11 14 16 18 20 
Reference Delay 6 10 14 18 22 26 30 
AES contains the following operations to the State (i.e., the intermediate data stored 
in a two dimensional array) [32]: (1) a layer of 8 x 8 S-boxes called ByteSub, (2) a 
byte-wise cyclic shift per row called ShiftRow, (3) an MDS mapping based on an (8, 4, 
5)-code per column called MixColumn, and (4) the round key mixing through XORs. 
The MDS mapping is defined over GF(28 ) and the S-box performs the equivalent of 
multiplicative inverse over GF(28) followed by a bit-wise affine operation. 
With parallelS-boxes implemented through table lookups, a hardware design is 
proposed in [66]. Adhering to the structure of the algorithm specification of [32] as 
in Figure 3.6(a), this design achieves a throughput of 1.82 Gbits/s in 0.18 f-Lm CMOS 
technology, where each S-box costs about 2200 gates. Since some operations over 
the composite field GF((24) 2) [22] are more compact than over GF(28), an efficient 
AES design with a low gate count in composite field arithmetic is proposed in [75]. 
A cryptographic core (i.e., essentially one round mainly consisting of 16 S-boxes and 
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the MDS mapping layer) in [75] only costs about 4000 gates and a delay of 240 gate 
levels [76] for the full cipher is expected in theory. 
3.3.1 Design I 
Following the normal encryption dataflow, labelled as Design I in Figure 3.6(a), we 
apply the discussed S-box model and MDS bit-parallel implementation method to 
ByteSub and MixColumn, respectively. After the first round key K 0 is added to 
the plaintext, the State goes through an iterative round structure. Regardless of 
its mathematical definition, ByteSub is implemented as a layer of 16 parallel 8 x 8 
S-boxes using the decoder-switch-encoder model. Then, the State iteratively pro-
ceeds through ShiftRow, MixColumn, and the addition with round key Kr. ShiftRow 
is implemented through wiring without any gates needed. Four bit-parallel MDS 
mappings perform MixColumn for the 4 columns. As listed in Table 3.9, we get an 
iterative core circuit of one round which costs 13456 gates and produces a delay of 
15 gate levels per round. Because the MDS mappings are omitted in the last round, 
the AES encryption of 10 rounds produces a delay of 148 gate levels, a significant 
improvement over the delay of 240 gate levels in the design of [75]. The design needs 
far fewer gates than that in [66]. 
Table 3.9: Gate Counts and Delays of Operations in AES Design I 
II Operations II ByteSub I MixColumn I Key Addition I Total per Round II 
Gate Count 12896 432 128 13456 II 
Delay (gate levels) 11 3 1 15 II 
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(a) Design I (b) Design II 
Figure 3.6: AES Encryption Implementations 
3.3.2 Design II 
As shown in Figure 3.6(b), labelled as Design II, we get a more compact circuit 
through hybrid operations over GF(28) and its equivalent composite field GF((24) 2). 
The polynomial P1(y) = y4 + y + 1 is used to define GF(24 ) and the polynomial 
P2(x) = x2 + x + 09H is used to define GF((24)2). Such a composite field is the same 
as in the implementation proposed in [75] for ease of comparison. The conversion 
from GF(28) to GF((24) 2) is denoted as T(·), and its inverse is r-1(-). 
It has been recognized that the multiplicative inverse over GF( (2m)n) can have 
a much lower complexity than the equivalent inverse over GF(2mn) [73, 77]. As an 
example, the equivalent ByteSub over GF((24) 2) costs less than one fifth of the gate 
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count of a general invertible S-box based on the upper bound of 806 in the decoder-
switch-encoderS-box model. However, the subfield-based operation is normally slow. 
In the implementation of Figure 3.6(b), the inverse over the composite field costs a 
gate delay of 14 (as deduced from [72, 73, 75, 76]). Given additional overhead for field 
conversion and ByteSub's affine function, the ByteSub instance has a much longer 
delay path than in the implementation of Design I. To mitigate this problem, we can 
incorporate all linear operations into LT1 in the first nine rounds and LT2 in the last 
round as shown in Figure 3.7, resulting in a delay of 202 gate levels for encryption. 
The number of gates used in the iterative core circuit is slightly (about 3%) less than 
in [75]. The detailed gate counts and delays for Design II components are listed in 
Table 3.10. 
Table 3.10: Gate Counts and Delays of Operations in AES Design II 
Operations 16xinversion LT1 LT2 Key Total 
over GF((24) 2) TO Addition per Round 
[72, 73, 75, 76] 
Gate Count 2384 792 304 208 128 3816 
Delay (gate levels) 14 5 3 3 1 20 
In order to mathematically represent LT1 and LT2, we denote the input State as 
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{Ui,j} and the output State as {Vi,j}, where i denotes the row index and j denotes 
the column index of an element in the State. The binary coefficients of Ui,j and 
Vi,j in their polynomial expressions can be written as two 32-bit tuples Ui,j and Vi,j, 
respectively. LT1 can be expressed as 
Vo · 
,J :Fio2 :Fio3 FL01 FL01 Uo· ,J T(63H) 
v1 · FL01 FLo2 FLo3 FLo1 U1,j-1 T(63H) ,J 
+ (3.10) 
v2 · 
,J FLo1 FL01 FL02 FLo3 U2,j-2 T(63H) 
v3 · 
,J FLo3 :FL01 :FL01 :FL02 U3,j-3 T(63H) 
In above equation, :FLab :FL02, and :FLo3 are 8 x 8 submatrices derived from the 
following expression: 
(3.11) 
where :Foi is the product matrix associated with 01H, 02H, or 03H in GF(28) and 
matrix FA is associated with the affine function A(·) inside ByteSub (i.e., A(X) = 
:FA · X+ 63H). :FT is the 8 x 8 transformation matrix associated with T(·)(i.e., 
T(Ui,j) = :FT · Ui,j)· Its inverse is :F:;,1. 
Similarly, LT2 is a function defined as 
Vo · 
,J Uo · ,J 63H 
vl,j 
=(FA· Fi1) U1,j-1 
63H 
+ (3.12) 
v2 · 
,J U2,j-2 63H 
v3 · 
,J U3,j-3 63H 
Once we know the matrices :FT, :F LOi, and the result of :FA · :Fi 1 (as listed in the 
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Appendix), the gate networks consisting of XORs can be straightforwardly derived 
for LT1 and LT2. The greedy method I described in [73] is used to reduce redundancy 
in the gate network, where small modifications are made in order to avoid the increase 
of delay. 
3.3.3 Implementation Results 
Figure 3.8 compares the estimated performance of the two designs of Figure 3.6 with 
respect to the implementation in [75]. Design I uses the MDS mapping implemen-
tation method and S-box model discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 directly (while 
"Design I (Ref.)" uses the reference model in [34] for the 8-boxes). In Design II, the 
method discussed in previous section is used to deduce the linear transformations 
LT1 and LT2. As Figure 3.8 shows, Design II gains a delay reduction of 16% and a 
slight reduction in the number of gates compared with the implementation of [75]. 
Design I is a much faster implementation with about three times as many gates. 
500% ,_...------------------·---·-·--.. , 
Figure 3.8: Performance Comparison of AES Designs 
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The round structures of the two AES designs have been coded in VHDL and syn-
thesized using Synopsys Design Compiler and TSMC's 0.18 pm CMOS cell library. 
Setting constraints to tradeoff area and delay during synthesis, we get the charac-
teristic curves shown in Figure 3.9. The two end points of each curve represent the 
synthesis results with smallest delay and smallest area. In line with our performance 
evaluation, Design I can lead to an iterative cipher architecture with a throughput 
up to 4 Gbits/s (i.e., the smallest round critical path is 3.04 ns). On the other hand, 
Design II is useful for an area-restricted or pipelined application because of its small 
area requirement. 
3.4 Summary 
We have presented a mechanism to select the MDS mappings for optimal hardware 
implementation of a block cipher. The optimized MDS mapping straightforwardly 
leads to a compact and fast implementation at the gate level. As well, a general 
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model of invertible S-boxes was proposed and the upper bounds of the minimal 
hardware complexity were deduced through systematic logic minimization. Since 
S-boxes and MDS mappings are both widely used cipher components, the discussed 
design, optimization, and hardware complexity evaluation provide an analytical basis 
for studying the hardware performance of block ciphers. As an example, two effi-
cient hardware designs of AES encryption were considered with regards to different 
tradeoffs between gate count and delay, and their synthesis results were presented. 
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Chapter 4 
Hardware Performance Characterization 
of Cipher Structures 
In this chapter, we present a general framework for evaluating the hardware perfor-
mance characteristics of block cipher structures composed of S-boxes and Maximum 
Distance Separable (MDS) mappings. In particular, we examine nested Substitution-
Permutation Networks (SPNs) and Feistel networks with round functions composed 
of S-boxes and MDS mappings. Within each cipher structure, many cases are con-
sidered based on two types of S-boxes (i.e., 4x4 and 8x8) and parameterized MDS 
mappings. In our study of each case, the hardware complexity and performance are 
analyzed. Cipher security, in the form of resistance to differential, linear, and integral 
attacks, is used to determine the minimum number of rounds required for a partic-
ular parameterized structure. Because the discussed structures are similar to many 
existing ciphers (e.g., AES, Camellia, Hierocrypt, and Anubis), the analysis provides 
a meaningful mechanism for seeking efficient ciphers through a wide comparison of 
performance, complexity, and security. The content of this chapter is also presented 
in [78]. 
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4.1 Studied Cipher Structures 
4.1.1 Nested SPNs 
The concept of a nested SPN was first introduced in [37). In a nested SPN, S-boxes 
may be viewed at different levels: each S-box at a higher level is actually a small 
SPN at the lower level. In this chapter, we examine nested SPNs which have the 
following properties: 
• The structure contains just two levels of SPNs. A higher level S-box consists 
of a lower level SPN; a lower level S-box is an actual 4 x 4 or 8 x 8 S-box. 
• The linear transformation layers in both levels are based on MDS codes, de-
noted as MD S H for the higher level and MD S L for the lower level. 
• The subkey mixture occurs directly before each layer of actual (i.e., lower-
level) S-boxes. One additional subkey mixture is used to replace the linear 
transformation at the end of the cipher structure. The subkey bits are mixed 
with data bits by XOR operations. 
• A "round" refers to the combination of the subkey mixture, lower-level S-box 
layer, and subsequent MDSL or MDSH linear transformation. 
As Figure 4.1 shows, MD S L is an MDS mapping from a (2mb mb m1 + 1 )-code 
over GF(2n1 ), while MDSH is an MDS mapping from a (2m2, m2, m2 + 1)-code over 
GF(2n2 ). The variables m~, m2 , n~, and n2 represent parameter choices for a nested 
SPN. 
In the most straightforward case, the output of each S-box forms one source sym-
bol for the MDS mapping, and each encoded symbol forms the input of a subsequent 
71 
1st higher level 
-- S-box (ll2 bits) ·-
: n,bits 
:0···0 
1,------, ! I MDSL I • 
!0···0 L-----------
~-----------, 
:0···0: I I 
! I MDSL I! • 
!0···0! L __________ J 
(~-1)-th higher level m2-th higher level 
r-- S-box (n2 bits) -1 1-- S-box (ll2 bits) -1 
I I 1 I !0 ... 0::0 ... 0! l 
1 :: 1 Roundl 
e e :1 MDSL 1: :1 MDSL 1: 
I 1 1 I L~-~~-~~J l~-~~-~~j ]Round 2 
MDSn I 
MDSL: based on a (2m~o m~o m1+ 1)-code over OF( 2"' ) 
MDSH: based on a (2mz, mz, ~+I)-code over GF(2"") 
Figure 4.1: Basic 2-level Nested SPN (4 Rounds) 
S-box at the same level. So the size of an S-box is n 1 bits at the lower level and 
n2 bits at the higher level. This leads to n2 = n1 m1. Thus, the block size of the 
SPN is n1m1m2. For example, the 128-bit block cipher Hierocrypt (Type I) [37] is 
described as the iteration of such a 4-round structure where n 1 = 8, n2 = 32, and 
At each level of a nested SPN, the branch number of the MDS layer determines 
the minimum number of active S-boxes in differential or linear cryptanalysis. For 4 
rounds of a nested SPN, an activeS-box at the higher level contains at least m 1 + 1 
activeS-boxes at the lower level. Since there are at least m2 + 1 activeS-boxes at the 
higher level, the minimum number of active lower-levelS-boxes is (m1 + 1)(m2 + 1). 
Therefore, the security against differential and linear attacks is evaluated as the 
following: 
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Theorem 4.1 (deduced from [5, 21, 36, 37]): With the assumption that all 8-box ap-
proximations involved in linear and differential cryptanalysis are independent, for 4r 
rounds of a nested SPN the maximum differential characteristic probability {denoted 
by Pd) is upper bounded by p~(m1 +l)(m2 +l) and the maximum linear characteristic 
probability {denoted by 11) is upper bounded by q~(m1 +l)(m2+1). 
To attack a cipher using differential cryptanalysis, the number of chosen plain-
texts is expected to be in the order of 1/ Pd. Similarly, for linear cryptanalysis, the 
number of known plaintexts is expected to be in the order of 1/ Pz. Hence, the upper 
bounds of Pd and 11 provided in Theorem 4.1 indicate the lower bounds of required 
workload for attacking 4r+1 rounds of the cipher based on a 4r round characteristic. 
The basic operations in MDS codes are multiplications and additions in finite 
fields. When n 2 is large, operations over GF(2n2 ) are inefficient and M DSH can be 
costly in computation. An alternative method to obtain the same branch number is to 
concatenate several parallel MDS codes over a smaller finite field. The concatenated 
codes may be designed to facilitate a bitslice implementation. 
Theorem 4.2 [37]: An MDS mapping defined by a (2m, m, m + 1)-code over the nl-
bit symbol set can be constructed by concatenating l mappings defined by a (2m, m, m+ 
1)-code over then-bit symbol set, where l can be any positive integer. 
For the example illustrated by Figure 4.1, since n 2 = m 1nt, the mapping MDSH 
over GF(2n2 ) can be implemented with m 1 parallel MDS mappings over GF(2n1 ). In 
this case, the basic MD S H layer is denoted as 1 x (2m2, m2, m2 + 1) over G F ( 2m1 n 1 ), 
and its simplified, parallelized M DSH layer is denoted as l x (2m2, m2, m2 + 1) over 
GF(2n2 ) where, for example, we can have l = m 1 and n2 = n 1 . Since m 1n 1 may 
be factored in other ways, other simplifications are also possible. Hence, we can 
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consider that the general relation n 2l = m1 n1 can be used to determine different 
cases of M DSH defined by the values of the symbol size, n 2 , or the number of 
parallel MDS mappings, l. A similar approach can also be applied to the M DSL 
layer. However, restrictions on values of n and m must be considered for designing 
a (2m,m,m+ 1)-code over GF(2n) such that 2m~2n+l in order that it is possible 
to construct an MDS code [24]. 
The 128-bit ciphers Square, AES, and Anubis can be regarded as the iterations 
of 4-round nested SPNs where n1 = n2 = 8 and m1 = m2 = 4. The parameters of 
Hierocrypt (Type II) are selected as n 1 = 8, n2 = 4, and m1 = m2 = 4. 
A set of nested SPNs can be generated with appropriate configurations of pa-
rameterized MDSL, MDSH, and S-boxes. As Theorem 4.2 illustrates, the MDS 
mapping defined over a large Galois field can be simplified using several mappings 
in a smaller Galois field. Table 4.1 lists the cases of nested SPNs in 12 categories 
(labelled as N1 to N12) defined by the S-boxes and M DS£. Thus, the cases within 
a category only differ in the simplification of MD S H. Each case can be regarded as 
4r rounds of a 128-bit cipher where r is an integer, except that no particular key 
schedule has been defined. Due to the difficulty of finding optimized MDS mappings, 
the cases with a Galois field larger than GF(28 ) are not considered. The values of 
Pd and P, represent the maximum differential and linear characteristic probabilities 
for 4r rounds evaluated by Theorem 4.1. 
In relation to real ciphers, case N4-a includes Square, AES, and Anubis. Type II 
of Hierocrypt belongs to case N4-b with a simplified M DSH over GF(24). Similar 
to SHARK and Khazad, case N8 is a one-level SPN. However, SHARK and Khazad 
are 64-bit ciphers because their MDS mappings are based on a (16, 8, 9)-code over 
GF(28). 
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Table 4.1: 128-bit Nested SPNs of 4r Rounds 
Case S-box MDSL: MDSH: Pd,Pt 
size l1x(2m1, m1, m1+l) over GF(2n1) l2x(2m2,m2,m2+l) over GF(2n2 ) 
N1-a 8x8 8x( 4, 2, 3) over GF(211 ) 2x(16, 8, 9) over GF(211 ) 2 -1o~r 
N1-b 4x(16, 8, 9) over GF(2") 
N2-a 8x8 16x(4, 2, 3) over GF(24 ) 2x(16, 8, 9) over GF(2ts) 2 -10~r 
N2-b 4x(16, 8, 9) over GF(2") 
N3-a 8x8 32x( 4, 2, 3) over GF(22 ) 2x(16, 8, 9) over GF{211 ) 2 -lli2r 
N3-b 4x(16, 8, 9) over GF(2") 
N4-a 8x8 4x(8, 4, 5) over GF{211 ) 4x(8, 4, 5) over GF(21:S) 2 -loUr 
N4-b 8x(8, 4, 5) over GF(2") 
N5-a 8x8 8x(8, 4, 5) over GF(2") 4x(8, 4, 5) over GF(2") 2 -10ur 
N5-b 8x{8, 4, 5) over GF(24 ) 
N6-a 8x8 2x(16, 8, 9) over GF(2ts) 8x(4, 2, 3) over GF(2ts) 2 -10~r 
N6-b 16x( 4, 2, 3) over GF(2") 
N7-a 8x8 4x(16, 8, 9) over GF(2") 8x(4, 2, 3) over GF(2") 2 -1o:.:r 
N7-b 16x( 4, 2, 3) over GF(24 ) 
N7-c 32x( 4, 2, 3) over GF(2"') 
N8 8x8 1x(32, 16, 17) over GF(2") same as MDSL 2 -~U4r 
N9 4x4 16x( 4, 2, 3) over GF(24 ) 1x(32, 16, 17) over GF(2ts) 2 -lU~r 
N10 4x4 32x{ 4, 2, 3) over GF{2~) 1x(32, 16, 17) over GF(2") 2 -1u:.:r 
Nll-a 4x4 8x(8, 4, 5) over GF(24 ) 2x(16, 8, 9) over GF(211 ) 2 -~ur 
Nll-b 4x(16, 8, 9) over GF(2") 
N12-a 4x4 4x(16, 8, 9) over GF(24 ) 4x(8, 4, 5) over GF(2ts) 2 -~ur 
N12-b 8x(8, 4, 5) over GF(2") 
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In theory, a maximum characteristic probability less than 2-128 indicates that the 
cipher is secure enough when only one characteristic is used for an attack. However, 
it is possible that several characteristics are combined to improved the attack as 
discussed in [41, 47]. As a result, it is still desirable that the maximum characteristic 
probability is much less than 2-128 . In the same sense, composite 8 x 8 8-boxes at 
the higher level of N9 and NlO cannot gain exactly the same security as 8 x 8 8-boxes 
used for Nl to N8, although the two types of ciphers may have the same maximum 
characteristic probabilities. 
4.1.2 A Class of Feistel Networks 
Figure 4.2 illustrates one particular class of round function F used for Feistel net-
works (as shown in Figure 2.5). Such a round function can be regarded as an SPN 
of one round with a size equal to half of the cipher block size. The round function 
includes one layer of key mixture with Ki (i.e., bit-wise XOR of Xi and Ki), one 
layer of invertible1 8-boxes for substitution, and an MDS mapping layer as a linear 
transformation. If the MDS mapping layer is constructed through concatenation 
of several small MDS mappings, it is necessary to include a permutation of MDS 
symbols in the linear transformation in order to ensure the avalanche effect. 
In a Feistel network whose round function has an invertible linear transformation 
appended to a layer of 8-boxes, it is proved in (46) that the number of active 8-
boxes in any differential or linear characteristic of 4r rounds is lower bounded by 
r x B + Lr /2 J, where B is the branch number of the linear transformation and r is 
an integer. For an MDS layer based on m symbols, B = m + 1. Therefore, we get: 
1 Invertible S-boxes are used so that a bijective round function can be constructed, which achieves 
the given upper bounds of maximal differential and linear probabilities faster in rounds than a 
general round function (79]. 
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Figure 4.2: A Class of the Round Function 
Theorem 4.3 (deduced from [46]): For4r rounds of a Feistel cipher with the round 
function of Figure 4.2, the maximum differential characteristic probability Pd and 
maximum linear characteristic probability Pz are upper bounded by p~x(m+l)+Lr/2J and 
q~x(m+l)+Lr/2J, respectively. 
To construct a typical128-bit cipher, a Feistel network of this class has a 64-bit 
round function which contains sixteen 4 x 4 or eight 8 x 8 parallel S-boxes followed 
by an MDS mapping layer. As listed in Table 4.2, six categories (labelled as Fl to 
F6) of these 128-bit Feistel networks can be generated. To ensure a good avalanche 
effect, an appropriate fixed permutation of MDS symbols after the MDS mapping is 
expected, which does not cost any gates. 
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Table 4.2: 128-bit Feistel Networks of 4r Rounds 
Case S-box MDS Pd, P, 
size lx(2m,m,m-!-1) over GF(2n) 
F1-a 8x8 4x(4,2,3) over GF(28 ) 2-6(3r+L2J) 
F1-b 8 x (4, 2, 3) over GF(24 ) 
F1-c 16 x (4, 2, 3) over GF(2:.!) 
F2-a 8x8 2 x (8, 4, 5) over GF(28 ) 2-6(5r+L2J) 
F2-b 4x(8,4,5) over GF(24 ) 
F3-a 8x8 1 x (16, 8, 9) over GF(28 ) 2-6(9r+L2J) 
F3-b 2 x (16, 8, 9) over GF(24 ) 
F4-a 4x4 4x(4,2,3) over GF(28) 2-2(3r+L2J) 
F4-b 8 x (4, 2, 3) over GF(24 ) 
F4-c 16 x ( 4, 2, 3) over G F(2:.!) 
F5-a 4x4 2 x (8, 4, 5) over GF(2t1) 2 -:.!tor+L·:iJJ 
F5-b 4 x (8, 4, 5) over GF(24 ) 
F6-a 4x4 1 x (16, 8, 9) over GF(28) 2 -:.!t~o~r+L·:iJJ 
F6-b 2 x (16, 8, 9) over GF(24 ) 
4.2 Comparison of Hardware Performance 
4.2.1 Performance Measures 
It is normally hard to compare hardware performance among different block ciphers. 
The main problems are: (1) each implementation represents a tradeoff between area 
and delay, (2) the specific hardware cost of a gate network is dependent on the target 
technology, and (3) ciphers may contain different security margins. 
For the first problem, the classical delay-area product is used to evaluate the 
hardware complexity universally. The typical methods used in the hardware imple-
mentation of a block cipher include a round iterated design, a pipelined design, a 
loop-unrolled design, and a block parallel design [70]. For a given cipher, the delay-
area product is kept roughly unchanged across the different design methods (except 
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for a loop-unrolled design), assuming the control overhead for parallelism can be ig-
nored. If a round iterated design is regarded as a reference, a k-block parallel design 
using several round iterated implementations will cost about k times the number of 
gates and result in about 1/k of the average time to produce an encrypted block. 
The same situation occurs in a pipelined design when each stage performs one or 
several rounds of the cipher. For loop unrolling, when k rounds are unrolled, it can 
be understood as removing the registers betweens rounds in a pipelined design of k 
rounds and then laying these rounds out. Using CAD tools to minimize such a large 
combinational circuit, its gate count is more than an iterative design but possibly 
much less than a pipelined design. By doing so, the encryption time for one block 
is reduced. Loop unrolling usually results in low performance in the sense of the 
delay-area product. 
For the second problem, a universal way is to assume that all gates have the 
same hardware cost (73]. Thus, the gate count and delay of all components are 
deduced from the upper bound of typical implementations. Such an approach leads 
to a measure of complexity which is technology-independent. However, in a certain 
target VLSI technology, the hardware costs of different gates may not be similar. In 
this case, it is possible to estimate the overall area (respectively, delay) by summing 
weighted gate counts (respectively, weighted gate layers traversed). The weights 
are proportional to the size of a gate (respectively, delay) and can be calculated by 
statistical comparison of hardware among gates based on a target technology. The 
hardware complexity is then evaluated by weighted area Aw and weighted delay Dw: 
Aw= G(u) x Wa(u) (4.1) 
gate type u 
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Dw= D(u) x Wn(u). (4.2) 
gate type u 
Associated with gate type u, G(u) and Wa(u) return the gate count and weight of 
each gate. In the critical path of the circuit, D(u) and Wn(u) return the number of 
traversed gate layers and weight of each layer associated with gate type u. 
For the problem caused by different security margins, we use a rule-of-thumb to 
determine resistance to differential and linear cryptanalysis. For differential crypt-
analysis, the number of chosen plaintext pairs to attack a cipher is expected to be 
in the order of 1/ Pd, where Pd is the maximum differential characteristic probabil-
ity determined by Theorems 4.1 and 4.3. Similarly, to attack a cipher using linear 
cryptanalysis, the number of known plaintexts is expected to be in the order of 1/ Pt, 
where P, is the maximum linear characteristic probability. 
Based on above considerations, we define three hardware performance metrics rJ8 , 
rJt, and rJ to measure the space, time, and overall performance, respectively. The 
three metrics integrate security and complexity and are defined as follows: 
rJs 
log2 1/ P (4.3) - # of rounds x Aw per round 
'f}t log2 1/ P (4.4) # of rounds x Dw per round 
rJ 
log2 1/P (4.5) - # of rounds x (Aw x Dw per round) 
where P = Pd for hardware performance in relation to differential attacks and P = 
P, in relation to linear attacks. The probability Pd/ P, represents the maximum 
differential/linear characteristic probability for the number of rounds specified in the 
denominator. In each expression, the numerator is essentially a security measure in 
bits and the denominator is a complexity measure. Since we assume that the S-boxes 
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in the three discussed cipher structures satisfy Ps = qs, the values of log2 1/ Pd and 
log2 1/ P, are the same. For the nested SPNs and Feistel networks discussed in Section 
2, log2 1/ P is a linear function of the number of rounds. Therefore, the values of 
'f/s, 'f/t, and rJ indicate how much security is expected to be obtained for a specific 
hardware cost, regardless of the number of rounds in a cipher. 
Targeted to the same design method, "'s shows the security contribution provided 
by each area unit; "'t shows the security contribution provided by each delay unit. 
For a fast implementation such as a pipelined or parallel design, a high "'s means 
that many independent blocks can be processed simultaneously. For a round iterated 
design, a high 'f/t means that the encryption time for a block is small. More generally, 
using the classical delay-area product as its denominator, rJ indicates the performance 
integrating both the delay and area complexities. 
The cases that we compare in the following sections are generated as 128-bit 
block ciphers defined by the nested SPN and Feistel networks. To calculate the 
gate count and number of gate layers per round, we consider the construction of 
the combinational circuits of the round structure with S-box and MDS mapping 
components which can produce high efficiencies in hardware. The hardware design 
and optimization of these components are described in Chapter 3. The detailed data 
used in the complexity estimation which is to be used for determining performance 
will be presented in this chapter. 
4.2.2 Hardware Performance of Nested SPNs 
From the viewpoint of implementation, a nested SPN follows the iterative dataflow 
of key addition, an S-box layer, and an MDS mapping layer (either MDSL or 
MDSH). Since S-boxes cost the most hardware complexity, a 128-bit multiplexor 
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selects M DSL and M DSH dynamically such that only one layer of S-boxes is needed 
in a round iterated design. So assuming a round iterated implementation, the round 
circuit used for each case in Table 4.1 includes a 128-bit key addition, one layer of 
S-boxes, MDSL, MDSH, and a 128-bit multiplexor2 • The 128-bit multiplexor can 
be implemented by 385 NAND gates (i.e., y = x1 · c + x2 • c where c is the select 
signal and "+" denotes OR). 
In hardware, the complexity of S-boxes are evaluated through the simplification 
results deduced from an encoder-switch-decoder model as proposed in Section 3.2. In 
this model, S-boxes are composed of low complexity gates (ANDs, ORs, and NOTs). 
A 4 x 4 S-box can be implemented using 50 gates and produces a delay of 6 gate 
layers; an 8x8 S-box can be implemented using 806 gates and produces a delay of 11 
gate layers. Involution MDS codes [30] are found by searching Hadamard matrices 
and have been optimized for hardware, as has been done in Section 3.1. MDS codes 
are implemented using XORs. Using these results, the complexity of each 128-bit 
2-level nested SPN is evaluated for each round. 
When Wc(u) = Wv(u) = 1 for any gate type u (i.e., all gates are assumed to have 
the same hardware complexity), we can sum the number of gates as the universal 
hardware area of a round structure. The calculation of the universal delay per 
round assumes the highest delay of MDSL and MDSH. Table 4.3lists the evaluated 
hardware complexity of S-boxes, MDS mappings, and round structures. The area and 
delay per round are then used in (4.3), (4.4), and (4.5) and the resultant performance 
measures 1]8 , 1Jt, and 1J are also listed in Table 4.3. 
Although each individual value in Table 4.3 cannot be perfectly accurate, the 
comparison of the performance measures does enable us to distinguish the cases 
2MDS Multiplexing is not necessary for N8. 
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Table 4.3: Complexity and Universal Performance Estimation of One Round of 128-
bit Nested Involution SPNs in Hardware 
Case S-boxes MDSL MDSn Round Total 'f/s 'f/t 'fJ 'f/r 
(universal) 
Gate#- XOR#- XOR#- Gate#- (lo-~ (lo-4) (lo-6) 
-Delay -Delay -Delay -Delay 
N1-a 12896- 11 256-3 1728-5 15393- 19 2.63 2.13 1.38 3.42 
N1-b 12896- 11 256-3 2048-5 15713- 19 2.58 2.13 1.36 3.35 
N2-a 12896- 11 208-2 1728-5 15345- 19 2.64 2.13 1.39 3.43 
N2-b 12896- 11 208-2 2048-5 15665- 19 2.59 2.13 1.36 3.36 
N3-a 12896- 11 224-2 1728-5 15361- 19 2.64 2.13 1.39 3.43 
N3-b 12896- 11 224-2 2048-5 15681- 19 2.58 2.13 1.36 3.36 
N4-a 12896- 11 672-4 672-4 14753- 18 2.54 2.08 1.41 3.77 
N4-b 12896- 11 672-4 576-3 14657- 18 2.56 2.08 1.42 3.79 
N5-a 12896- 11 576-3 672-4 14657- 18 2.56 2.08 1.42 3.79 
N5-b 12896- 11 576-3 576-3 14561- 17 2.58 2.21 1.51 4.04 
N6-a 12896- 11 1728- 5 256-3 15393- 19 2.63 2.13 1.38 3.42 
N6-b 12896- 11 1728- 5 208-2 15345- 19 2.64 2.13 1.39 3.43 
N7-a 12896- 11 2048-5 256-3 15713- 19 2.58 2.13 1.36 3.35 
N7-b 12896- 11 2048- 5 208-2 15665- 19 2.59 2.13 1.36 3.36 
N7-c 12896- 11 2048-5 224-2 15681- 19 2.58 2.13 1.36 3.36 
N8 12896- 11 8064-6 8064-6 21088- 18 2.42 2.83 1.34 2.63 
N9 1600- 6 208-2 8064-6 10257- 15 2.49 1.70 1.66 6.50 
N10 1600-6 224-2 8064-6 10401- 15 2.45 1.70 1.63 6.41 
N11-a 1600- 6 576-3 1728- 5 4417- 14 5.09 1.61 3.64 16.2 
N11-b 1600- 6 576-3 2048- 5 4737- 14 4.75 1.61 3.39 15.1 
N12-a 1600- 6 2048- 5 672-4 4833- 14 4.66 1.61 3.33 14.8 
N12-b 1600-6 2048- 5 576-3 4737- 14 4.75 1.61 3.39 15.1 
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which are more efficient in hardware. 
Figure 4.3 shows the tendency of the universal performance comparison (i.e., 
W0 (u) = 1, Wv(u) = 1). In an ASIC design, XOR gates are more expensive 
than other gates such as NOT, AND, and OR gates. Figure 4.4 shows a weighted 
performance comparison when Wa(XOR) = Wv(XOR) = 2 and weight for others is 
one. The two figures follow the similar tendency in performance comparison: 
• The size of the S-box largely determines space and time performances. Using 
smallS-boxes tends to cost less hardware area, but more delay than using large 
S-boxes. Given fixed chip area, the cipher cases using smallS-boxes are more 
advantageous for parallelism as their higher "'s values show. 
• Many SPN structures (N1-N10, Nll-N12) are essentially equivalent with re-
spect to their hardware performance. Hence, it is wise for a cipher designer to 
consider those structures which can facilitate software implementation. 
• When the symbol size is 8 bits or less, the simplification of MDS mappings 
through concatenation does not significantly improve the performance when 
the MDS mappings have been selected to be optimized for hardware. For 
example, Case N4-b in Table 4.1 does not gain a much higher improvement in 
hardware than Case N4-a. 
• When m1 or m2 are very high, the MDS mapping determined by m 1 or m 2 (e.g., 
M DSn in cases of N9 and NlO) will cost much more hardware and overwhelm 
S-box costs, which degrades the cipher performance. 
• As a cipher of Case N4-a, AES is very suitable for a round iterated design. 
However, its suitability for pipelined or parallel implementations is not as high 
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Figure 4.3: Universal Performance Comparison of Nested SPNs 
Figure 4.4: Weighted Performance Comparison of Nested SPNs 
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as cipher cases using 4 x 4 S-boxes such as cases of Nll and N12. 
The above conclusions are based on hardware complexity and security against 
differential and linear attacks. For some other attacks such as the integral attack, 
the effectiveness significantly decreases after a certain number of rounds. In this 
circumstance, a performance metric of the round structure is defined as: 
1 
Tfr = · Aw x Dw per round 
Since the security in bits to resist these attacks increases very rapidly in the number 
of rounds, with a trend much steeper than differential and linear attacks as more 
rounds are appended, we take a fixed number of rounds (e.g., about 8 for the integral 
attack on AES) as enough for the security. The comparison of round performance is 
also included in Figures 4.3 and 4.4. It is obvious that the nested SPNs with small 
S-boxes and modest sized MD S L and MD S H have significantly better performance 
in relation to the integral attack than other cases. 
4.2.3 Hardware Performance of Feistel Networks 
The Feistel network discussed in this section is limited to the class described in 
Section 4.1, which has an SPN-like round function. As listed in Table 4.2, the cases 
of the same category only differ in the simplification of the MDS mapping. The 
hardware of one round of the Feistel network includes a 64-bit key addition layer, an 
S-box layer, an MDS mapping layer, and a 64-bit XOR after the round function (as 
shown in Figure 4.2). The key addition costs 64 XOR gates and a delay of one gate 
level. The XOR after the round function has the same hardware complexity as the 
key addition. 
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Table 4.4: Complexity and Universal Performance Estimation of One Round of 128-
bit Feistel Networks in Hardware 
Case S-boxes MDS Round Total 'f/s 
"'t 
"' (universal) 
Gate # - Delay XOR #-Delay Gate # - Delay (lo-3 ) (lo-4) 
F1-a 6448-11 76-3 6652- 16 0.79 0.33 0.49 
F1-b 6448-11 72-2 6648- 15 0.79 0.35 0.53 
F1-c 6448-11 80-2 6656- 15 0.79 0.35 0.53 
F2-a 6448-11 264-3 6840- 16 1.21 0.52 0.75 
F2-b 6448-11 240-3 6816- 16 1.21 0.52 0.76 
F3-a 6448- 11 720-4 7296- 17 1.95 0.84 1.15 
F3-b 6448- 11 864-4 7440- 17 1.92 0.84 1.13 
F4-a 800-6 76-3 1004- 11 1.74 0.16 1.58 
F4-b 800-6 72-2 1000- 10 1.75 0.18 1.75 
F4-c 800-6 80-2 1008- 10 1.74 0.18 1.74 
F5-a 800-6 264-3 1192- 11 2.31 0.25 2.10 
F5-b 800-6 240-3 1168- 11 2.35 0.25 2.14 
F6-a 800-6 720-4 1648- 12 2.88 0.40 2.40 
F6-b 800-6 864-4 1792- 12 2.65 0.40 2.21 
As shown in Figures 4.5 and 4.6, both the universal (Wc(u) = 1, Wn(u) = 1 for 
any gate type u) and weighted (i.e., Wc(XOR) = 2, Wn(XOR) = 2 and We= 1, 
W n = 1 for all other gate types) performance comparisons indicate: 
• It is useful to pick an MDS mapping that has a large branch number (i.e., 
m+1). The cases with such an MD8 mapping have significantly higher values 
in all three performance measures. 
• With high "'t values, the cases with 8 x 8 8-boxes demonstrate high perfor-
mance in non-pipelined and non-parallel implementations. With high"' values, 
the cases with 4 x 4 8-boxes demonstrate high performance in pipelined and 
parallel implementations because many independent blocks can be processed 
simultaneously. 
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Figure 4.6: Weighted Performance Comparison of Feistel Networks 
Camellia is a 128-bit Feistel cipher with a 64-bit round function which consists of 
eight 8x8 invertible S-boxes and a linear transformation. Hence, Camellia is similar 
to Feistel networks that we discussed but does not use an MDS mapping. The branch 
number of the Camellia linear transformation is 5. An efficient implementation of 
such a linear transformation costs 176 two-input XOR gates and a delay of 3 gate 
layers in universal comparison. Thus, Camellia has universal performance similar to 
Case F2-a which has 264 XOR gates and a delay of 3 gate layers (see Table 4.4). 
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Compared with the case F3-a, Camellia has a slightly more compact round structure 
(i.e., about 5% less in gate count than Case F3-a). However, each round of Camellia 
contributes much less to the security. Eleven rounds of F3-a provides equivalent 
security to nineteen rounds of Camellia. Further calculation shows that the overall 
hardware universal performance 'f/ of F3-a is about 50% higher than that of Camellia. 
The weighted performance comparison follows a similar trend. 
4.2.4 Synthesis Results 
The above performance analysis is based on theoretical evaluation of hardware com-
plexity. The usability of these analytical results can be verified when VLSI technol-
ogy is targeted. To avoid arduous work on synthesizing each cipher case, we did a 
high level synthesis of each component used in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The components 
are coded in VHDL and synthesized with Synopsys Design Compiler. Two CMOS 
libraries3 were used where most standard cells have one or two bit-wise inputs. 
During synthesis, if the minimum area (respectively, delay) is set as the main 
constraint\ the numbers of equivalent gates (respectively, critical delay time) of 8x8 
S-boxes are close to their estimates in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. The gates and delays 
of 4 x 4 S-boxes are slightly less than their estimates because it is much easier for 
CAD tools to simplify smaller S-boxes. This effect indicates that the performance 
advantage of using small S-boxes as shown in Figures 4.3 to 4.6 is significant and 
slightly understated. 
Since the MDS mapping is implemented in XOR gates, the areas and delays 
3lsL10k.db and TSMC's 0.18 p,m CMOS library are targeted separately. 
4When other constraints are set, the absolute values of area and delay will vary, but their 
comparison follows a similar trend. 
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closely follow the proportional relation of their estimates in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. Be-
cause XOR gates are larger and slower than other gate types, synthesis tools may 
replace them with other gates such as NXORs during optimization. Nevertheless, 
the delays and numbers of equivalent gates imply that a weight of 2 is reasonable 
for an XOR gate. This effect makes the cases with large MDS mapping worse in 
weighted performance, e.g., the cases in N8 to N12, F5, and F6. 
This problem is encountered in the realizations where a large percent of XORs 
are used. The weighted performance shown in Figures 4.4 and 4.6 are thus more 
useful for a closer comparison than the universal method. 
4.3 Summary 
In this chapter we have considered two cipher structures composed of S-boxes and 
MDS mappings. Various cipher cases were generated from these structures with 
different component configurations. Their security and complexity were examined 
and integrated into performance metrics. 
In hardware, the discussed cipher cases using large S-boxes are suitable for non-
pipelined and non-parallel applications where delay is the main design criterion. In 
pipelined and parallel applications, the cipher cases using smallS-boxes produce high 
performance. Further, appropriate selection of an MDS mapping layer is important 
for security against differential and linear attacks. With little change in the linear 
transformation, a suggestion was made to improve Camellia in terms of security and 
hardware efficiency. 
For a Feistel network, more rounds are needed to be secure against differential 
and linear attacks. Compared with Feistel networks, the nested SPNs generally have 
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higher hardware performance. When the same S-boxes are used, a nested SPN tends 
to be more efficient in hardware to resist differential and linear attacks. Considering 
the threat of integral attacks, nested SPNs with smaller S-boxes are preferred. 
Analogous with a nested SPN, MISTY [38] can be regarded as a nested Feistel 
network. Using provable security as the security measure, it will be interesting future 
work to compare the hardware performance between these two nested structures with 
similar performance metrics defined in Section 4.2. 
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Chapter 5 
Software Performance Characterization of 
Cipher Structures 
This chapter analyzes the software performance of cipher structures. The cipher 
structures studied are still nested SPNs and the class of Feistel networks analyzed 
in the previous chapter. Similar to the hardware performance metrics previously 
introduced, a novel performance metric is presented which allows us to consider 
the performance of a cipher structure as the combination of security and software 
efficiency. The parameterized cases of 128-bit block ciphers are studied. The software 
efficiency is mainly evaluated through a table-lookup implementation, where the 
number of table lookups is used as the time measure and the table size required 
is the space measure. A table-lookup implementation method is selected because 
it is usually efficient and such a method makes it possible to compare performance 
generally across different cipher configurations and different computing platforms. 
The efficiencies of other implementations (e.g., bitslicing, xtime [5], and power-index 
exchange) are also briefly examined. The content of this chapter is also presented 
in [80]. 
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5.1 Table Lookup Implementations 
The table lookup approach incorporates the S-boxes and the linear transformation 
into a table that is then accessed to perform both operations. This approach has 
been used for fast implementations of DES [9], AES [5], and Camellia [10]. Using this 
approach, the two cipher structures discussed in the former chapter can be imple-
mented efficiently in software through table lookups, logic operations (e.g., XORs), 
and rotations. This chapter analyzes the efficiency of such fast implementations so 
that the memory and computational cost for a cipher case can be estimated. Inde-
pendent of the targeted machine, the space complexity is evaluated as memory used 
for tables and the time complexity is evaluated by the number of table lookups. 
The table lookup approach is chosen for analysis because it is normally faster 
and more general than other implementation approaches. A table lookup operation 
involves the reading of data from memory and also encompasses other operations 
necessary for indexing such as rotation and masking. Although the number of clock 
cycles to implement different operations is machine dependent, using the number of 
lookups and the size of the tables is suitable for determining a rough estimate of the 
time and space complexity of an efficient software implementation. 
Larger tables require large data structures, and depending on the memory orga-
nization of the computer used, might require longer access times than smaller tables. 
This connection between the space and time complexities exists but becomes negligi-
ble when the tables that we compare are not far different in size. On the other hand, 
smaller tables may have indices with bit lengths less than 8 bits. In this case, shifting 
and masking are typically required for each lookup, which costs additional processing 
time. In this chapter, it is assumed that each table lookup requires the same access 
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time. The effect on lookup times caused by different table sizes, as will be examined 
in the experimental results of particular cipher cases, does not significantly affect our 
performance comparison. 
In software, regardless of the implementation approach, the S-box layer is typ-
ically done by table lookups. An MDS mapping based on a (2m, m, m + 1)-code 
conceptually performs a matrix multiplication over a Galois field, which requires m 2 
modular multiplications and m(m -1) XORs on words that are of the size of Galois 
field elements. To bypass costly multiplications, we enlarge the S-box table such 
that the MDS mapping work is included in the table lookups. This is the essence 
of the table lookup implementation. According to the size of the S-boxes and the 
type of MDS mappings, any cipher case may select appropriate methods as follows 
to generate lookup tables. 
5.1.1 Cases with 8 x 8 S-boxes 
The dataflow of a round in these cases involves the keyed input entering 8x8 S-boxes 
followed by l mappings based on a (2m, m, m+1)-code over GF(28). (The case of two 
concatenated mappings over GF(24) will be discussed later.) To represent the op-
erations mathematically, we denote the input, output, subkey, and MDS generation 
matrix as {Ai}, {Ei}, {Ki}, and {Ci,j}, respectively, each containing 8-bit elements. 
Thus, the key mixture, S-box layer, and MDS mapping are expressed together as: 
Eo Co,o Co,1 Co,m-1 S(Ao EI7 Ko) 
E1 C1,0 C1,1 C1,m-1 S(A1 EI7 K1) (5.1) -
Em-1 Cm-10 
' 
Cm-1,1 Cm-1,m-1 S(Am-1 EI7 Km-1) 
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Denoting the keyed input as Bi = Ai E9 Ki, (5.1) is equivalent to: 
Eo Co,o Com-1 
' 
E1 C1,0 
x S(Bo) E9 · · · E9 C1,m-1 
Em-1 Cm-10 
' 
Cm-1,m-1 
Hence, we may generate m tables as the following: 
Co,j x S(-) 
c1,j X S(-) 
Cm-1,j X S(-) 
X S(Bm-1). (5.2) 
(5.3) 
where 0:::;; j:::;; m-1. The output of several S-boxes followed by the MDS mapping 
may then be generated using: 
(5.4) 
Each fetch from the table Tj[·] accepts an 8-bit input as the index and produces 
an 8m-bit output from the indexed entry. It takes 256m2 bytes of memory to store 
these m tables. Given a processor with a word size of w bits, implementation of (5.4) 
needs mr8m/wllookups and (m-l)r8m/wl XORs. In cases where the word size w 
is larger than the size of a table index, the preparation of a table lookup input will 
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generally need a rotation and masking (bit-wise AND) within a word. 
When the size of an MDS field is smaller than the size of the S-boxes, we can 
consider an MDS mapping layer of more than one MDS mapping (i.e., the adjacent 
S-box output bits may pass through different mappings). The table Ti[·] is then es-
tablished through concatenation. Each entry of Ti[·] consists of concatenated results 
from different MDS mappings. The result from one mapping corresponds to a specific 
subset of the table lookup output. For example, considering 8 x 8 S-boxes followed 
by 2 x (2m, m, m + 1) over GF(24), each coefficient Cii in (5.1) can be regarded as 
concatenation of two 4-bit coefficients c;i and c;~ from two MDS mappings, so that 
cij = c;j II c;~' where " II " denotes concatenation. Then we generate m tables as: 
c~ .xs'(·) II c; .xs"(·) 
,J ,J 
7j[·] = c~,j x s'(-) II c~,j x s" (·) (5.5) 
where 0 :::; j :::; m - 1, s' ( ·) and s" ( ·) represent 4 output bits of an S-box, and 
s (-) = s' (.)II s" (.). When these concatenated tables { Tj [.]} are used in ( 5.4)' the 
size of tables and the number of lookups and XORs are the same as for the tables 
required in (5.3). 
5.1.2 Cases with 4 x 4 S-boxes 
In constrained environments such as smart cards, cipher cases using 4 x 4 S-boxes 
cost much less memory for table storage than those using 8 x 8 S-boxes. We can 
use the same method described by (5.2) and (5.4) to generate a set of small tables. 
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Since the variables Bi and Ei in (5.2) and (5.4) are now 4 bits, each fetch from the 
table Ti[·] accepts a 4-bit input as the index and produces a 4m-bit output from the 
indexed entry. It takes 8m2 bytes of memory to store these m tables since each table 
requires 16·m·4/8 = 8m bytes. Such an implementation needs mr4m/wllookups 
and (m-1) r 4m/w 1 XORs. 
When memory is not constrained, a modified method can be used to reduce the 
number of table lookups by a factor of 2. To implement a cipher case with 4 x 4 
S-boxes, each table 7j[·] in (5.4) has an index of 4 bits. We can combine two tables 
into one, represented by T'i, whose index is 8 bits. As a result, (5.4) is transformed 
to: 
(5.6) 
Em-1 
where Bi and Ei are representing 4-bit values. For each 8-bit input XII Y composed 
of 2 concatenated 4-bit values, X andY, the table performs: 
where 0 ~ j ~ m/2- 1. It takes 64m2 bytes of memory to store these m/2 tables. 
The implementation of (5.6) needs (m/2)f4m/wllookups and (m/2-l)f4m/wl 
XORs. 
The method expressed by (5.6) should also be chosen for the cases where the 
symbol length of an MDS mapping is larger than the S-box size. For example, the 
inputs of two adjacent 4x4 S-boxes followed by an MDS mapping over GF(28) have 
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to be combined as an 8-bit index to a table of 256 elements. 
5.2 Software Performance Comparison 
It is normally hard to compare software performance among different block ciphers. 
The main difficulties are: (1) each cipher has its own security margin, (2) each 
implementation method represents a tradeoff between memory and speed, (3) the 
number of clock cycles required by one operation is determined by the platform, 
and (4) one specific instruction set may facilitate some operation combinations (e.g., 
DSP processors can do multiplication and accumulation using one single instruction). 
Considering the above difficulties, in order to get around the last three problems, we 
select the table lookup approach as a general and efficient method to implement all 
the cipher cases. Moreover, a meaningful study of the performance of ciphers should 
make comparisons between ciphers in consideration of a consistent security level. 
5.2.1 Time Performance Metric 
In software, the memory used for table storage is independent of the number of 
rounds. Since the memory can be easily allocated in many computers1 , the tradeoff 
between space and time is not as important as that in hardware. Therefore, instead 
of defining three metrics for space, time, and overall performance as in the previous 
chapter, we care more about the time performance in software. To compare the time 
used for a given cipher to achieve a certain amount of security, we define the time 
performance measure "l(w) with respect to differential and linear attacks, where w is 
1The smart card is an exception where memory is restricted. 
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the processor word size: 
log2 1/ P 
7J(w) = (# of rounds) x (# of table lookups per round) (5.7) 
The numerator of (5.7) indicates the security of the cipher for the specified num-
her of rounds, where we use a heuristic approach to determine resistance to differ-
ential and linear cryptanalysis. For differential cryptanalysis, the number of chosen 
plaintexts to attack a cipher is expected to be in the order of 1/ P, where P is 
the maximum differential characteristic probability Pd determined by Theorems 4.1 
and 4.3; the number of known plaintexts required by linear cryptanalysis is expected 
to be in the order of 1/ P, where Pis the maximum linear characteristic probability 
P, of the cipher. For the nested SPNs and Feistel networks discussed in Chapter 4, 
log2 1/ P is a linear function of the number of rounds for both differential and linear 
cryptanalysis. Therefore, the value of 7J(w) indicates how much security is expected 
to be obtained within a unit running time (i.e., time for one table lookup), regardless 
of the number of rounds in a cipher. 
Note that one table lookup has associated with it the setup of an index (e.g., 
one rotation and one masking operation) and a post-lookup XOR. Among these 
operations, the table lookup would normally require the most clock cycles in most 
processors. Hence, we use the table lookups as a barometer for the number of oper-
ations required to implement the cipher. 
5.2.2 Comparison of Nested SPNs 
In the previous chapter, Table 4.1 lists the cases of nested SPNs in 12 categories 
(labelled as N1 to N12) defined by the S-boxes and M DSL. The values of Pd and P, 
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Table 5.1: Software Performance of 128-bit Nested SPNs 
# of table lookups 
Case Table size per 4 rounds 'Y/(8) 'Y/(32) 'Y/(64) 
(KBytes) 8-bit 32-bit 64-bit 
N1-a,b 17 320 96 64 0.51 1.69 2.53 
N2-a,b 17 320 96 64 0.51 1.69 2.53 
N3-a,b 17 320 96 64 0.51 1.69 2.53 
N4-a,b 8T 256 64 64 0.59 2.34 2.34 
N5-a,b 8T 256 64 64 0.59 2.34 2.34 
N6-a,b 17 320 96 64 0.51 1.69 2.53 
N7-a,b,c 17 320 96 64 0.51 1.69 2.53 
N8 64 1024 256 128 0.20 0.80 1.59 
N9 64.03125 576 192 128 0.18 0.53 0.80 
N10 64.03125 576 192 128 0.18 0.53 0.80 
Nll-a 16.125 384 128 96 0.23 0.70 0.94 
Nll-b 0.625 384 128 128 0.23 0.70 0.70 
N12-a 4.5 384 96 96 0.23 0.94 0.94 
N12-b 0.625 384 128 128 0.23 0.70 0.70 
t : By use of the same mapping in M DSL and M DSn, half of the table size can be saved. 
represent the differential and linear characteristic probabilities for 4r rounds evalu-
ated by Theorem 4.1 and used asP in (5.7) to determine Tf(w)· Table 5.1 lists the 
table size (i.e., the sum of sizes of tables required for M DSL and M DSn rounds) 
and the number of table lookups for 4 rounds for each cipher case. The table sizes 
listed in this table represent a minimum requirement and can only be achieved when 
an S-box does not differ from the corresponding S-box in another MDS mapping in 
the same layer (although S-boxes may be different within the domain of one MDS 
mapping). As a result, only one table as in (5.4) is required for each of the M DSL 
and MDSH layers. 
For each case using 4 x 4 S-boxes, the tables with 4-bit indices are created as 
shown in (5.4) or (5.5) when the MDS mapping is chosen over GF(24) or GF(22), re-
spectively. However, as explained in Section 5.1.2, the performance can be improved 
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by using 8-bit indices in the lookup as in (5.6) at the expense of more memory. For 
example, case N11-b can be implemented using 8-bit indices thereby doubling the 
efficiency but requiring 8 times the memory to store the lookup tables for both the 
M DSL and M DSH rounds. When GF(28 ) is chosen for the MDS mapping, the 
length of table indices has to be 8 bits. The number of table lookups is used in the 
calculation of the denominator in (5.7). 
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Figure 5.1: Software Performance Comparison of Nested SPNs 
The table also includes the performance "7(w) for each case. The implementation 
performance on three types of processors (i.e., w = 8, 32, 64) is considered. The 
implementation on an 8-bit processor is suitable for smart cards, where the memory 
size is constrained. The implementations on 32-bit and 64-bit processors are suitable 
for applications on general purpose computers and workstations. The values of 7J(w} 
are also presented in Figure 5.1. By comparing these measures, it is possible to 
distinguish the cases which are more efficient in software and the following general 
conclusions can be made: 
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• The implementation performance is improved when the word size of the proces-
sor increases, although in some cases there is no difference in the performance 
on a 32-bit or 64-bit processor. 
• The cases with larger S-boxes (N1, · · ·, N8) have better performance but cost 
more memory to store the lookup tables. 
• The cases with the same S-box size (N1, · · ·, N8 and N9, · · ·, N12) share similar 
performance although their memory requirements can vary significantly (as 
shown in Table 5.1). 
• Cases N4 and N5 have the best, or close to the best, performance for all word 
sizes. 
• As an example of N4-a, AES has very good performance. M DSL and M DSH 
in AES are based on the same (8,4,5) code. Therefore, half of the table size 
can be saved. Its byte-wise cyclic shifts (ShiftRow), before the MDS mapping, 
can be easily realized by taking the data from a modified byte location in the 
State as the index for a table lookup. Since the indirect addressing mode is 
supported by most processors, such a cyclic shift does not need to be coded 
separately in a table lookup implementation. 
5.2.3 Comparison of Feistel Networks 
The Feistel network discussed in this section is limited to the class described in 
Section 4.1, which has an SPN-like round function. The 128-bit cipher cases of this 
class have been listed in Table 4.2, which have 64-bit round functions consisting of 
sixteen 4 x 4 or eight 8 x 8 parallel S-boxes followed by an MDS mapping layer. To 
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ensure a good avalanche effect, an appropriate fixed permutation of MDS symbols 
after the MDS mapping is expected, which may cost a small amount of additional 
processing time. The cases of the same category in Table 4.2 only differ in the 
simplification of the MDS mapping. The performance comparison details are given 
in Table 5.2, where table lookups use 4-bit indices when 4 x 4 S-boxes are used in 
a cipher case. A summary of the performance measure 'f/(w) is also illustrated in 
Figure 5.2. The following conclusions can be drawn: 
• An MDS mapping that has a large branch number (i.e., m+l) results in good 
performance for implementations on computers supporting a large word size 
(e.g., comparing 'f/(S} and 'f/(64) in cases F3-a and F3-b). 
• Although they require more memory, the cases with 8x8 S-boxes demonstrate 
higher performance. 
• For the cases with 4x4 S-boxes, we can trade off memory and time requirements 
by choosing the element size of the MDS mapping. Using small Galois fields 
for the MDS codes, cases F4-b, F4-c, and F5-b can be used for some memory-
constrained applications. However, their performance is not as high as the 
counterparts using large Galois fields (e.g., F4-a and F5-a) for a word size 
larger than 8. 
• Compared with nested SPN networks, the Feistel networks discussed here need 
less memory but result in a lower performance. 
Camellia uses 8 x 8 S-boxes and a linear transformation that is not MDS-based 
with branch number 5. (An MDS-based linear transformation would have a branch 
number of 9.) Hence, a simplified Camellia structure (without FL/FL-1 functions) 
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Table 5.2: Software Performance of 128-bit Feistel Networks 
# of table lookups 
Case Table size per round 11(8) 11(32) 11(64) 
(KBytes) 8-bit 32-bit 64-bit 
F1-a,b,c 1 16 8 8 0.33 0.66 0.66 
F2-a,b 4 32 8 8 0.26 1.03 1.03 
F3-a,b 16 64 16 8 0.22 0.89 1.78 
F4-a 1 16 8 8 0.11 0.22 0.22 
F4-b,c 0.03125 16 16 16 0.11 0.11 0.11 
F5-a 4 32 8 8 0.09 0.34 0.34 
F5-b 0.125 32 16 16 0.09 0.17 0.17 
F6-a 16 64 16 8 0.07 0.30 0.59 
F6-b 0.5 64 16 16 0.07 0.30 0.30 
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produces a security level equivalent to F2-a,b in Table 4.2. A fast Camellia imple-
mentation using table lookups was introduced in [10], which incorporates the linear 
transformation and 8-boxes into several tables with 8-bit indices and 64-bit entries. 
In this method, a simplified Camellia has the equivalent number of table lookups 
to 18-round F3-a,b. As a result, Camellia uses tables as large as F3-a,b, while its 
performance is lower than both F2-a,b and F3-a,b on 32-bit processors and equal to 
F2-a,b but lower than F3-a,b on 64-bit processors. 
5.2.4 Experimental Results 
The performance comparison above is based on the assumption that the number of 
lookups is a good time measure for table lookup implementations. We implemented 
typical SPN cipher cases from Table 4.1 in "C" using the MS Visual C++ 6.0 compiler 
and determined the throughput for each implementation on an Intel Pentium III 
933MHz computer. The throughput is measured by encrypting a data file containing 
millions of plaintexts. It is expected that the throughput will vary inversely to the 
number of lookups, considering throughput to be defined as: 
h h block length t roug put= ______ ___;;;_ __ _ 
processing time for each block 
As shown in Table 5.3, the expected trend in throughput can be observed in the 
implementations when the number of rounds are set to the same value, especially in 
the compiler optimized version. When the table index is 8 bits, the byte permuta-
tion after the lookup operations (e.g., the concatenation of parallel MDS mappings 
discussed in Theorem 4.2) can be easily done by reordering the table lookup inputs 
for next round. When the table index is 4 bits as in Nll-b, bit manipulation within 
105 
bytes costs more processing time. This cost is compensated by the use of small ta-
bles, which can be easily cached during the program run. The bottom two rows of 
Table 5.3 lists the results of our 10-round AES implementation and reference code 
in ANSI C2.0 [81], respectively. 
Table 5.3: Experimental Results of 32-bit Implementations of Nested SPNs 
Case # Throughput (Mbitsjs) #lookups Comments 
rounds non-optimized optimized (4 rounds) 
N1-a 32 18.16 45.65 96 similar to N2, N3, N6, N7 
N4-a 32 22.58 60.86 64 similar to 32-round AES 
N8 32 10.49 17.02 256 with uniform round 
Nll-b 32 16.06 36.21 128 similar to Nl2-b 
N4-a 10 68.38 155.91 64 10-round AES (our code) 
N4-a 10 119.51 120.64 64 reference AES code 
Table 5.4: Experimental Results of Two Real Ciphers 
Cipher Throughput (Mbitsjs) #lookups 
non-optimized optimized 
AES 32.7 55.3 160 
(10 rounds, 32-bit) 
Simplified Camellia 20.1 72.5 288 
(18 rounds, 32-bit) 
Simplified Camellia 35.2 87.3 144 
(18 rounds, 64-bit) 
The experimental throughput results for AES and Camellia using the GNU C++ 
compiler on a 64-bit Alpha machine (COMPAQ AlphaServer DSlO) are listed in Ta-
ble 5.4. The 32-bit implementations of AES and Camellia are tested on this machine 
by using 32-bit data type arrays to store lookup tables and 32-bit operations for 
XORs. Before optimization, the throughput and the inverse of estimated number of 
lookups follow the same trend. After optimization, the 32-bit Camellia implementa-
tion is largely improved and close to its 64-bit implementation. With the smallest 
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number of lookups, the 64-bit simplified Camellia is still the fastest after optimiza-
tion. It should be noted that such software comparison of Table 5.4 is purely based 
on software throughput. When security is considered simultaneously as shown in 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2, AES has a higher performance (as a typical SPN corresponding 
to N4-a) than Camellia. This reflects the fact that the Camellia cipher has a lower 
security margin than the AES cipher. Note that it is not meaningful to compare the 
numbers in Table 5.3 to Table 5.4 as the implementation platforms are different. 
5.3 Alternative Implementations 
Besides the table lookup approach, a block cipher can be implemented in other ways 
based on its structure. We briefly discuss these alternatives without a full expose of 
their characterization because they apply to specialized circumstances rather than 
having general application. 
5.3.1 Bitslice Implementations 
For some cipher cases, a bitslice software implementation derived from the gate level 
circuit may be more efficient in parallelized applications [34]. A bitslice design is 
suitable for the cases whose synthesized circuits are compact. A w-bit processor 
can be regarded as w bit-processors in parallel. The gate level network circuit is 
described with instructions in software. Each bit in hardware corresponds to a word 
in software and each word is the concatenation of bits belonging to w separate blocks. 
Given enough registers in a processor, the memory requirement is negligible since no 
table lookups are necessary. Typically, the bitslice technique can be applied in three 
ways: 
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(a) Parallel blocks: This is the classic bitslice implementation. A total of w plain-
text blocks are reorganized so that the bits at the same bit positions of different 
original blocks are now collected in one register. The number of registers re-
quired to store these blocks is equal to the block size of the cipher. Then, 
all registers are used as signals to a gate network deduced from a hardware 
implementation. Each gate in the network corresponds to a logic operation 
in software. The output signals, w bits each, are converted to their original 
format as w ciphertext blocks. Whether a cipher case discussed in this chapter 
is suitable for bitslice implementation can be determined from its space per-
formance value 'f/s in hardware, which was investigated in Chapter 4. When 
'f/s is high, a compact gate network can be used. The gate count of the circuit 
determines the number of instructions used in the bitslice software. Thus, a 
high 'f/s indicates a small number of clock cycles in software. 
(b) Bitslice cipher: Serpent [33) is an example of an internal bitslice implementa-
tion. In Serpent, each 128-bit block is expressed as four 32-bit words after a 
bit permutation. 8-boxes in each round can be regarded as 32 sets of parallel 
and identical 4 x 4 gate networks. A word is the collection of 32 bit signals, 
each corresponding to its own set of gate networks at the same locations. The 
other cipher operations can also be easily expressed by words. At the end of 
encryption, the bits of the four output words are permuted to form a 128-bit 
block. 
(c) Within special linear operations: It has been shown that several parallel MDS 
mappings can be concatenated into one big mapping. When the number of 
parallel MDS mappings in each round, denoted by w', is at least 8, there is a 
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more subtle bitslice method within the round structure, as used in Hierocrypt 's 
MDS mapping [37]. The linear expression of each output bit is extended to the 
expression of words, whose size is w' bits. The input and output bit variables 
are replaced with word variables, each including w' adjacent bits. Such a 
method works for any concatenated linear transformation with a convenient 
number of parallel sets. This parallel structure within a specific operation 
avoids the overhead caused by the block representation transformation between 
the standard form and bitslice parallel form as required in (a). 
5.3.2 Power Implementations 
Although the table lookup method is very efficient, the memory required for table 
storage is usually too large for a smart card, which has a restricted memory size. 
Hence, it is desirable to utilize a fast implementation for a smart card application 
that does not require large tables. Because an S-box just requires a small array, the 
main concern is then how to perform MDS mappings with low memory cost. 
Defined as 1-bit left shift followed by bit-wise XOR with an appropriate irre-
ducible polynomial in [5], the xtime operation can be used to perform multiplications 
for the MDS mapping. The operation xtime has no table lookups and the matrix 
multiplication is easier when all coefficients meet two requirements: (1) low Ham-
ming weights and (2) low value. It is easy to find an MDS mapping satisfying these 
two requirements. When an SPN uses this mapping, however, the mapping's inverse 
used for decryption does not necessarily satisfy the two conditions and many more 
operations are therefore needed, making decryption much slower than encryption. 
As we know, any element in a finite field can be expressed by both its power 
representation and its polynomial representation. As a result, the multiplication of 
109 
two elements can be realized by index addition on their power representations (22]. 
Here we examine the software efficiency when this approach is used for cipher imple-
mentations on a processor. Note that this approach cannot be used for AES which 
has its MDS mapping based on an irreducible but not primitive polynomial. 
Suppose poly(·) returns the polynomial representation of a GF(2n) element from 
the index of power representation and its inverse function is denoted as pow(·). We 
know that 
Y = C ·X= poly((pow(C) + pow(X)) mod (2n-l)) 
when C =/::. 0, X =/::. 0, and where Y is in polynomial representation. If the processor 
records the carry bit c for n-bit addition pow( C) +pow(X), the modulo operation 
can be bypassed: 
Y = C ·X= poly((pow(C) + pow(X)) +c) . 
Using this method to perform the MDS mapping after substitution, C indicates one 
coefficient in MDS generation matrix C. Each coefficient C in C is constant and 
nonzero. Denote pow( C) as Cpow· If X is the output of ann x n S-box S(-) with 
input Z, substitutionS(-) can be merged into the above operations: 
Y = C ·X= poly(Cpow + pow(S(Z)) +c) . 
Therefore, each multiplication over Galois fields costs two additions and two table 
lookups. The two tables for poly(·) and pow(S(Z)) need 2n+1 bytes in total. It can 
be seen that the nature of the coefficients in generation matrix C does not affect the 
speed of multiplication. If the coefficients inC are randomly selected, this method 
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is more efficient than the xtime method and, hence, does provide better balance 
between the speeds of encryption and decryption. 
5.3.3 General Comparison of Methods 
Table 5.5 gives a general comparison of the software implementation methods dis-
cussed in this section. 
Table 5.5: Comparison of Software Methods Used in MDS Codes 
MDS coefficents S-box/MDS 
Method Speed Memory Universal affect affect operations 
speed memory merged? 
Table lookups fast large yes no no yes 
Bitslice parameter- none noT yes no no 
dependent 
Power slow small yes+ no* no yes 
xtime slow none yes yes no no 
t : the number of parallel sets should be compatible with machine operand sizes. 
+ : the polynomial to define the finite field must be primitive. 
* : it can make a small difference depending on how many coefficients are ls in C. 
5.4 Summary 
We have considered the software performance of two cipher structures composed 
of S-boxes and MDS mappings. Various cipher cases were generated from these 
structures with different component configurations. Table lookup implementations 
were used to evaluate the software efficiency of the various cases. A performance 
metric was defined to capture the security and efficiency simultaneously. With the 
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tendency similar to hardware performance, cases using 8 x 8 S-boxes are faster than 
cases using 4x4 S-boxes and nested SPNs are more efficient in obtaining security than 
Feistel networks. Specifically, AES and Camellia were analyzed in terms of software 
performance, and some interesting performance features were noted and confirmed 
through experimental results. Three other software implementation methods that are 
applicable in special circumstances were also discussed and their general advantages 
and disadvantages were listed. 
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Chapter 6 
Applicability of XSL Attacks 
Many comparisons of security, complexity, and performance have been made in the 
previous chapters among block ciphers composed of 4 x 4 and 8 x 8 S-boxes. The 
security estimate is based on differential, linear, and integral cryptanalysis. Recently, 
it has been found that many block ciphers can be described by overdefined systems 
of quadratic equations. Although solving Multivariate Quadratic (MQ) equations is 
NP-hard, it is observed in [82, 83] that the complexity could be subexponential if the 
equations are overdefined. As a result, the complexity evaluations claimed in [11, 84] 
to break AES and Serpent by solving an overdefined set of quadratic equations are 
lower than in an exhaustive search. Since the computation is too large, neither 
the two ciphers nor their simplified variants with a reduced number of rounds have 
been practically attacked as of now. However, for cipher designers, the potential 
attack may be a security concern because efficient algorithms to solve overdefined 
MQ equations could be found in the future. 
In this chapter, while we do not study the details of the attack, some proper-
ties are discussed based on a toy cipher example presented in [11]. Moreover, a 
method to evaluate a cipher's susceptibility to this attack is proposed with results 
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applied to several currently proposed block ciphers and a newS-box design criterion 
is presented. 
6.1 Introduction to XSL Attacks 
A block cipher can be sometimes described by a system of MQ equations. The 
equations involve bit values of input, output, key, and intermediate data. When the 
unknown bit values are not more than the equations, it is possible to get the key 
bits as part of the equation system solution. For example, Figure 6.1 shows a very 
simple partial encryption system1 from a 2-bit plaintext (x1 , x0 ) to a 2-bit ciphertext 
(zt, z0 ). The S-box performs substitution as shown in Table 6.1. A 2-bit key (kt, ko) 
is mixed with the S-box output (y1, y0 ) by XORs. 
S-box 
Zt Zo 
Figure 6.1: A Simple Example 
Table 6.1: Mapping Table of a 2 x 2 S-box 
Input x1xo 0 1 2 3 
Output Y1Yo 3 2 0 1 
1Such a trivial toy system is, of course, trivial to break and is simply for illustration purposes. 
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The 8-box in Figure 6.1 can be described by the equations over GF(2) as shown 
in (6.1). 
1 = xo + Xt +Yo 
0 = XoXl + XoYo 
0 = Xo + XoXt + XoYt (6.1) 
0 = XoXt + XtYo 
0 = XtYl 
1 = Xo + Xt + XoXt + YoYt 
We denote r as the number of possible linearly independent quadratic equations for 
an S-box and denote t as the number of different terms (including "1") in these 
equations. In this case, r = 7 and t = 11. An equation system is overdefined if r 
is much larger than the size of the 8-box, e.g., 2 bits in this example. Two other 
equations can be written for key mixture: 
{ zo = xo + ko 
Zt = Xt + kt 
(6.2) 
If a plaintext and its ciphertext are obtained, we can easily determine the key 
(k1 , k0 ) by solving the equation system consisting of (6.1) and (6.2), i.e., 4 unknown 
variables y1, y0 , k1, and k0 with 9 equations. When the quadratic equation sys-
tern becomes larger and contains many more unknown variables, however, it will be 
hard to get the solution. In fact, solving systems of MQ equations is an NP-hard 
problem [82]. 
It has been observed that the complexity to find the solution drops significantly 
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if the equations are overdefined. Moreover, if the equations are sparse, the com-
plexity could be further reduced. Three algorithms have been proposed to solve 
overdefined MQ problems. They are relinearization [82], XL [85], and XSL [11] al-
gorithms. Based on relinearization and XL algorithms, XSL stands for "eXtended 
Sparse Linearization" or "multiply(X) by Selected monomials and Linearization". 
The XSL attack on a block cipher begins with the initial equations for each n x n 
S-box, which has r equations and t terms. Based on these equations derived from 
S-boxes, a system of equations is then written for the whole cipher. Assuming at 
least one pair of plaintext and ciphertext is known, the intermediate bits and key bits 
are unknown variables to be solved in these equations. Each equation of an S-box 
is multiplied by all possible terms for all subsets of ({3 - 1) other S-boxes, where 
the parameter {3 is a positive integer selected during the attack. Then, each term of 
high degree is considered as a new variable and Gaussian elimination is performed. 
It is assumed that at least one univariant equation (i.e., with only one unknown 
variable but the equation contains the powers of the variable in this case) can be 
generated through Gaussian elimination [85]. Such an equation can be solved with 
Berlekamp's algorithm [86]. With the results of possible univariable equations, the 
former equation systems can be simplified and a similar process can be repeated until 
all variables are determined. 
To perform a general XSL attack (the first XSL attack in [11]), one working 
condition has to be satisfied. Denote T as the number of terms in the equations and 
T' as the number of terms that can be multiplied by one original bit variable and still 
belong to the set of T terms. Denote Free as the number of linearly independent 
equations that are newly generated. In [11], the working condition of XSL attacks is 
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given as 
Free 1 
T-T' > 
and the complexity of the attack is evaluated by 
(6.3) 
t-r ~ ~ (--)wf3 ·(Block Size)wf3 ·(Number of rounds)2wf3 (6.4) 
n 
where the coefficient w is the exponent associated with the complexity of Gaussian 
elimination. Typically, w = 3. An improved method presented in [87] can lead w to 
be no more than 2.376. This upper bound of w is used in the complexity evaluation 
of (6.4). 
Applying the XSL attack on AES of 128-bit blocks and 256-bit keys, the expected 
workload is Tw ~ 2298 , which is higher than that for an exhaustive search. Further, a 
new cipher BES is defined in [84] which uses simple algebraic operations over GF(28). 
It has been shown in [84] that AES can be regarded as a special case of BES. As 
a result, by describing AES in its BES equivalent form, an extremely sparse and 
overdefined multivariant quadratic systems can be constructed over GF(28 ). In this 
approach, it is expected that even AES of 128-bit keys may also be vulnerable with 
the estimated complexity Tw ::::::::: 287 [11, 84]. The complexity to break Serpent using 
a key of 256 bits is evaluated as Tw ~ 2210 [11]. For each attack, the value of (J must 
be large enough to ensure that Free> T- T'. However, a small increase of (J (even 
1 or 2) results in a much larger workload. 
117 
6.2 Effectiveness of the Attack 
Since the XSL attack has not yet been demonstrated to work as claimed by its 
authors, it is still unclear whether it should be regarded as a serious security threat. 
Some skepticism of this attack has been raised in the cryptology community [88, 89]. 
It appears that the XSL attack could be applied in theory to break AES and 
Serpent. However, two main issues have to be noted when effectiveness is scrutinized. 
Firstly, the working condition stipulated in (6.3) is necessary but not sufficient for the 
success of the attack. Secondly, a sub-exponential (or even polynomial) complexity 
is largely based on the conjecture that (3 grows very slowly (or is even constant) when 
the number of rounds or the block size increases. 
Due to the difficulty in undertaking the massive computation, the effectiveness 
of an attack is typically based on the simulation of simplified versions of targeted 
ciphers. For example, differential and linear attacks are well believed to work because 
the expected complexity can be demonstrated well on DES with a reduced number 
of rounds [39, 40]. Until now, the only achievable simulation of the XSL attack on 
a block cipher came from the Appendix of [90]. A "toy" cipher is targeted for the 
simulated attack, which is an SPN composed of 3 x 3 S-boxes. Each round of the 
cipher contains round key XORing, a layer of parallel S-boxes, and bit permutation. 
Applying XSL to the toy cipher with different block sizes and numbers of rounds, 
the working condition is satisfied within a reasonably small number of rounds. The 
results from [90] are presented2 in Table 6.2. 
For each case in Table 6.2, it is emphasized in [11, 90] that the number of rounds 
does not cause the complexity to increase exponentially. When the block size of the 
2The complexity is calculated by Tw where w = 2.376. 
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Table 6.2: Maximum Number of Rounds for a Toy Cipher to Satisfy XSL Working 
Condition 
II # S-boxes/round I Block size # rounds I Complexity 
II : I ~~. 
toy cipher is fixed (6, 12, or 24 bits), the values of{::_<;;, appear to "either converge to 
a fixed value, or they decrease very slowly" [90] as the number of rounds increases. 
However, a trend different from such an optimistic conjecture seems to be overlooked. 
When the block size of the cipher increases, the maximum number of rounds for which 
the working condition is satisfied decreases. As a result, it is not surprising that the 
working condition cannot be satisfied for even one round of the toy cipher with a 
large block size, e.g., on the order of 128 bits. More extensive simulation will be 
necessary to understand the effectiveness of the attack when applied to realistically 
sized block ciphers. 
6.3 Applicability to Cipher Structures 
More research is required to clearly understand the actual complexity of XSL attacks. 
Even so, it is wise for a cipher designer to evaluate the potential security threat from 
this attack. As a necessary requirement to launch an XSL attack, the S-box must 
be able to be described by overdefined MQ equations. Based on this concept, we 
propose a new criterion to S-box design which is more straightforward and applicable 
than the security contribution r suggested in [11). 
For an nxn S-box with input X= (xn-1, · · ·, xo) and output Y = (Yn-1, ···,Yo), 
the total number of possible terms {1, Xn-b ···,Yo, Xn-1Xn-2, · · ·, Y1Yo} in a quadratic 
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expression is: t = n(2n-1)+2n+1 = 2n2+n+l. Denote { c0 , · · ·, Ct-1} as the binary 
coefficients associated with the t terms in any possible quadratic equation. For 
each possible X, 0 ~X~ 2n -1, we calculate the values of the t terms and denote 
them by {ax,o, · · · ,ax,t-1}· Then we can write 2n equations to form a system with 
{co,···, Ct-d as the unknown: 
ao,o ao,1 ao,t-1 co 0 
a1,o a1,1 a1,t-1 C1 0 
- (6.5) 
a2n-1,0 a2n-1,1 a2n-1,t-1 Ct-1 0 
Each possible nonzero solution of { c0 , · · · , Ct-d will form a quadratic expression of 
the S-box. Denote A as the matrix composed of ai,j, 0 ~i~ 2n-1 and 0 ~j~ t-1, 
in (6.5). We have the rank of A, denoted as R(A), bounded by 
R(A) < min(2n, t) 
< min(2n, 2n2 + n + 1) . 
When n ~ 6, R(A) ~ 2n < t. Assuming the S-box is such that R(A) = 2n, we 
get the expressions of the 2n terms' coefficients c0 , • • ·, c2n_1 by Gaussian elimination 
on (6.5). Without loss of generality, we suppose they are the first 2n terms: 
co boo 
' 
bo 1 
' 
C1 b1 0 
' 
bll 
' 
-
C2n-1 b2n-1 0 
' 
b2n-11 
' 
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where the binary constants b0 ,0 , • • ·, b2n_1,t_2n_1 are calculated from Gaussian elimi-
nation. Thus, (t- 2n) independent vectors are obtained to express all solutions: 
co boo 
' 
bo 1 
' 
+ .. ·+Ct-1 0 (6.6) 
0 1 0 
Ct-1 0 0 1 
Therefore, (t- 2n) linearly independent quadratic equations can be written for the 
8-box when R(A) = 2n. More generally, when R(A) :::;; t, the number of independent 
quadratic equations written for the 8-box is t- R(A). If t- R(A) > n, the system 
is overdefined. 
When n > 6, R(A) :::;; t < 2n. If the 8-box is randomly generated, it can be 
shown that the possibility that R(A) = t is very high. When R(A) = t, there is 
no nontrivial solution for (6.5) (i.e., { c0 , ... , Ct-1} must be all zeros). Therefore, the 
X8L attack cannot be launched. When R(A) < t, the X8L is possible depending on 
the security contribution [11]: 
In this case, r = t- R(A). We get 
r = (R(A))rR~A>l . 
n 
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It should be noted that r = (t/n)rt/nl when R(A) = t. In this case, the complexity 
evaluation is meaningless because the attack definitely fails due to nonexistence of 
quadratic expressions for 8-boxes. Therefore, the security contribution provided 
in [11] is not a straightforward way to evaluate the susceptibility of a cipher to the 
attack. Thus, we give an easy approach to evaluate the potential susceptibility of an 
8-box to the X8L attack as the following: 
(a) Calculate matrix A given the mapping table of the 8-box. 
(b) Calculate the rank of matrix A, R(A). 
(c) Compare R(A) with t. If R(A) =t, the cipher is resistant to the XSL attack. 
Otherwise, the difference between t and R(A) shows how susceptible the cipher 
may be to the XSL attack. 
The resistance to the X8L attack comes from the difficulty to describe 8-boxes 
using quadratic equations. This approach can be used by cipher designers to ensure 
that, even if the X8L algorithm becomes practical, the cipher is still immune to this 
attack. It is important to note that ciphers based on 4 x 4 8-boxes cannot be easily 
made immune because R(A) :::; 2n < t when n = 4, while for 8 x 8 8-boxes this is 
possible. 
Table 6.3 shows the evaluated resistance of several block ciphers including 10 
randomly generated 8 x 8 8-boxes. The 8-boxes of AE8, Camellia, Hierocrypt-3, 
and MISTY have similar algebraic structures which are power operations over finite 
fields. Such a structure has been proved (e.g., as in [91]) to be able to enhance 
the resistance to differential and linear attacks. The power operation can also be 
simplified by the equivalent operations in the composite field although the advantage 
in circuit synthesis is not as significant as expected (as shown in Chapter 3). For the 
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Table 6.3: Evaluated Susceptibility to the XSL Attack 
Cipher S-box Ps qs t-R(A) Algebraic Comments 
size n structure 
Serpent 4 2-2 2-2 21 random susceptible 
AES 
Camellia 8 2-6 2-6 39 power over G F susceptible 
Hierocrypt-3 
Hierocrypt 8 2-5.42 2-5.01:~ 23 unknown susceptible 
MISTY S7 7 2 ·6 2 -6 21 power over G F susceptible 
MISTY S9 9 2-!S 2-!S 36 power over G F susceptible 
Anubis 8 2 ·5 2 ·;i.!S;i 0 random immune 
Khazad 
RS-1,9T 8 2-4.ti!S 2 -4 0 random immune 
RS-2,3,5,6t 8 2 -4.42 2 -4 0 random immune 
RS-4,7,8,10T 8 2-4.1Y 2 -4 0 random immune 
t : RS-1,· · ·,10 are randomly generated by computer. 
same reason, these S-boxes might be prone to be attacked based on some algebraic 
methods and the XSL attack encourages more attempts in this direction. On the 
other hand, S-boxes with this algebraic structure are only a very small subset of all 
possible bijective mappings. It is very easy to generate S-boxes randomly with the 
full rank of matrix A. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the full rank of matrix A 
as a criterion for future S-box selection, when other criteria have been satisfied. 
It should be noted that even if susceptibility is observed by this method, the suc-
cess of an XSL attack is still based on the reasonableness of the complexity evaluated 
in [11]. The XSL attack cannot work on the ciphers proved to be immune in this 
method even if its complexity is implied to be low by the analysis in [11]. 
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6.4 Summary 
This chapter briefly discussed the effectiveness of XSL attacks and their applicability 
to block ciphers. An approach was proposed to check the immunity of an S-box to 
this attack. It has been shown that ciphers using 8 x 8 S-boxes can be easily designed 
to be immune to this attack while it is hard for ciphers using 4 x 4 S-boxes. The 
potential susceptibility of several block ciphers to XSL attacks was also analyzed 
using this approach. 
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Chapter 7 
Simple Power Attacks on Cipher Key 
Schedules 
This chapter explores a potential vulnerability when a block cipher is implemented in 
an 8-bit smart card environment. Introduced in [56], power analysis exploits the fact 
that the power consumption of some cryptographic implementations is dependent on 
the intermediate data values. It is indicated in [92] that many smart card processors 
demonstrate a roughly linear relation between the Hamming weight of the data and 
the power consumed at the associated clock cycle. The Hamming weight attacks 
against the key schedules of DES and AES were discussed in [93, 94]. It was shown 
in [94] that an AES cipher key could be deduced given accurate leakage information 
of Hamming weights and a pair of plaintext and ciphertext. The susceptibility of 
NESSIE candidates to power attacks was theoretically evaluated in [95], which mainly 
focused on differential power analysis and gave Camellia a high rank among others. 
In this chapter, we apply a simple power analysis to Camellia's key schedule as a 
typical example and demonstrate that the attack works even if leakage information 
bears noise and distortion. Using the same typical leakage model, our attack on 
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Camellia runs faster than the attack on AES presented in [94] and does not require 
any pair of plaintext and ciphertext. More generally, a method is proposed to evalu-
ate how vulnerable a block cipher is toward similar attacks. The countermeasures in 
terms of both design rationale and implementation are also suggested. The content 
of this chapter is also presented in [96]. 
7.1 Camellia's 128-Bit Key Schedule 
The attack described in this chapter is focused on Camellia's 128-bit key schedule [6]. 
The attacking technique to be discussed can be easily modified for the 192- and 256-
bit key schedules. 
Camellia's 128-bit key schedule expands 26 subkeys of 64 bits from the original 
key KL and another derived key KA of 128 bits. Each subkey can be obtained as one 
half of KL or KA after they are left rotated for a specific number of bits. This number 
can be 0, 15, 30 (only for KA), 45, 60, 77 (only for KL), 94, or 111, depending on the 
round number. During encryption or decryption, 18 sub keys are used for the round 
function in the 18 rounds. The other 8 subkeys are used for pre-, post-whitening and 
the F L-, F L - 1-functions. 
KA is derived from the original key KL through a Feistel network. As shown 
in Figure 7.1, KL is the input of such a network. The left half is the input to the 
same round function as in encryption. The round function can be divided into 3 
steps: (1) a 64-bit constant, denoted as Ei for round i, is XORed with the input, 
(2) the S-function performs byte-wise bijective substitution, and (3) the P-function 
performs a linear transformation. The output of the round function is XORed with 
the right half of the round input. The two halves are then swapped. This Feistel 
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structure is iterated for a total of 4 rounds for the 128-bit key schedule. Note that 
the intermediate result after 2 rounds is XORed with KL to form the next round 
input. To ease the description of the attack in later sections, each 64-bit block in 
Figure 7.1 is labelled as 7i, 0 ~i ~17 . 
• To • $£1 T2 
S-function T3 
P-function T4 / 
' 
-
S.7 
-
• 
a:>L; T6 
To Ts 
S-function T1 
P-function Ts f 
' ...__ ~./ 
c I Ts 
I ®KL I 
T9 ® To= Ts • $£3 Tto 
S-function Tu 
P-function T12 f 
' ~./ 
- -
• 6:>14 Tt4 Ts 
S-function Tts 
P-function T16 , 
' _":::...1 
I I 
_t 
Figure 7.1: Camellia's 128-bit Key Schedule 
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7.2 Hamming Weight Attack 
The Hamming weight attack exploits the relation between data and its Hamming 
weight derived by examining a power trace. If the Hamming weight can be captured 
from a poorly designed cryptographic device, we can use it to eliminate those data 
candidates failing to meet this relation. Given a Hamming weight of h for a particular 
byte, there are (~) byte values consistent with this weight. Hence, as deduced 
in [57, 94], the number of byte values consistent with a Hamming weight is expected 
to be 
( ) ( )
2 
8 8 8 1 8 
Lprob{H = h} = L 256 ~ 50.27. 
h=O h h=O h 
(7.1) 
Thus, to attack a block cipher with 128-bit key running on an 8-bit processor, the 
leakage of Hamming weight information for each key byte straightforwardly enables 
attackers to reduce the possible key space from 2128 to 50.2716 ~ 290·43 • However, 
depending on the nature of a block cipher, the outcome of a Hamming weight attack 
could be much simpler than this reduced workload if many intermediate values are 
derived from a small subset of key or subkey bits. For example, the attack presented 
in this chapter exploits the redundancy in the key schedule of Camellia and is able 
to determine all key bits without knowledge of any plaintext and ciphertext pair. 
The complexity of our attack is very low, e.g., a processing time of 5 ms on a Pill 
computer. 
7.2.1 Basic Power Leakage Model 
A popular power leakage model was proposed in [92] with two assumptions. One 
assumption is that the processor leaks the Hamming weights of data being processed. 
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For example, for an XOR operation on bytes such as Z = X ED Y, information of 
the Hamming weights of X, Y, and Z can be derived by examining the processor 
power consumption. It is also assumed that the power consumed by the processor 
demonstrates a linear relation to the Hamming weight of the processed data. As 
defined in [92], the power consumption at a specific time j is 
Power[j] = c · H[j] + L + n (7.2) 
where H[j] is the Hamming weight at time j, L is the additive constant portion in 
the power trace, c represents the incremental amount of power caused by each extra 
1 in the Hamming weight, and n is a random variable with zero mean representing 
noise. 
In the basic model of this chapter, we need not restrict the Hamming weight-
power relation to be linear. Instead, we simply assume that the power consumption 
monotonically varies in relation to the change of the Hamming weight of processed 
data. Hence, the power consumption is 
Power[j] = f(H[j]) + L + n (7.3) 
where f(·) is a monotonically increasing or decreasing function. We also assume that 
the influence of L and n can both be ignored by offsetting and averaging over several 
similar power traces. Therefore, the Hamming weight can be reliably quantized from 
Power[j]. Our attack discussed in this section is based on this basic model. 
The transition count information of Hamming weight is not considered in this 
attack because the Hamming weight difference possibly measured between two se-
quential clock cycles is determined by the order of the code, which depends on coding 
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styles as well as the key schedule specification. 
7.2.2 Requirements for the Attack 
In general, in order to launch a Hamming weight attack, the following prerequisites 
have to be satisfied. 
• Access to the power consumption. The attacker needs to collect the power 
consumption traces from the cryptographic device. A typical approach is to 
sample the current through a small resistor, which is inserted between external 
power or ground and its corresponding pin on the smart card. 
• Ability to identify the clock cycles for individual steps in the key schedule. For 
example, if the attacker knows the implementation well (e.g., a former em-
ployee), the timing information can be easily determined. Alternatively, a 
general method is suggested in [93] to distinguish the periods used for the key 
schedule from periods associated with data processing. The basic idea is to ex-
ecute the protocol many times on several smart cards, each with different user 
information. Then, statistical analysis is performed to identify those clock cy-
cles in which the same card behaves similarly with various data to be encrypted 
but different cards behave differently even if the same data is encrypted. These 
clock cycles are assumed to be used for the key schedule. Within these peri-
ods, the attacker can identify the clock cycles for specific operations based on 
features of the key schedule. 
• Monotonic relation between power and Hamming weight. The power consumed 
by the attacked device has to be at least a monotonic function of the Hamming 
weight of the processed data as indicated in (7.3), if not a linear function. 
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• One pair of plaintext and ciphertext. The Hamming weight attack is expected 
to reduce the key space to a small subset. The cipher key is then distinguished 
by checking which of the remaining keys can be used to encrypt the plain-
text to the expected ciphertext. As shown later for Camellia, when enough 
Hamming weights can be collected, we can deduce all key bits with certainty 
without requiring a plaintext encryption and in this case, this requirement is 
not necessary. 
7.2.3 Attack Against Camellia Subkey Generation 
Our attack on Camellia is implemented through two steps. The first step exploits 
the rotational relations between KL and the resultant subkeys; the second step will 
exploit relations in the derivation of KA from K£. Several64-bit subkeys are derived 
from KL through left rotation for a certain number of bit positions (denoted by 
"<<<"). Since attackers can only check the Hamming weight of each byte, the 
rotation offsets (15, 45, 60, 77, 94, 111) provide information determined by the 
equivalent shift in byte-oriented bit positions as given by the remainder when the 
rotation offset is divided by 8. Hence rotation offsets (15, 45, 60, 77, 94, 111) are 
equivalent to bit-position shifts of (7, 5, 4, 5, 6, 7). The resulting bit shifts (7, 5, 4, 
5, 6, 7) to the left are equivalent to bit shifts (1, 3, 4, 3, 2, 1) to the right. 
As shown in Figure 7.2, each rotation of KL gives a chance to consider bits with a 
different byte partition due to the shift of bit-positions with bytes. Assuming 8m+4 
adjacent bits of KL are unknown, up to 5m Hamming weights1 collected through 
power measurement during subkey generation can be used to validate candidates for 
1m Hamming weights from KL and up to 4m from 4 rotations of KL giving bit shifts of 7, 6, 
5, and 4. Because the left half of (KL <<< 60) is not present in subkeys, the number of collected 
Hamming weights is between 4m and 5m according to the location of the (8m+4)-bit chunk. 
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KL[0, ... ,7) 
Figure 7.2: An Example of Camellia Subkey Generation 
(gray bits: assumed (8m+4)-bit chunk where m=2) 
these key bits. In general, the value of m indicates a tradeoff between speed and 
effectiveness. A large m causes a long searching time, while a small m may not 
provide enough Hamming weight checks to significantly reduce the key space (e.g., 
5 checks on 12 bits when m= 1 vs. 10 checks on 20 bits when m=2). 
In order to increase the attacking speed, a dynamic pruning method is used in-
stead of exhaustive search over all 8m+4 bits. Firstly, the left-most 12-bit chunk 
of the 8m+4 bits under investigation is examined. It is expected that most 12-bit 
candidates cannot meet the 5 Hamming weights2 of bytes obtained by different byte 
partitions of KL during subkey generation. Since the required Hamming weights are 
known by an attacker, those invalid candidates are discarded. For each of the result-
ing candidates for these 12 bits, the next adjacent 8 bits in (8m + 4)-bit chunk are 
examined in terms of Hamming weights newly obtained by different byte partitions 
among the current candidate and these 8 unknown bits. If these hypothetical Ham-
ming weights match values obtained from power measurements, the corresponding 
2If any byte derived from rotating these 12 bits is located at the left half of (KL <<< 60), one 
Hamming weight is not available from measurement. 
132 
8 bit candidates are concatenated to the current 12-bit candidate to form a larger 
partial key candidate of 20 bits. In the same way, the next adjacent 8 bits keep being 
examined until the whole set of (8m+4)-bit partial key candidates are determined. 
In our attack, KL is divided into 4 overlapped parts KL[124rvl27,0rv3l], KL[28rv63], 
K£[60"'951, and K£[92"'1271 so that they can be processed quickly and independently. 
Each part produces a number of 36-bit candidates (i.e., m = 4). Any four candidates 
from these four parts can be joined into one KL guess when their overlapped bits 
are consistent. When this procedure is applied to Camellia's key schedule with 20 
randomly generated cipher keys, an average of about 238 candidates of the full KL 
pass this step. We could use an exhaustive search on these 238 candidates to find the 
key, but there is another way to uniquely determine the key as we shall see in the 
next section. 
7.2.4 Attack Against the Derivation of KA 
In this section, we examine the second step in the attack, which gains more key 
information from the steps involved in the derivation of key KA· Although the 
structure to derive KA has a very good avalanche effect as well as non-linearity, it 
can be easily broken using a Hamming weight attack. 
In the first round illustrated in Figure 7.1, each byte of KL's left half (denoted 
as T0 ), is XORed with constant E 1. The result is denoted as T2 • The following 
S-function is byte-wise substitution. These two steps are expressed as 
T2 - To EB Et 
T3 S(T2) . 
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If we still use KL[124..vl27,0"'31) and KL[28..v63) separately to prune partial key space as 
described in Section 7.2.3, two more Hamming weight checks for each hypotheti-
cal byte can be performed by comparing the Hamming weights in T2 and T3 with 
the corresponding values from measurement. Each output byte of the P-function 
(T4 = P(T3 )) depends on at least 5 input bytes. To continue the candidate pruning, 
we combine any two candidates of KL[I24..vl27,0"'31) and KL[28..v63) with consistent over-
lapped bit values to form 8 byte guesses of KL's left half KL[o,_,631, denoted as T~. The 
output of round function with input T~ is denoted as T~. If T~ = T0 , then T~ = T4 . 
Because the Hamming weight per byte in T4 is known, another 8 Hamming weight 
checks can be performed to examine each T~. In most cases, only 1 or 2 possible 
candidates of the left half of KL can pass this step. 
For each T~ remaining, the right half of KL (denoted as T1) is guessed. The 
second Feistel round in Figure 7.1 is expressed as 
T1 - S(T6) 
Ts - P(T1) . 
Similarly to the left half guess, K£[60,_,951 and K£[92,_,127] can be considered separately 
to prune the partial key space by using three more Hamming weight checks for each 
byte in n rv T7. Then, any two candidates of KL[64..v99) and KL[96..vl28,0..v3) with 
consistent overlapped bit values are combined to form a candidate of KL's right half 
K£[64,_,1271, denoted as T;. The output of the round function with input T~ E9 T~ is 
denoted as T~. If T~ =To and T; = T1 , then T~ = Ts. Thus, another 8 Hamming 
134 
weight checks can be performed to validate each T~ candidate. 
It is unlikely that a wrong guess T~ of KL's left half leads to a candidate T; that 
can pass all of the above Hamming weight checks. Even when such a case happens, 
similar Hamming weight checks can be continued with T9 to T17 so that the original 
key is identified uniquely. The attack could also stop at any point and a brute force 
search would be executed on remaining key candidates. 
We applied this attack to Camellia's 128-bit key schedule with 10,000 randomly 
generated sample keys. The experimental results listed in Table 7.1 show that 2 
rounds of Hamming weight checks in KA's derivation is enough for unique key iden-
tification in most cases. It takes less than 5 ms to compute the possible key candi-
date(s) using a Pill 933MHz computer with 512MB memory. 
Table 7.1: Experimental Attack Results with 104 Samples of 128-Bit Camellia Cipher 
Keys 
Scope of HW checks To"' T1 To"' Ts To"' Tg To"' T10 
in KA's derivation 
Percentage of cases 14.04% 97.49% 99.98% 100% 
with unique key identification 
Ave. # of spurious keys 5.3588 0.0264 0.0002 0 
7.2.5 Extension to 192-Bit and 256-Bit Key Schedules 
When the key size is 192 or 256 bits, KL is the first 128 key bits. The remainder 
of the key is denoted as KR, which is also rotated to generate subkeys. For 192-bit 
keys, KR's right 64 bits are padded with the complement of its left 64 bits. The 
input of KA's derivation is changed from KL to KL EB KR. Another derived key KB 
is obtained through two rounds of Camellia's encryption structure with KA EB KR as 
input. 
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Similar to the attack against the 128-bit key schedule but in the reverse direction, 
the attack begins with the last round of the Feistel structures used to derive K A 
and KB. Combined with Hamming weight checks during the rotations used in the 
generation of subkeys, a small number of KA and KB candidates are expected to 
pass the test. For each combination of remaining KA and KB candidates, a unique 
KR candidate can be determined so that only the 128-bit KL needs to be deduced 
using a method similar to what has been shown in the previous section. It is highly 
unlikely for wrong guesses of KA and KB to deduce KL and KR to pass Hamming 
weight checks. 
7.3 Two Variants of the Attack with Robustness 
to Measurement Errors 
A Hamming weight attack is normally fast and easy to implement when all required 
Hamming weights are measured accurately. However, in real circumstances, imper-
fect measurement cannot be always avoided. An attacker could attempt to mitigate 
the measurement noise using some statistical methods (e.g., averaging) in order to 
keep measurement accuracy at a satisfactory level. The attack described in the 
previous section is not error-tolerant. As a result, a spurious key or no key could 
be recognized as the correct key when measurement noise is high enough to cause 
errors in the determination of Hamming weights. Two modified attacks are thus 
given to tolerate errors. We first present a model which incorporates errors into the 
determination of Hamming weights. 
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7.3.1 Noisy Power Leakage Model 
Denote h[j] as the Hamming weight quantized from the power trace at time j in 
this model. Since J(-) in 7.3 is not always linear and averaging over power traces 
may not be feasible to eliminate the effect of noise, the error during quantization 
needs to be considered. A number of wrong captures of clock cycles may also occur. 
This could be caused by imperfect understanding of timing information about the 
implementation such that the Hamming weight processed by an unrelated instruction 
may be wrongly recognized. We assume that power measurement noise can result 
in a Hamming weight quantization error of ±1. Then, the real Hamming weight 
obtained from measurement equipment is modelled as 
{H[j] + 1,H[j]-1} 
h[j]= rand([O, ... 'HmaxD 
H[j] 
with prob = Pcx 
with prob = Pf3 
with prob = 1-Pa- Pf3 
(7.4) 
where Pcx is the probability that h[j] is wrongly quantized as its adjacent Hamming 
weight and Pf3 is the probability that the result is uniformly randomly taken due 
to wrong recognition of clock cycles. When Pa = Pf3 = 0, the leakage model is 
equivalent to the basic model in Section 7.2.1. 
It should be noted that the power consumption of some smart cards does not 
monotonically change with the Hamming weight of the data. For the two types 
of smart cards examined in [97], the power consumption regions of the data with 
adjacent Hamming weights are partly overlapping. The quantization errors due to 
these overlapped regions can be modelled using Pa =f:. 0 even though the required 
monotonic relation is not perfectly maintained. Thus, the cryptographic applications 
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on the smart card types examined in [97] are also susceptible to the attack variants 
described in this section. 
7.3.2 Attack Variant 1 Robust Against Small Noise 
The "small" noise mentioned here means that its effect is only able to cause an error 
no more than 1 on the measured Hamming weight. Such type of noise suits the 
power leakage model given by (7.4) where P!i = 0. To tolerate these small errors, 
the only modification in the attack is to change the method of Hamming weight 
checks. Instead of considering whether the two Hamming weights from a candidate 
byte partition and measurement (denoted by h' and h, respectively) are the same in 
order to determine the viability of the candidate, a candidate byte remains viable if 
ih' - hi :::; 1. 
Since the current Hamming weight comparison is looser than equality checking, a 
wrong key guess is more likely to pass the test. This attack variant costs more time 
and memory because a wrong key guess may need more checks to be eliminated. 
However, Camellia's KA derivation provides checks up to T17 and these can all be 
used to eliminate wrong keys. For a randomly generated key KL3 , the processing 
times used to perform the attack are listed in Table 7.2. During the listed time 
periods with different error rates Pa, Hamming weight checks are performed until 
only the correct key remains. Note that when Pa is high, the processing time is 
short. This is because when the small measurement errors occur more frequently, it 
is more likely for candidate Hamming weight h' passing the current Hamming weight 
comparison to be farther from the Hamming weight of the actual key, thus, more 
3The first randomly generated key is used as KL which is {D7, 13, E8, 80, 5F, FD, E3, 9E, lB, 
C6, CF, 4D, F4, C7, 66, EF} in hexadecimal. 
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likely for its associated key guess to fail in next Hamming weight comparison. 
Table 7.2: Processing Times of Attack Variant 1 on a Pill 933MHz Computer 
Error rate POl 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 
Processing time 13 mins 45 mins 7.2 hours 2.2 days ';:::j7 days ';:::j70 days 
As shown in Table 7.2 for P01 = 0, this attack variant has a processing time that 
is much longer than the original attack discussed in Section 7.2 which works with the 
assumption of no measurement errors. Thus, using this variant would not be good 
unless the effect of small noise is unavoidable (i.e., P01 =I 0). 
7.3.3 Attack Variant 2 Robust Against Wide Range of Noise 
Attack variant 1 overcomes the effects of small errors in Hamming weight measure-
ment whether frequently happening or not. However, in some systems a wide range 
of noise may occur due to wrong recognition of clock cycles associated with Ham-
ming weight measurements. When a clock cycle is wrongly recognized, h may be 
any integer among [0, Hmax] dependent on the data processed at that moment. The 
occurrence of this type of error is reflected in a nonzero value for P13 in (7.4). In this 
circumstance, attack variant 1 could lead to a correct byte failing a check and being 
eliminated and eventually to determination of an incorrect key. Attack variant 2, 
however, can be employed to attack the key schedule when a wide range of noise is 
unavoidable, i.e., P13 > 0. 
Instead of dynamically pruning key guesses through a local Hamming weight 
comparison, a weighted comparison scheme is applied. Each Hamming weight check 
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now returns a weight w which measures the difference between h' and h: 
w=W[Ih' -hi]. 
The entry value of array W[·] depends on the error distribution and drops to 0 as the 
index rises (e.g., in our experiment, W[O] = 5, W[l] = 2, W[2] = · · · = W[Hmax] = 0). 
Let Sw denote the sum of returned values from n Hamming weight comparisons for 
the bytes of a partial key candidate. When a candidate partial key is true, it is 
expected that 
n 
Sw = L W[lh:- hi I]~ (l-Pa-Pf3) · n · W[O] + Pa · n · W[l] (7.5) 
i=l 
when W[2] = · · · = W[Hmax] = 0. Thus, the probability of the following inequality 
being true is quite high: 
(7.6) 
when n is large enough and 0 ~ 7J ~ 1. A smaller 7J makes (7 .6) more likely to be true, 
but allows more spurious partial keys to pass the test. 
If all of the left half of K L is hypothesized to calculate Sw, the processing time 
for an exhaustive search in 264 candidates will be formidable. Therefore, we use a 
nested approach illustrated in Figure 7.3, which we label as EDST as indicated in 
the figure caption. The left half of KL is divided into 3 parts. The weight sum Sw 
is calculated for each candidate partial key. Given a specific 7], the candidates will 
be discarded if inequity in (7.6) cannot be satisfied. The remaining candidates are 
sorted according to Sw and only A candidates with high Sw will be stored to form 
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larger candidate partial keys. Within affordable computation, the attack prefers a 
small value of 1J and a large value of A so that the correct candidate will not be lost 
due to errors. 
'--y-----J L-y---J '--y-----J 
I EDST I I EDST I I EDST I 
'------- _______ /
v I EDST I occ:::=::=::::::: (Any right half guess assumes the left half is known) 
'--y-----J L-y---J '--y-----J 
I EDST I I EDST I I EDST I 
Figure 7.3: A Nested EDST Approach 
(E: Evaluate Sw for each candidate; D: Discard if not satisfying (7.6); 
S: Sort remaining candidates by Sw; T: Truncate and keep first .X candidates.) 
In the experiment to attack Camellia's key schedule with 20 randomly generated 
keys as samples, the EDST approach has been run for 2, 3, and 8 byte candidate 
partial keys with 1J = 0.5, 0.7, and 0.8, respectively. The percentages of small noise 
and wide ranging noise are both 10% (i.e., Pa = P13 = 0.1). When A= 256, 30% of 
keys can be uniquely identified in an average time of 74 hours; 45% of keys will be 
uniquely identified with more processing time when A= 512. 
7.4 General Susceptibility Evaluation 
The Hamming weight attack and its variants described in this chapter also work for 
the key schedule of some other ciphers. Two main measures are of interest for this 
attack: (1) the size of targeted partial key space (denoted by n) that the attack 
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Table 7.3: Susceptibility Evaluation for Several Block Ciphers 
II Ciphers II 101 I ~ I Comments II 
AES 24U 4.4 mainly exploit EB 
Camellia 28m+4 ~ 6.22 exploiting rotation only 
DES 2!!m+!! ~8 exploit rotation 
IDEA 21:Sm+t> ~ 6.5 exploit rotation 
SAFER++ 2!!m+!! ~ 24 exploit rotation and byte-wise addition 
SHACAL-0 2;1:.! 3.75 EB without rotation 
hypothesize 1 byte in each word 
SHACAL-1 264 ~ 3.5 EB with rotation 
hypothesize 2 bytes in each word 
begins with and (2) the average number of Hamming weight checks per byte in the 
targeted partial key space, denoted as ~· An attacker hopes to find a scenario to 
reduce the candidates in !l. A small !l implies a low workload for exhaustive search 
within !l. A high~ leads to a small number of valid candidates left after attacking. 
Assuming the operations in the key schedule to be independent of each other, the 
number of candidates left per byte is expected to be 256( 5~5~7 )e. This implies that 
when ~ > 3.41, it is possible to reduce the number of valid partial key candidates 
close to one. In a real attack, ~ has to be much larger than 3.41 because most 
operations are correlated (such as the fixed rotations of Camellia). For the attack in 
Section 7.2, l!ll = 236 , ~=6.22. 
Table 7.3 shows the susceptibility of DES, IDEA, SAFER++ [98], AES (deduced 
from [94]), SHACAL-0 and SHACAL-1 [99] toward similar attacks. The values of 
l!ll and~ listed in this table are based on our assessment of values that can lead to 
a real attack. It is possible that more efficient attacking scenarios exist with more 
desirable 101 and~· No evident vulnerability to the attack from the key schedules of 
MISTY1 [38], Khazad [31], SHACAL-2 [99], and RC6 [8] are observed. 
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For a general Hamming weight attack as described in Section 7.2.3, a low value 
of 101 is desirable in order to search partial keys promptly (ideally, m= 1 for ciphers 
listed in Table 7.3). In some cases, however, it is convenient to choose a larger !l to 
facilitate attacking based on the nature of the key schedule as in Section 7.2.4. 
7.5 Countermeasures 
Hamming weight attacks, like other simple power attacks, work well only on sus-
ceptible cryptographic devices. Most countermeasures require additional operations 
and diminish performance. From the viewpoint of a cipher designer, a key schedule 
is resistant to a Hamming weight attack in nature if a good avalanche effect exists 
from the cipher key to subkeys as well as from one subkey to another. As a result, a 
very large n (ideally the whole key space) has to be hypothesized to get a value of e 
high enough for key identification. From the viewpoint of a system designer, a 16- or 
32-bit smart card implementation is desirable because a larger word size decreases 
the number of possible Hamming weight checks and makes measurement harder and 
less accurate. Alternatively, a more resistant CMOS technology proposed in [100] 
can be used for smart cards if applicable. The power consumed by these types of 
circuits does not depend on the data being processed. 
To provide resistance to a cipher already designed on 8-bit smart cards, the 
following countermeasures can be selected during implementation: 
• Data masking. The approach of masking operations with random content is 
widely used to frustrate power analysis (e.g., in [101, 102, 103]). For example, 
Z = XE9Y can be implemented with Z = ((XE9R)E9Y)E9R. The random data 
R enlarges l!ll to 28 1!11. Although the number of Hamming weight checks rises 
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from 3 to 6 in the operation including masking, the Hamming weight checks 
per byte in the targeted partial key space only changes to (~ · log2 l!1l/8 + 
3)/(log2 l!1l/8 + 1). 
• Operation Randomization. Some operations in key schedules are commutative 
and distributive, e.g., (X EB Y) <<< 1 = (Y <<< 1) EB (X <<< 1). It is 
hard for attackers to recognize the proper clock cycles from power traces if the 
program switches these equivalent operations randomly or data-dependently 
(e.g., reverse order of EB and <<< when X is odd). Thus, the measurement 
Hamming weight h could be unrelated to candidate Hamming weight h' due to 
wrong clock cycle recognition, which makes Pf3 larger. However, it is noted in 
many references (e.g., [102] and [104]) that neither reordering the instruction 
sequence nor adding delay between instructions guarantees safety if the attacker 
can run the protocols many times. 
7.6 Summary 
Camellia has a key schedule with high agility. KA's derivation brings nonlinear 
properties into subkeys and gains more resistance to slide and related-key attacks. 
However, rotations used to generate subkeys provide enough information about KL 
to compromise the key if Hamming weight information is available from power mea-
surements. Further, the fact that KL is used as the input of KA's derivation struc-
ture provides attackers with enough information to launch a Hamming weight attack 
to uniquely identify the key. The Feistel structure of KA's derivation gives many 
chances to verify the hypothesis. The two attack variants in Section 7.3 exploited 
this redundancy to gain robustness in the presence of errors in the Hamming weight 
144 
measurements. Consequently, when Camellia is implemented in the device with 
Hamming weight leakage, it is very important for implementors to consider appro-
priate countermeasures as discussed in Section 7.5. Many other ciphers can be shown 
to be susceptible to similar attacks and we proposed two measures to evaluate the 
susceptibility of a block cipher to such attacks. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions 
8.1 Contributions 
This thesis analyzes the implementation, performance, and security of block ciphers. 
The main contributions of this research include the following: 
Design and Analysis of Cipher Components 
MDS mappings optimized for bit parallel hardware design are searched for in different 
finite fields (GF(22), GF(24), GF(28)). With different sizes and branch numbers, 
the resultant involution and non-involution MDS mappings provide many choices 
for a cipher designer to select. The decoder-switch-encoder model is proposed for 
invertible S-boxes and its hardware complexity is deduced after circuit simplification. 
The complexity evaluation is justified with synthesis realization targeted to 0.18 p,m 
and 0.35 f-Lm CMOS technologies. 
Two AES hardware designs are implemented in hardware with different tradeoff 
of area and delay. The shortest round delay is 3.04 ns, which can lead to a very 
high throughput of up to 4 Gbits/s. By comparing the two designs, the effectiveness 
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of using composite finite field mathematics to realize the AES S-box (as suggested 
in [75, 77]) is examined and comments are given based on the ASIC synthesis result. 
The direct design (Design I) is a fast realization for non-feedback usage of AES. The 
subfield design (Design II) gives a better result with regards to the tradeoff between 
area and delay. Both area and delay are better than for the design of Rudra et al. [75] 
using the same complexity evaluation method. 
Performance Characterization of Cipher Structures 
The research provides mechanisms to compare cipher structures in terms of hardware 
and software performance before time-consuming realizations. Since the security is 
integrated into the performance measures, such mechanisms facilitate good under-
standing of efficiency and security at an early stage of a block cipher's design. Hence, 
the connection between cipher design and implementation is enhanced significantly. 
The hardware complexity of cipher structures is evaluated on the basis of the 
complexity of components. Cipher security, in the form of resistance to differential 
and linear attacks, is used to normalize the performance in the analysis. By defining 
a set of metrics, the performance comparison is applied to cipher cases with different 
configurations of parameterized S-boxes and MDS mappings. Because the discussed 
structures are similar to many existing ciphers such as AES and Camellia, the anal-
ysis provides a meaningful mechanism for seeking efficient ciphers through a wide 
comparison of security, performance, and implementation methods. 
Similarly, the software performance is compared for the cipher cases that have 
been considered. The software complexity is evaluated using a table lookup imple-
mentation, which is general and used for many block ciphers as fast implementations. 
The accuracy of the complexity evaluation is confirmed by coding typical cipher cases 
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on a PHI PC and an Alpha machine. The alternative software implementation meth-
ods are also generally compared. 
Alternative Attacks on Block Ciphers 
Differential and linear cryptanalysis are the most fundamental methods used by block 
cipher designers for security evaluation. However, other attacks on block ciphers are 
also considered in this work. 
The XSL attack brings a new concept of security concern into cipher design. 
Although its complexity was conjectured with a very attractive outcome, an XSL 
attack has not been practically applied to break AES or any other published block 
cipher with even one round. Based on simulation results presented by its authors, 
the effectiveness of XSL attacks is considered. We proposed a method to check and 
ensure the immunity of a block cipher even if an XSL attack can be practiced. 
The vulnerability of Camellia's key schedule to simple power analysis is observed 
and an attack is implemented for the first time. Further, two attack variants are also 
developed with robustness in the presence of measurement errors. Countermeasures 
and a general susceptibility evaluation method are suggested for implementation. 
The discussion of the XSL attack in this thesis suggests new directions of S-box 
design and security evaluation. The Hamming weight attack is illustrated in detail so 
that the implementers can understand the possible threat and make efforts to avoid 
it. 
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8.2 Recommendations for Future Research 
According to the results and experience obtained in this work, the following future 
research can be suggested: 
• A model has been proposed to analyze hardware complexity of invertible S-
boxes. The dynamic programming method can be used to reduce the redun-
dancy of the decoder because the mapping table is invertible. It would be 
desirable to relate more cryptographic properties (e.g., nonlinearity, algebraic 
order, and resistance against attacks) to hardware complexity. 
• The performance metrics have been defined as the integration of complexity /ef-
ficiency and security. In Chapters 4 and 5, we use the maximum characteristic 
probabilities Pd and Pz to deduce the resistance of a block cipher against dif-
ferential and linear attacks, respectively. It is possible to use more advanced 
tools (such as in [41, 47, 105, 106]) for security evaluation. For example, in 
practice characteristics are combined to produce a differential used in a differ-
ential attack, where a differential probability can be higher than a characteristic 
probability. Similarly, a linear hull is used in a linear attack and the resultant 
workload can be expressed by the probability of the linear hull. However, new 
techniques are required to relate these advanced evaluation methods to the 
number of rounds for a cipher. 
• In Chapter 6, it has been observed through experiment that a randomly gen-
erated S-box is very likely to be immune to an XSL attack. However, its 
probability is hard to calculate due to the complicated structure of matrix A 
in (6.5). It would be attractive to develop a theoretical method to determine 
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this probability as has been done with the probability that a randomly gen-
erated 8-box gains high resistance to differential and linear attacks [107, 108]. 
A further step is to design an 8-box with optimal properties with respect to 
the immunity to X8L attacks and security to differential and linear attacks. A 
more significant and challenging task is to determine the veracity of the XSL 
attack. 
• A simple power analysis attack has been described in Chapter 7 which works 
well on Camelllia's smart-card solution if the processor leaks Hamming weight 
information. The simulated results show that the two variants are robust to 
measurement errors. An actual attack using data measured from a smart-card 
reader is required for further proof of the practicality of the attack. 
150 
References 
[1] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "FIPS 46-3 Data Encryption 
Standard (DES)," Available at csrc .nist .gov/publications/fips. 
[2] "IEEE standard specifications for public-key cryptography," in IEEE Standard 
Documents- 1363, 2000. 
[3] Electronic Frontier Foundation Press Release. Available at www. eff . org/ 
Privacy/Crypto_misc/DESCracker. 
[4] RSA's DES Challenge Ill. Available at www. rsasecurity. com/rsalabs/ 
challenges. 
[5] J. Daemen and V. Rijmen, "AES proposal: Rijndael," 1999. Available at 
csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/rijndael. 
[6] K. Aoki, T. Ichikawa, M. Kanda, M. Matsui, S. Moriai, J. Nakajima, and 
T. Tokita, "Camellia: a 128-bit block cipher suitable for multiple platforms-
design and analysis," in Proceedings of Selected Areas in Cryptography - SAC 
2000, vol. 2012 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 39-56, Springer-
Verlag, 2001. 
151 
[7] New European Schemes for Signatures Integrity and Encryption (NESSIE) 
website. Available at www. cosic. esat .kuleuven. ac. be/nessie. 
[8] R. L. Rivest, M. J. B. Robshaw, R. Sidney, and Y. L. Yin, "The RC6 block 
cipher," August 2002. Available at www. rsasecuri ty. com/rsalabs/rc6. 
[9] B. Schneier, Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in 
C {2nd Edition). John Wiley & Sons, 1995. 
[10] K. Aoki, T. Ichikawa, M. Kanda, M. Matsui, S. Moriai, J. Nakajima, and 
T. Tokita, "Camellia: A 128-bit block cipher suitable for multiple platforms 
(NESSIE submission)," 2000. Available at www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.ac. 
be/nessie. 
[11] N. Courtois and J. Pieprzyk, "Cryptanalysis of block ciphers with overdefined 
systems of equations," in Proceedings of Advances in Cryptology- ASIA CRYPT 
2002, vol. 2501 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 267-287, Springer-
Verlag, 2002. 
[12] D. R. Stinson, Cryptography Theory and Practice (2nd Edition). Chapman & 
Hall/CRC, 2002. 
[13] A. J. Menezes, P. C. van Oorschot, and S. A. Vanstone, The Handbook of 
Applied Cryptography. CRC Press, 1996. 
[14] W. Stallings, Cryptography and Network Security: Principles and Practice (2nd 
Edition). Prentice Hall, 1998. 
[15] R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. M. Adleman, "A method for obtaining digital 
152 
signatures and public-key cryptosystems," m CACM, vol. 21, pp. 120-126, 
1978. 
[16] RSA Laboratories' Frequently Asked Questions About Today's Cryptogra-
phy (Version 4.1). Available at http: I /www. rsasecurity. com/rsalabs/faq/ 
3-1-2. html. 
[17] W. Diffie and M. E. Hellman, "New directions in cryptography," in IEEE 
Transactions on Information Theory, vol. IT-22, pp. 644-654, November 1976. 
[18] A. J. Menezes, Elliptic Curve Public Key Cryptosystems. Kluwer, 1993. 
[19] C. E. Shannon, "Communication theory of secrecy systems," in Bell System 
Technical Journal, vol. 28, pp. 656-715, 1949. 
[20] H. M. Heys and S. E. Tavares, "Substitution-permutation networks resistant to 
differential and linear cryptanalysis," in Journal of Cryptology, vol. 9, pp. 1-19, 
1996. 
[21] V. Rijmen, J. Daemen, B. Preneel, A. Bosselaers, and E. D. Win, "The cipher 
SHARK," in Proceedings of Fast Software Encryption - FSE'96, vol. 1039 of 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 99-112, Springer-Verlag, 1997. 
[22] R. Lidl and H. Niederreiter, Finite Fields, Volume 20 of Encyclopaedia of 
Mathematics and its Applications. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 
1983. 
[23] J. Daemen, Cipher and Hash Function Design Strategies Based on Linear and 
Differential Cryptanalysis. PhD thesis, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 1995. 
153 
[24] F. MacWilliams and N. Sloane, The Theory of Error-Correcting Codes. Ams-
terdam: North-Holland, 1977. 
[25] C. M. Adams and S. E. Tavares, "The structured design of cryptographically 
good S-boxes," in Journal of Cryptology, vol. 3, pp. 27-41, 1990. 
[26] W. Meier and 0. Staffelbach, "Nonlinearity criteria for cryptographic func-
tions," in Proceedings of Advances in Cryptology- EUROCRYPT'89, vol. 434 
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 549-562, Springer-Verlag, 1990. 
[27] K. Nyberg, "Perfect nonlinear S-boxes," in Proceedings of Advances in Cryp-
tology - EUROCRYPT'91, vol. 547 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 
pp. 378-386, Springer-Verlag, 1991. 
[28] J. Daemen, R. Govaerts, and J. Vandewalle, "Correlation matrices," in Pro-
ceedings of Fast Software Encryption - FSE'94, vol. 1008 of Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science, pp. 275-285, Springer-Verlag, 1995. 
[29] A. Youssef, S. Mister, and S. Tavares, "On the design of linear transformations 
for substitution-permutation encryption networks," in Proceedings of Selected 
Areas in Cryptography- SAC'97, 1997. 
[30] P. Barreto and V. Rijmen, "The Anubis block cipher," in First Open NESSIE 
Workshop, Leuven, November 2000. Available at www. cosic. esat .kuleuven. 
ac. be/nessie. 
[31] P. Barreto and V. Rijmen, "The Khazad legacy-level block cipher," in First 
Open NESSIE Workshop, Leuven, November 2000. Available at www. cosic. 
esat.kuleuven.ac.be/nessie. 
154 
[32] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "FIPS 197 Advanced En-
cryption Standard (AES)," Available at csrc .nist .gov/publications/fips. 
[33] R. Anderson, E. Biham, and L. Knudsen, "Serpent: A proposal for the 
Advanced Encryption Standard." . Available at www. cl. cam. ac. uk;-r j a14/ 
serpent . html. 
[34] E. Biham, "A fast new DES implementation in software," in Proceedings of 
Fast Software Encryption - FSE'97, vol. 1267 of Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science, pp. 260-272, Springer-Verlag, 1997. 
[35] R. L. Rivest, "The RC5 encryption algorithm," in Proceedings of Fast Software 
Encryption- FSE'94, vol. 1008 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 86-
96, Springer-Verlag, 1995. 
[36] J. Daemen, L. Knudsen, and V. Rijmen, "The block cipher Square," in Pro-
ceedings of Fast Software Encryption - FSE'97, vol. 1267 of Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science, pp. 54-68, Springer-Verlag, 1997. 
[37] K. Ohkuma, H. Muratani, F. Sarro, and S. Kawamura, "The block cipher 
Hierocrypt," in Proceedings of Selected Areas in Cryptography - SAC 2000, 
vol. 2012 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 72-88, Springer-Verlag, 
2001. 
[38] M. Matsui, "New block encryption algorithm MISTY," in Proceedings of Fast 
Software Encryption- FSE'97, vol. 1267 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 
pp. 54-68, Springer-Verlag, 1997. 
155 
[39] E. Biham and A. Shamir, "Differential cryptanalysis of DES-like cryptosys-
tems," in Proceedings of Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '90, vol. 537 of 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 2-21, Springer-Verlag, 1991. 
[40] M. Matsui, "Linear cryptanalysis method for DES cipher," in Proceedings of 
Advances in Cryptology- EUROCRYPT'93, vol. 765 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pp. 386-397, Springer-Verlag, 1994. 
[41] X. Lai, J. L. Massey, and S. Murphy, "Markov ciphers and differential crypt-
analysis," in Proceedings of Advances in Cryptology- CRYPT0'91, vol. 547 of 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 17-38, Springer-Verlag, 1991. 
(42] H. M. Heys, "A tutorial on linear and differential cryptanalysis," in Cryptologia, 
vol. XXVI, pp. 189-221, 2002. 
[43] X. Lai, "Higher order derivatives and differential dryptanalysis," in Proceed-
ings of Symposium on Communication, Coding and Cryptography in honour of 
James L. Massey on the occasion of his 60-th birthday, Monte-Verita, Ascona, 
Switzerland, 1994. 
(44] L. R. Knudsen, "Thuncated and higher order differentials," in Proceedings of 
Fast Software Encryption - FSE'94, vol. 1008 of Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science, pp. 196-211, Springer-Verlag, 1995. 
[45] E. Biham, A. Biryukov, and A. Shamir, "Cryptanalysis of Skipjack reduced to 
31 rounds using impossible differentials," in Proceedings of Advances in Cryp-
tology - EUROCRYPT'99, vol. 1592 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 
pp. 12-23, Springer-Verlag, 1999. 
156 
[46] M. Kanda, "Practical security evaluation against differential and linear attacks 
for Feistel ciphers with SPN round function," in Proceedings of Selected Areas 
in Cryptography- SAC 2000, vol. 2012 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 
pp. 324-338, Springer-Verlag, 2001. 
[47] K. Nyberg, "Linear approximation of block ciphers," in Proceedings of Ad-
vances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT'94, vol. 950 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pp. 439-444, Springer-Verlag, 1995. 
[48] L. Keliher, H. Meijer, and S. Tavares, "New method for upper bounding the 
maximum average linear hull probability for SPNs," in Proceedings of Advances 
in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2001, vol. 2045 of Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science, pp. 420--436, Springer-Verlag, 2001. 
[49] B. S. Kaliski Jr. and M. Robshaw, "Linear cryptanalysis using multiple approx-
imations," in Proceedings of Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '94, vol. 839 
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 26-39, Springer-Verlag, 1994. 
[50] L. R. Knudsen and M. Robshaw, "Non-linear approximations in linear crypt-
analysis," in Proceedings of Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT'96, 
vol. 1070 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 224-236, Springer-Verlag, 
1996. 
[51] E. Biham, "On matsui's linear cryptanalysis," in Proceedings of Advances in 
Cryptology - EUROCRYPT'94, vol. 950 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 
pp. 398-412, Springer-Verlag, 1995. 
157 
[52] F. Chabaud and S. Vaudenay, "Links between differential and linear cryptanal-
ysis," in Proceedings of Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT'94, vol. 950 
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 356-365, Springer-Verlag, 1995. 
[53] M. Matsui, "On correlation between the order of S-boxes and the strength of 
DES," in Proceedings of Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT'94, vol. 950 
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 366-375, Springer-Verlag, 1995. 
[54] Toshiba Corporation, "Security evaluation: Hierocrypt-3." NESSIE Algorithm 
Submission, 2000. Available at www. cosic. esat. kuleuven. ac. be/nessie. 
[55] L. R. Knudsen and D. Wagner, "Integral cryptanalysis (extended abstract)," 
in Proceedings of Fast Software Encryption - FSE 2002, vol. 2365 of Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science, pp. 112-127, Springer-Verlag, 2002. 
[56] P. Kocher, J. Jaffe, and B. Jun, "Differential power analysis," in Proceedings of 
Advances in Cryptology- CRYPT0'99, vol. 1666 of Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science, pp. 388-397, Springer-Verlag, 1999. 
[57] T. Messerges, E. Dabbish, and R. Sloan, "Examining smart-card security under 
the threat of power analysis attacks," in IEEE Transactions on Computers, 
vol. 51, pp. 541-552, April 2002. 
[58] P. Kocher, "Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, 
and other systems," in Proceedings of Advances in Cryptology- CRYPT0'96, 
vol. 1109 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 104-113, Springer-Verlag, 
1996. 
[59] H. Handschuh and H. M. Heys, "A timing attack on RC5," in Proceedings 
158 
of Selected Areas in Cryptography - SAC'98, vol. 1556 of Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science, pp. 306-318, Springer-Verlag, 1999. 
[60] E. Biham and A. Shamir, "Differential fault analysis of secret key cryptosys-
tems," in Proceedings of Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '97, vol. 1294 of 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 513-525, Springer-Verlag, 1997. 
[61] E. Biham, "New types of cryptanalytic attacks using related keys," in Journal 
of Cryptology, vol. 7, pp. 229-246, 1994. 
[62] A. Biryukov and D. Wagner, "Slide attacks," in Proceedings of Fast Software 
Encryption- FSE'99, vol. 1636 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 245-
259, Springer-Verlag, 1999. 
[63] Helion Technology Technical Report, 2003. Available at www .heliontech. com. 
[64] B. Weeks, M. Bean, T. Rozylowicz, and C. Ficke, "Hardware performance 
simulations of round 2 Advanced Encryption Standard algorithms," in National 
Security Agency white paper, 2000. Available at www .nist .gov/aes. 
[65] T. Ichikawa, T. Kasuya, and M. Matsui, "Hardware evaluation of the aes fi-
nalists," in Proceedings of 3rd AES conference, pp. 279-285, 2000. 
[66] H. Kuo and I. Verbauwhede, "Architectural optimization for a 1.82gbits/sec 
VLSI implementation of the AES Rijndael algorithm," in Proceedings of Cryp-
tographic Hardware and Embedded Systems- CHES 2001, vol. 2162 of Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science, pp. 51-64, Springer-Verlag, 2001. 
159 
[67] A. J. Elbirt, W. Yip, B. Chetwynd, and C. Paar, "An FPGA implementa-
tion and performance evaluation of the AES block cipher candidate algorithm 
finalists," in Proceedings of 3rd AES conference, pp. 13-27, 2000. 
[68] K. Gaj and P. Chodowiec, "Comparison of the hardware performance of the 
AES candidates using reconfigurable hardware," in Proceedings of 3rd AES 
conference, pp. 40-56, 2000. 
[69] B. Preneel, B. V. Rompay, S. Ors, A. Biryukov, L. Granboulan, E. Dottax, 
M. Dichtl, M. Schafheutle, P. Serf, S. Pyka, E. Biham, E. Barkan, Dunkel-
man, J. Stolin, M. Ciet, J.-J. Quisquater, F. Sica, H.Raddum, and M. Parker, 
"Performance of optimized implementations of the NESSIE primitives," tech. 
rep., NESSIE, February 2003. Available at www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.ac. 
be/nessie. 
[70] J. Nechvatal, E. Barker, L. Bassham, W. Burr, M. Dworkin, J. Foti, and 
E. Roback, "Report on the development of the Advanced Encryption Stan-
dard (AES)," tech. rep., U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST), October 2000. Available at csrc .nist .gov/encryption/aes. 
[71] L. Xiao and H. M. Heys, "Hardware design and analysis of block cipher com-
ponents," in Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Information 
Security and Cryptology- ICISC 2002, vol. 2587 of Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science, pp. 164-181, Springer-Verlag, 2003. 
[72] E. Mastrovito, "VLSI design for multiplication over finite fields GF(2m)," 
in Proceedings of Applied Algebra, Algebraic Algorithms and Error-Correcting 
160 
Codes- AAECC-6, val. 357 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 297-309, 
Springer-Verlag, 1989. 
[73] C. Paar, Efficient VLSI Architectures for Bit-Parallel Computation in Galois 
Fields. PhD thesis, University of Essen, Germany, 1994. 
[74] Online Documentation on Synopsys Design Compiler, v2000.05 ed. 
[75] A. Rudra, P. Dubey, C. Jutla, V. Kumar, J. Rao, and P. Rohatgi, "Efficient Ri-
jndael encryption implementation with composite field arithmetic," in Proceed-
ings of Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems- CHES 2001, val. 2162 
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 171-184, Springer-Verlag, 2001. 
[76] A. Rudra. Personal Communication. 
[77] V. Rijmen, "Efficient implementation of the Rijndael S-box." Available at 
www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/-rijmen/rijndael. 
[78] L. Xiao and H. M. Heys, "Hardware performance characterization of block 
cipher structures," in Proceedings of Cryptographers' Track RSA Conference 
2003, val. 2612 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 176-192, Springer-
Verlag, 2003. 
[79] M. Kanda, Y. Takashima, T. Matsumoto, K. Aoki, and K. Ohta, "Strategy for 
constructing fast round functions with practical security against differential 
and linear cryptanalysis," in Proceedings of Selected Areas in Cryptography -
SAC'98, val. 1556 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 264-279, Springer-
Verlag, 1999. 
161 
[80) L. Xiao and H. M. Heys, "Software performance characterization of block cipher 
structures," 2003. Submitted to IEEE Transactions on Computers. 
[81) P. Barreto and V. Rijmen, "AES reference code in ANSI C." Available at 
www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/-rijmen/rijndael/. 
[82) A. Kipnis and A. Shamir, "Cryptanalysis of the HFE public key cryptosystem 
by relinearization," in Proceedings of Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '99, 
vol. 1666 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 19-30, Springer-Verlag, 
1999. 
[83) A. K. Lenstra and A. Shamir, "Analysis and optimization of the TWINKLE 
factoring device," in Proceedings of Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 
2000, vol. 1807 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 35-52, Springer-
Verlag, 2000. 
[84) S. Murphy and M. J. Robshaw, "Essential algebraic structure within the AES," 
in Proceedings of Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2002, vol. 2442 of Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science, pp. 1-16, Springer-Verlag, 2002. 
[85) N. Courtois, A. Klimov, J. Patarin, and A. Shamir, "Efficient algorithms for 
solving overdefined systems of multivariate polynomial equations," in Proceed-
ings of Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2000, vol. 1807 of Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science, pp. 392-407, Springer-Verlag, 2000. 
[86) E. R. Berlekamp, Algebraic Coding Theory, ch. Factoring Polynomials over 
Fnite Fields. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968. 
162 
[87] D. Coppersmith and S. Winograd, "Matrix multiplication via arithmetic pro-
gressions," in Journal of Symbolic Computation, vol. 9, pp. 251-280, 1990. 
[88] B. Schneier, "More on AES cryptanalysis." Crypto-Gram Newsletter, available 
at www. counterpane. com/crypto-gram-0210 .html, October 2002. 
[89] T. Moh, "On the Courtois-Pieprzyk's attack on Rijndael." Available at www. 
usdsi. com/aes .html, September 2002. 
[90] N. Courtois and J. Pieprzyk, "Cryptanalysis of block ciphers with overdefined 
systems of equations (preliminary version)," 2002. Available at eprint. iacr. 
org/2002/044. 
[91] K. Nyberg, "Differential uniform mappings for cryptography," in Proceedings 
of Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT'93, vol. 765 of Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science, pp. 55-64, Springer-Verlag, 1994. 
[92] T. S. Messerges, "Using second-order power analysis to attack DPA resistant 
software," in Proceedings of Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems 
- CHES 2000, vol. 1965 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 238-251, 
Springer-Verlag, 2000. 
[93] E. Biham and A. Shamir, "Power analysis of the key scheduling of the AES 
candidates," in Second Advanced Encryption Standard ( AES) Candidate Con-
ference, Rome, Italy, 1999. 
[94] S. Mangard, "A Simple Power-Analysis (SPA) attack on implementations of 
the AES key expansion," in Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on 
163 
Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC2002, vol. 2587 of Lecture Notes 
in Computer Science, pp. 343-358, Springer-Verlag, 2002. 
[95] E. Oswald and B. Preneel, "A theoretical evaluation of some NESSIE candi-
dates regarding their susceptibility towards power analysis attacks," Technical 
report, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Dept. ESAT, October 2002. 
[96] L. Xiao and H. M. Heys, "A simple power analysis attack against the key sched-
ule of the Camellia block cipher," 2003. Submitted to Information Processing 
Letters. 
[97] M.-L. Akkar, R. Bevan, P. Dischamp, and D. Moyart, "Power analysis, what 
is now possible ... ," in Proceedings of Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 
2000, vol. 1976 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 489-502, Springer-
Verlag, 2000. 
[98] NESSIE Archive, "SAFER++ submission," 2000. Available at www. cosic. 
esat.kuleuven.ac.be/nessie. 
[99] H. Handschuh and D. Naccache, "SHACAL," 2000. Available at www. cosic. 
esat.kuleuven.ac.be/nessie. 
[100] K. Tiri, M. Akmal, and I. Verbauwhede, "A dynamic and differential CMOS 
logic with signal independent power consumption to withstand differential 
power analysis on smart cards," in Proceedings of the 28th European Solid-
State Circuits Conference, Florence, Italy, September 2002. 
[101] L. Goubin and J. Patarin, "DES and differential power analysis," in Proceedings 
164 
of Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES'99, vol. 1717 of 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 158-172, Springer-Verlag, 1999. 
[102] S. Chari, C. Jutla, , J. R. Rao, and P. Rohatgi, "A cautionary note regarding 
evaluation of AES candidates on smart-cards," in Proceedings of the 2nd AES 
Candidate Conference, March 1999. 
[103] T. S. Messerges, "Securing the AES finalists against power analysis attacks," 
in Proceedings of Fast Software Encryption - FSE 2000, vol. 1978 of Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science, pp. 150-164, Springer-Verlag, 2000. 
[104] R. Anderson and M. Kuhn, "Tamper resistance- a cautionary note," in Pro-
ceedings of the 2nd USENIX Workshop Electronic Commerce, pp. 1-11, 1996. 
[105] K. Nyberg and L. R. Knudsen, "Provable security against differential crypt-
analysis," in Journal of Cryptology, vol. 8, pp. 27-37, 1995. 
[106] M. Matsui, "New structure of block ciphers with provable security against 
differential and linear cryptanalysis," in Proceedings of Fast Software Encryp-
tion - FSE'96, vol. 1039 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 205-218, 
Springer-Verlag, 1996. 
[107] L. O'Connor, "On the distribution of characteristics in bijective mappings," in 
Proceedings of Advances in Cryptology- EUROCRYPT'93, vol. 765 of Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science, pp. 36Q-370, Springer-Verlag, 1994. 
[108] L. O'Connor, "Properties of linear approximation tables," in Proceedings of 
Fast Software Encryption - FSE'94, vol. 1008 of Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science, pp. 131-136, Springer-Verlag, 1995. 
165 
Appendix A 
MDS Searching Results 
This appendix contains the search results for the most efficient MDS in hardware 
for specific parameters. The hardware complexities are measured by the Hamming 
weights of the product matrices associated with the MDS generation matrices. The 
maximum delay is determined from the row with the maximum Hamming weight. 
To simplify the expression of circulant, Hadamard, and Cauchy matrices, the 
following three functions are defined for the representation from tuples to square 
matrices { Ai,j }, 0 :::; i, j :::; k- 1: 
{ Ai,j} = cir( ao, · · · , ak-1) if Ai,j = a(i+i) mod k 
{ Ai,i} = had( ao, · · · , ak-1) if Ai,i = aiEM 
{Ai,j} = cauchy((ao, · · ·, ak-1), (f3o, · · ·, f3k-1)) if Ai,j = 1/(ai E9 {3i)· 
A normal matrix can be written as { {Ao,l, · · ·, Ao,k-d, · · ·, {Ak-1,1. · · ·, Ak-l,k-d }. 
By doing so, the MDS searching results can be straightforwardly presented in Ta-
bles A.1 and A.2. 
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Table A.1: Search Results of MDS Codes Optimized For Encryption 
MDS Galois w(Fe) Delay w(Fe-1) Delay Fe Example 
Field Fe Fcl (may not be unique) 
(4,2,3) GF(2~) 9 2 12 2 { {1,1 },{1,2}} 
(4,2,3) GF(24 ) 17 2 46 3 { {1,1 },{1,2}} 
(4,2,3) GF(21S) 35 3 182 4 { {1,1},{1,2}} 
(8,4,5) GF(24 ) 76 3 168 4 cir(1, 1, 4, 9) 
(8,4,5) GF(21S) 164 3 460 5 cir(1, 1, 2, 71) 
(16,8,9) GF(24 ) 464 4 600 5 had(1,9,13,6,2,12,10,8)T 
(16, 8, 9) GF(21l) 784 4 2256 6 cir(1,1,2,142,71,16,1, 70) 
t : equivalent to cauchy((O, 3, 5, 6, 8, 11, 13, 14), (1, 2, 4, 7, 9, 10, 12, 15)) 
Table A.2: Search Results of Involution MDS Codes 
MDS Galois w(Fe) Delay Fe Example 
Field (may not be unique) 
(4,2,3) GF(2:.~) 11 2 { {2,1},{2,2}} 
(4, 2, 3) GF(24 ) 21 2 {{4,1},{2,4}} 
(4, 2, 3) GF(21l) 48 3 { {142,1},{70,142}} 
(8, 4, 5) GF(24 ) 88 3 had(1, 4, 9, 13) 
(8, 4, 5) GF(21S) 200 4 had(1, 2, 140, 142) 
(16,8,9) GF(24 ) 544 5 had(2,4,8,5,12,3,10,15) 
(16,8,9) GF(21S) 928 5 had(1,2,142, 70, 71,4,143,6) 
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Appendix B 
Matrices Used for AES Design II 
The following five matrices are derived from the mathematical representation of the 
two linear transformations, LT1 and LT2, in the AES Design II of Section 3.3. A 
network of XOR gates can be generated easily with knowledge of these matrices. 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
:FT - :f'LOt= 
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
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1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
FL02 FL03= 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
FA ·Fi1 
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
-
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 
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consumption, a small resistor is usually inserted in series with the power or ground 
input of the device. Simple power analysis directly examines the relation between 
the measured power trace and cryptography operations. As a more sophisticated 
attack, differential power analysis uses the statistics over a long period of power 
consumption trace to distinguish the correct key guess. 
Two types of power leakage have been observed and analyzed in [57], which exist 
in smart cards due to different internal circuits. The Hamming weight information 
may be leaked when the majority of the current is used to discharge the equivalent 
capacitor associated with the data bus. The transition count information (i.e., Ham-
ming weight difference between the previous and current data values) may be leaked 
when the majority of the current is used to switch the gates driven by the data bus. 
In addition to power analysis attack, attacks based on timing information leakage 
were introduced in [58] to break Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and other asymmetric 
key cipher implementations. A timing attack exploits the fact that different inputs 
require slightly different amounts of processing time. Some block ciphers may also 
be liable to this attack if the data dependent operations are used without protection. 
For example, the data-dependent rotations of block cipher RC5 have been exploited 
for a timing attack in [59]. As another type of attack suggested in [60], differential 
fault analysis recovers the hidden secret key stored in a smart card by investigating 
the malfunction induced by the attacker. 
It should be noted that appropriate countermeasures can be selected to frustrate 
many potential implementation attacks. However, these countermeasures typically 
cause system performance to be lowered. 
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2.3.5 Other Attacks 
Although most security evaluations are focused on linear, differential, and sometimes 
integral cryptanalysis, other statistical attacks still need to be considered by a cipher 
designer. For example, both the related key attack [61] and the slide attack [62] 
exploit the regularity of a key schedule, and their complexities are independent of 
the number of rounds. 
2.4 Block Cipher Irnplementations 
When a cipher is implemented, the complexity is embodied by the area and delay 
measured in hardware and by the memory and clock cycles measured in software. 
One block cipher can be implemented using different approaches due to a variety 
of development platforms, technologies, and implementors' experience. This sec-
tion lists some published implementations of DES, AES, and Camellia as specific 
examples. 
2.4.1 Hardware Implementations 
In hardware, ciphers are normally implemented into two major VLSI devices: Field-
Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) and Application-Specific Integrated Circuits 
(A SICs). An FPGA is an integrated circuit chip consisting of a large two-dimensional 
array of small function units, which can be programmed. The circuits can be re-
configured within the array by changing the connection status between the units. 
Therefore, FPGAs are flexible and easy to develop. An FPGA implementation is 
considerably faster than software implementations and its product cost is low for 
small volume manufacture. An ASIC is a full- or semi-custom chip and cannot be 
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